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ABSTRACT
COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN TURKEY 
"OFFICE-SEEKING OR POLICY PURSUING?"
A STRUCTURAL APPROACH 
TUNA BAÇKÔY
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
SUPERVISOR: PROF. DR. ERGUN ÖZBUDUN 
SEPTEMBER, 1996
This study examines Turkish coalition government experiences to find 
answer to the question of whether they were office-seeking coalitions or policy- 
oriented ones. Accordingly, the theoretical framework is proposed to investigate 
all aspects of the coalitions during the fonnation and maintenance stages. 
Situational, compatibility, and motivational variables are taken into account as the 
factors that influence the composition of the coalitions, their duration and 
success. Four European country experiences are elaborated briefly so as to show 
significance of the party system for coalition building and coalition success. After 
the application of these three variables to the Turkish coalition experiences 
distribution of seats among the coalition partners and common problems that they 
faced are also elucidated with reference to the composition of coalitions.
ÖZET
COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN TURKEY 
"OFFICE-SEEKING OR POLICY PURSUING?"
A STRUCTURAL APPROACH 
TUNA BA$K0Y
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
SUPERVISOR; PROF. DR. ERGUN ÖZBUDUN 
SEPTEMBER, 1996
Bu tez Türkiye'deki koalisyon hükümetlerinin devlet kaynaklarını kontrol 
etme yada politika üretmek amaçlı hükümet mi oldukları sorusuna cevap vermek 
için bütün koalisyon deneyimlerini kapsar. Buna paralel olarak teorik çerçeve 
koalisyon hükümetlerinin bütün yönlerini inceleme amacını gütmektedir. 
Durumsal, uygunluk, ve motivasyonal değişkenler koalisyonların içeriğini, 
sürekliliğini, ve başarısını etkileyen faktörler olarak düşünüldü. Parti sisteminin 
koalisyonlarin inşasi ve başarısı üzerindeki etkilerini göstennek amacıyla dört 
Avrupa ülkesinin koalisyon deneyimleri özetlendi. Yukarida belirtilen üç değişken 
Türkiye'ye  ^ uygulandıktan sonra bakanlıkların dağılımı ve koalisyon
hükümetlerinin karşılaştığı ortak problemler koalisyonların içeriği referans 
alınarak incelendi.
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INTRODUCTION
in multiparty democracies political parties compete with each other to attract 
more constituencies on the basis o f their 'proposed program o f action explicitly intended 
to bring about a particular states o f the world which can be thought o f policies'. * The type 
o f election system employed in every country affects the distribution o f seats in 
proportion to votes each party received. There are two types o f widely used election 
systems; simple majority and proportional representation system, and among these two, 
the proportional representation which includes the list system with d'Hondt calculation 
method is the most widely used one.^
A political party which won the absolute majority o f the parliamentary seats 
obtains right to form government. If there is such a party either at least two or more 
parties come together and form a coalition government or some o f them may give outside 
support to a minority government led by a political party or parties. The aim o f this 
thesis is to analyze Turkish coalition government experiences in the light o f coalition 
theories to find out whether Turkish coalition experiences fit into the office-seeking or 
policy-pursuing categories with possible reasons.
Coalition governments are seen as not beneficial because o f the fact that political 
parties have no capability to fully implement their party programs in order to carry out 
their policy objectives individually. In this sense, Blondel and Muller-Rommel point out 
two dimensions o f coalition governments as a positive and a negative one.^ On the one
'a . Laver and W. B. Hunt, Policy and Paiiy Competitions {London'. Routledge, 1992), p. 3. 
-According to Lijphart, fourteen out of twenty-two democratic countries use the proportional 
representation method with the list system. A. Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns o f  Majoritarian and 
Consensus Government in Twenty-one Coimtries {^t'w Haven: Yale University Press), pp. 150-168. 
.^1. Blondel and F. Muller-Rommel, eds.. Cabinets in ITeston £ ’iz/o>ue(Houndmills; McMillan, 1988), 
.pp. 9-12.
hand, each coalition partner may restraint the arbitrary use o f political power by other 
coalition party(ies), on the other hand, the probability o f conflict among coalition 
partners decrease the policy flexibility o f the government, starting during the bargaining 
stage.
1. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES 
Political parties are the only actors in parliamentary democracies that ensure 
continuation o f the system as a whole. For this reason it is essential to elaborate the 
nature o f a political party very briefly. Macridis defines a political party as 
an association that activates and mobilizes the people, represents interests, 
provides for compromise among competing points of view, and becomes 
ground for political leadership.“*
It is an essential instrument for gaining political power and governing the country. 
Political parties integrate various groups through participation, socialization, and 
mobilization processes. By doing this they also converge various demands and interests 
of different groups into policy and decisions. That process, in general, is called interest 
articulation and aggregation. In this way they steer the government machine to 
implement their particular articulated and aggregated policies which were demanded by 
their constituencies.
Political parties may be integrative or competitive in their approach to social 
matters.^ Integrative parties are seen especially in one or two party systems for each 
party claims to represent the interests o f the whole nation. Contrary to this, a competitive 
party seeks the support o f a particular section o f the society and tries to get as much 
possible support as it can by developing the best policies to the demands and interests o f
“*R. C. Macridis, 'Introduction', in R. C. Macridis, eds.. Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas 
(New York: Harper&Row, 1967), p.9.
5lbid., p.23.
that specific group. Parallel to this idea Epstein uses the concept o f 'programmatic party', 
he claims that minor parties are more programmatic than their larger counterparts.^ 
Social cleavages shape and reshape the party systems in time. These cleavages can be 
economic, regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and rural-urban one. In this 
understanding, it can be asserted that party systems are the result o f existing cleavages in 
a particular country.'^
Interests and demands o f social groups may change in time. A party with such a 
constituency must adopt new policies and leave the old attachments. Nevertheless, parties 
have an image that stems from their past policies and actions. They have sometimes 
difficulties in dealing with such situations. Because, on the one hand, each party tries to 
assure its internal policy consistency, on the other hand, if it aims to gain the support o f  
it has to answer the changing demands o f its social base so as to win more votes. 
Macridis adds
thus parties are intermediate institutions- between the unity of government and 
diversity of the electorate, between the radical minorities of the electorate and 
the general assumptions, between the acquisition of power and the code of past 
policies, between the policies of the electorate has supported and the policies 
necessary for changed conditions.^
That kind o f an understanding implies the existence o f two-way traffic between 
the ruler and the ruled and that is the core idea of the parliamentary democracy if it is 
considered as a pyramid built from below and political parties are the only actors that
D. Epstein, Political Parties in Westein Democracies Jersey; Transaction Inc., 1993, second 
edition), p.264.
^S. M. Lipset, 'Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups', in R. C. Macridis, eds.. Political 
Parties, p.43. He also corroborates Duverger claim's of the inseparable relation between the electoral 
system and party system.
^Ibid., p.22.
bridge the gap between the citizens and the state.They turn the demands and interests o f 
citizens into government policies.^
This is the ideal type o f a political party in Weberian sense and its definition in 
Western European democracies. The situation is somewhat different in transitional and 
developing societies which recently adopted multiparty democratic system. Because o f  
rapid social change and population increase, political parties are not able to fulfill new 
demands o f various social groups in a competitive party system, having a short history. 
Since the middle classes, which constitute the largest section o f the society in Western 
democracies, are absent in developing countries, political conflict concentrates at the 
extremes o f the political Left-Right spectrum. Competition among political parties is 
seen as a 'zero-sum game' which means that the winning party both gains control o f the 
system and seeks to transform it inalterably into its own image'.'“ The party which 
controls the system uses the state resources to increase its strength among the masses and 
'almost inevitable that the party will become above all a channel for patronage and 
purchase o f political support'." The reason for this is that political parties have no 
institutionalized structure. Party officials and parliamentary deputies work as if patrons. 
Their first aim is to concentrate on short-term benefits rather than long-run policy 
objectives that pave way to the emergence o f political clientelism. It alludes a particular 
kind o f relationship between the two actors that is based on direct exchange o f goods. 
By using scarce resources the patron develops unequal, one-sided relationship that 
implies inequality o f the status and the client is subordinated to the patron's will. 
Otherwise there is no way to access the services provided by the patron.
“S. Neuman, 'Toward a Study of Political Parties', in A. J. Milnor, eds.. Comparative Political Parties 
(New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Company, 1971). p, 29.
"'M. Palmer, Dilemmas o f  Political Development: An Introduction to the Policies o f  Developing Areas 
(Illinois; E. E. Peacock Publishers, 1989), p.204.
' 'P. Cammack, D. Pool and W. Tardoff, Third World Politics: A Comparative Introduction (hondow. 
Mc.Millan, 1989), p. 113.
'-.I. Chub, Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy {Camhiidge: Cambridge University Press,
1982), especially first part of the book.
In developing countries, it is very difficult for any political party to gain majority 
o f parliamentary seats due to the frequent change in composition o f constituencies o f 
political parties which stems from heterogeneous and transitional structure o f the 
society. Consequently coalition governments become inevitable. There must be 
compromise and reconciliation among the political parties as precondition for the 
formation and the survival o f the cabinet coalitions. In the absence o f these conditions 
under the firm and decisive leadership that is able to meet the severe problems the 
developing countries face. Palmer describes the situation as follows:
.......tlie longevity of coalition regimes tends to be perilously short, coalition
governments often last less than a year, and alignments with the coalition shift 
even more frequently. Thus, hard but unpopular policies requiring more 
sacrifice for the sake of economic and political development initiated by one 
coalition are often softened or reversed by the next political parties.*^
in the light o f this succinct introduction as parallel to the aim o f the thesis the first 
chapter covers the review o f coalition theories and theoretical framework, the second 
chapter, the experiences o f the four European countries. While the third chapter 
concentrates on Turkish coalition governments that subsume all experiences to 
substantiate whether they were office-seekers or policy-pursuers coalitions the conclusion 
evaluates the overall findings.
1 3 M. Palmer, Dilemmas o f  political Development, p.208.
CHAPTER I
CABINET COALITIONS
Political parties are the sole actors that are competing with each other to acquire 
as many seats as possible so as to form the cabinet and hence to control instrumentalities 
o f the government individually. Qualitative and quantitative characteristics o f the party 
system become significant during the coalition formation stage. There are different 
classifications o f party systems but as relevant to the topic o f this thesis it is enough to 
mention here three names like Blondel, Sartori, and Laver and Schoffield. Blondel makes 
distinction, on one hand, between two party systems and two-and-a-half party systems, 
on the other hand, between the multiparty systems with a dominant party and without a 
dominant party. Sartori distinguishes four categories: two party systems; multiparty 
systems with moderate pluralism whose prominent traits are limited fragmentation and 
moderate centripetal competition; multiparty systems with polarized pluralism that are 
characterized by the existence o f high number o f parties with centrifugal tendencies due 
to the ideological polarization; and finally predominant party systems.^
Laver and Schofield identify three types o f party system with reference to the 
number o f political parties, their size, and their relative position on the ideological
'G. Sartori, 'European Political Parties; The Case of Polarized Pluralism', in .T. LaPalombara and M. 
Weiner, eds., Political Paiiies and Political Development {Punation: Princeton University Press, 1966), 
and P. Mail', ' Political Parties and the Stabilization of Party Systems', in P. Mair, eds.. West European 
Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pl7-19. Wheras Duverger makes distinction 
between two aprty systems and multiparty systems Almond, by emphasizing qualitative aspects the 
multiparty systems, draws a line between 'working' multiparty systems and 'non-working' or 'immobilist' 
multiparty systems. In addition to these Rokkan distinguishes between even multiparty systems with three 
or more parties having approximately equal size and a dominant party with three or more small parties 
and two big parties with one small party.
spectrum.“ These are bipolar party systems; unipolar party systems; and multipolar party 
systems. According to them, the first one includes two big parties and a smaller party 
which holds the power, and depending on its decision government swings from one pole 
to another like the German and Austrian party systems. The second one comprises a large 
party and several smaller ones as seen in Luxembourg, Ireland, Iceland, Norway(1945- 
1971) and Sweden.^ But the third system consists o f parties with different numbers and 
effective size. Coalition bargaining becomes complex and difficult. The Netherlands, 
Belgium, Finland, Italy take place within the third category.'*
1.1. REVIEW OF COALITION THEORIES 
It is possible to make distinction between two groups o f scholars according to the 
criterion they put into the heart o f their theories. Riker, Gamson, Leiserson and Axelrod 
can be put into the first category, De Swaan, Budge and Keman, Laver and Schofield 
into the second one. Whereas the former perceive the coalition parties' gains in terms of 
government portfolios as the only factor that determines a party's decision whether to 
include in a specific coalition or not, the latter sees party policy as the only motive during 
the coalition bargaining.
The idea that underlies the core o f 'office-seeking' coalition theories is stemming 
from the game theory. The theory assumes the existence o f a rational actor who 'is the 
one that acts so as to maximize his utility function'.^ Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
contributed to the theories o f coalition by developing their game theory that necessitates 
the existence o f at least two rational actors as described above, some conditions such as 
zero-sum gains, and easy access to the information about other actors. In other words.
“M. Laver and N. Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics o f  Coaiition in Europe (Oxio\&. 
Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 114.
■*lbid., p. 114.
‘‘Ibid., 116.
^A. De Swaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations Fransisco and Washington: Jossey-Bass 
Inc. , 1973), p.20.
since the aim o f all participants is alike, every possible act and fixed gains must be 
known by all participants in a way that participants can develop strategies to maximize 
their gains and hence to reduce the cost.*5 The theory is an n-person constant-sum games 
which means that rational actors do not want to share the fixed prizes with an 
unnecessary actor or actors after assuring that their coalition is winning. In other words, 
actors try to form winning coalitions which do not contain unnecessary members. This 
type o f coalition is a 'minimal-winning' one because it does not contain such members, 
the subtraction o f a single actor means that the coalition can no longer assure its winning 
status.
For further clarification o f this theory o f minimal-winning coalition Riker and 
Gamson inserted the 'size' principle into the theory and the former argued that 
in n-person, zero-sum games, where side-payments are permitted, where 
players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum 
winning coalitions occur.^
The size, here, ascribes the weight o f the parties or their deputy number. Simply he 
argues that parties prefer to enter into a coalition with a party or parties that have 
necessary number o f seats in order to win the confidence vote and no more. He also 
provides an explanation for the formation o f surplus majority coalitions with the help o f 
his concept, 'information effect'. He stated that depending on the number o f parties
..the greater the degree of imperfection or incompleteness of information, the 
larger will be the coalitions that coalition makers seek to foim and the more 
frequently will winning coalitions actually formed be greater than minimum
size.'
’^W. H. Riker, The Tlieoiy o f  Political Coalitions Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962, 
secón edition), pp. 14-15.
^Ibid., p. 32.
^W. H. Riker, The Theoiy o f  Political Coalitions, pp.88-89.
According to Gamson, parties share the coalition payoffs proportional to the 
resources, i.e., number o f deputies they contributed to the coalition.^ However, in some 
situations number o f the political parties with unequal weight may be higher which 
implies that coalitions to be formed have to include more actors. Leiserson provides an 
explanation for these situations by advancing his theory o f 'bargaining proposition'. He 
claims that
winning coalitions with the fewest members form,....since negotiations and 
bargaining are easier to complete, and a coalition is easier to hold together, 
other things being equal, with fewer parties.*®
There appears a problem about how parties choose their possible coalition 
partners if  there are several parties with the equal weight. Leiserson gives an answer to 
this question by introducing the concept, 'ideology'. In such situations actors try to form 
coalitions with a party or parties, having the most similar ideologies.'* For further 
specification Axelrod proposed a closely related theory that predicts 'minimal connected 
winning coalitions'. The term 'connected' is used for coalitions that consist o f parties 
which are adjacent on the policy scale.*^ Coalitions that are made up o f adjacent parties 
are called 'closed coalitions'. Again, here, size is the determining factor.
Up to now either the number o f political parties or their size and sometimes both 
o f them determine the composition o f coalitions, however party ideology remained as an 
auxiliary variable. As an overall evaluation it can be claimed in the light o f these theories 
that political parties form coalitions to procure payoffs rather than to achieve party 
polices. Such theories could not provide explanations for grand coalitions, or minority 
governments.
®A.De Swaan, Coalition Theories, p.63.
'®.M. Leiserson, 'Coalition Government in Japan', in S. Groennings, E. W. Kelley,and M. Leiserson, eds., 
Tiie Study o f  Coaiition Behavior York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), p.90.
' ' M. Leiserson, 'Power and Ideology in Coalition Behavior: An Experimental Study', in S. Groennings et 
all., eds.. The Study o f  Coaiition Behavior, p.
*“A. De Swaan, Coaiition Theories, p.75.
In order to surmount this deficiency and to provide an explanation for the 
formation o f grand coalitions or minority governments De Swaan advanced his 'policy 
distance' theory. He claims that
an actor strives to bring about and be included in a winning coalition with an
expected policy that is as close as possible to his own most preferred policy.'^
With this radical shift, quantitative restrictions disappeared provided that fifty 
plus one per cent o f the parliamentary seats are secured by the partners. However, party 
policy became the determining factor for the composition o f the cabinets. Its further 
implication is that political parties' perception o f the government ministries also changed 
They were started to be seen as means for implementation o f party policies.
In real life settings the situation is somewhat different and more complex than 
those theories imply. For this reason it is essential to build a theoretical tool that enables 
one to understand all influencing factors during the formation as well as the maintenance 
stage. By doing this the factors that lead to the disintegration o f coalitions can be 
discerned without missing any relevant aspect.
1. 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
As the sole actors political parties can only bargain each other to set cabinet 
coalitions. Coalition government may be defined as a group o f political parties that come 
together by pooling their resources to act common policy objectives stated in their 
coalition protocol through exercising control over the shared government apparatus o f  
the state’‘* This definition implies the existence o f two stages: coalition formation and its 
maintenance. Questions to be asked here may be: why a particular coalition is formed
'ftbid., p.98.
'‘*E. C. Browne, Coalition Theories: A Logical and Empirical Critique (California: Sage Publications, 
1973), p.l4.
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rather than other possible other alternatives? and which factors do influence coalition 
maintenance?.
It seems appropriate to define some frequently used concepts in coalition theories 
before elaborating the theoretical framework. These concepts are as follow: 'core', 'center 
party, 'pivotal party', and captive party'.
The notion 'core' refers to a position or a space that lies at the center o f  the policy 
space, a center party is a party that occupies the area or the center along the Left-Right 
continuum. It is more humanitarian in social and economic matters, more tolerant than 
the Left in matters o f religion simultaneously, though it is less tolerant to co-operation 
with the socialist and communist p a r t ie s .I t s  constituency is made up o f petite 
bourgeoisie and small shopkeepers in addition to the industrial working classes and big 
industrialists.*^ Factions with different policy orientation provide policy flexibility 
through alternation o f control o f a particular faction to the overall party machine for 
some time like Italian Christian Democratic Party(DC), or Belgian Christian-Social 
Party(CVP/PSC). The center party is 'ready to cooperate with all responsible forces and 
at times pleading for a 'broadly based government' or even a 'national coalition' 
According to De Swaan, the core policy position always exists and it is an area where the 
stable solution for coalition formation lies. As parallel to this idea Sartori suggests that 'a 
center opinion, or a center tendency always exists in politics; what may not exist a center 
party'. For stable coalitions the center party which occupies the core policy position is 
necessary. In the absence o f this type o f a party or parties, or if the core is empty, other *
* ,^D. Pickles, Government and Policy o f  Fiance (London: Methuen, 1972, vol.l), p. 169 
*^’W, Safran, The French Polity York: Longman, 1985, second edition).
*^ A. De Swaan, Coalition Theories, p. 109.
***G. Sartori, 'European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism', in J. LaPalombara and M. 
Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development {Pfmceton'. Princxeton University Press, 1966), 
p.l56.
'*^Laver and Schofield claim that in multidimensional policy space, in contrast to unidimensional space, 
only the largest party may occupy the core policy position. Small parties have no such chance. M. Laver 
and N. Schofield, Multiparty Government, p.l34.
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parties with different policy objectives gain strategie importance and the process o f  
coalition formation becomes complex and hence the formed coalition, as a result, may be 
fluctuating, unstable and short-lived due to the lack o f stable membership. Budge and 
Keman briefly describe the repercussions o f the absence o f the center party at the 
governmental level as such that
government policy fluctuating with changes of coalition; acrimonious disputes 
within the coalition and a possibility of total immobility to agree on any stable 
policy. There is a further implication from the point of view of normative 
democratic theoiy that policy solutions will be arbitraiy, products of chance 
conjunctions of circumstances, rather than cohering around an equilibrium 
point produced by the electoral and legislative success of the parties.-·^
A 'pivotal party' is a party in a minimal winning coalition that ceases to be 
winning if  that party withdraws form the coalition.-* In other words, it is a key party for 
the coalition. On the other hand, a 'captive party' is an extremist party that can be 
excluded from the government and hence has no capability to propose coalition options, 
rather it is heavily dependent on the decision o f other parties. A captive party has desire 
to participate in the cabinet coalitions. The initiator party plays the card o f inclusion o f it 
against the pivotal party in order to reduce the latter's bargaining power. In addition to 
this, moderate parties may follow accommodative strategies to alleviate the negative 
public opinion by including it into the coalition. However the latter insists on minimal 
winning coalitions because they have no chance to play o ff one actor against another so 
as to turn power balances for its advantage within the coalition.22
Budge and H. Kemaii, Parties and Democracy: Coalition Forma tion and Goveinment Functioning in 
Twenty States {Oxford'. Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 22.
H. Riker, The Theory o f  Political Coalitions, p. 125.
--S. Groennings, 'Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and 
Maintenance', in S. Groennins et all., eds. The Study o f  Coalition Behavior, p. 451.
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Political parties may perceive office or policy in different manners. By using 
these two criteria Laver and Schofield distinguish four types o f parties. Political parties 
may see office as an end in itself or as a means to achieve policy objectives. They may 
also develop policies as a means to gain office or for their own sake.-^
To answer the two questions that have been mentioned earlier-why the 
particular coalitions are formed rather than other possible alternatives? and how are 
coalitions maintained after the formation?, the coalition formation and maintenance 
stages should be treated separately for achieving a better understanding.
According to Groennings the time period in which coalition formation process is 
activated, causal relations between actors and the relative importance o f the coalition to 
the actors determine the composition o f coalitions.-“* Parallel to these three factors 
situational, compatibility and motivational variables influence each party's willingness to 
participate or not in a particular coalition.
1. 2. 1. SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
Situational variables include economic, political, and social characteristics o f the 
time period in which a particular coalition is formed. Number o f political parties, the 
location o f political parties on the policy scale i.e., whether they are center, pivotal or 
captive parties, are also included within the situational variables. Keman and Budge 
propose three general assumptions that are related to the location o f parties during the 
bargaining stage. These are:
1. When no party secures the parliamentary majority, parties that can win the 
confidence vote create a cabinet coalition so as to implement their most preferred 
policies;
-^M. Laver and N. Schofield, Multiparty Government, p. 38-39. 
-“*S. Groennings, 'Notes Toward Theories', p. 450.
2.a. In democratic systems, since the ultimate aim o f political parties is to secure 
the democratic life they do not accept to enter into a coalition with anti-system parties;
2.b. If there is no anti-systemic threat, parties try to form a coalition by 
considering the line o f socialist-bourgeois division;
2.C. If there is no such division each party follows its own interests;
Political parties usually have several factions. While they unite during the 
emergency situations like during the election and coalition bargaining times, and if  there 
is an outside threat to the integrity o f the party they try to control the party and if  the 
party is a governing one they try to transform their policy preferences into government 
policies.
Situational variables also deal with cultural values and norms about the political 
issues that influence the degree o f willingness o f the parties to negotiate. Therefore 
public opinion as an external pressure over their decisions plays a significant role in 
Western democratic societies. Pragmatic party constituencies encourage the politics o f 
compromise. But they may be suspicious o f some coalition partners. Groennings argue 
that parties may represent positive and negative attitudes during the formation stage.-^ In 
contrast to the former that consist o f behaviors like rationality, willingness to experiment, 
senses o f thrust, tolerance, and pragmatism, the latter concentrate on senses o f suspicion, 
parochialism, superiority, and self-righteousness, craving for contradiction, and an 
outlook that compromise is a sign o f weakness. However, when the situation became 
enduring parties feel a great pressure to coalesce with the party or parties in contrast to 
the normal times. '^^
-^I. Budge and H. Keman, Parties and Democracy, p. 34. 
-^ ’S. Groennings, 'Notes Toward Theories', p. 453. 
-’ Ibid., 454.
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1. 2. 2. COMPATIBILITY VARIABLES 
These variables represent particular features o f parties that support or discourage 
partnership among parties. The related proposition is that high degree o f similarity 
among the compatibility variables o f different parties increases chance o f the creation o f  
a coalition. Party ideology, or similar goals, their social bases, party structure, leadership, 
and prior party relations can be counted within this category.
Those actors with similar ideology or common policy goals are more likely to 
form a coalition if  such things have priority for them. Another factor related to 
compatibility is the party structure because there is a positive relationship between the 
degree o f centralization and party elites' decision to coalesce with other parties, 
especially with the unwanted one, and to continue the partnership if they are in the same 
coalition. The existence o f factions means organized dissensus within the party and weak 
institutionalization makes the situation difficult for party elites' to decide whether or not 
to enter into a coalition with a particular party.
Leadership variable deals with the similarities between the party leaders, their 
response to the pressure coming from party supporters and their constituencies.-*^
Prior party relations play decisive role over decisions o f the actors during the 
coalition bargaining stage as such that traditional animosities and historical experiences 
reduce the chance o f making a coalition. Prior coalition success or failure either increases 
or decreases the available number o f parties and hence coalition options.-*^
-**lbid„ 454. 
“‘-^ Ibid., p. 455.
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1. 2. 3 MOTIVATIONAL VARIABLES
Motivational variables deeply affect a party's decision to or not to enter into a 
coalition during the bargaining stage. All parties have constituencies and they promise 
their supporters to implement particular policies before elections. Voters measure their 
success by looking at the criterion like to what degree they fulfill their promises once 
they are in power. Voters decide whether to punish or reward in the subsequent elections 
by looking at their policy performance.
In general there are two motives that parties have to take into consideration: the 
desire to gain rewards and desire to assure a party's survival or avoidance o f  party 
identity loss. Rewards may be 'positions, policies, and depriving one's worst enemy o f  
control'.3'^  In addition to these, legitimacy for the extremist parties and public recognition 
for the smaller parties are very vital motivations. There is a positive relation between the 
immediate need to rewards and the party's desire to take part in a coalition. The 
anticipated positions o f parties and number o f political parties also influence a party's 
decision.
Parties having the same ideology or similar goals do not want to create a coalition 
among themselves, especially small parties escape from such a partnership because o f 
fear o f being swallowed up by the big partner. The reason for this unwillingness is that 
they are competitors for the same constituency. Small parties also avoid making 
coalitions with the big partner due to the fear o f remaining under the shadow o f the
^*hbid., p. 456.
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latter.^' They accept the participation only on the condition that they get as many 
government portfolios as they can get. If their position on the policy scale does not allow 
such a chance they want to set up a coalition that also includes small partners besides a 
big one in order to alleviate such a danger. Extremist parties prefer to create coalitions 
with the nearest party and with the minimal number o f parties in which they have the 
greatest weight to control the policy direction o f the coalition.^-
1. 3. DISTRIBUTION OF MINISTRIES
Coalition payoffs are important for both policy-pursuing and office-seeking 
coalition partners. Distribution has two dimensions: quantitative and qualitative. 
Gamson's theory o f proportional distribution is true for only coalitions which include 
either parties with different sizes or parties with almost equal size in normal situations. 
But this balance seems to skew toward pivotal and small parties in unstable and 
competitive bargaining situations because the largest party or parties become dependent 
on the smaller ones.
Browne proposes two reasons why the small parties usually extract bonus or extra 
ministries from their big partner.^  ^ The first one is that they are pivotal parties in the 
sense that the fate o f coalition depends on their decision which gives them psychological 
power. Secondly, larger parties prefer small ones as they give them a chance to control 
the government's policy direction without any restrictions. So the bigger party gives extra 
or bonus ministries to the smaller ones as long as the latter do not challenge its leadership 
position in the government and does not harm its control over the flow o f government
^'A. Paiiebianco, Political parties: Power and Organization {C^.mhïïàÿ,e\ Cambridge University Press 
,1988).
^-A. De Swaan, 'An Empirical Model of Coalition Formationin N-Person Game of Policy Distance 
Minimization', in S. Groennings et all., The Study o f  Coalition Behavior, p. 429.
C. Browne, Coalition Theories: A Logical and Empirical C/fri'çi/e (California: Sage Publications, 
1973), p. 56.
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policy.3‘* When the number o f small parties increases the party with the greater size has to 
distribute more portfolios which means the loss o f its leadership position. Then it gives 
up such a claim and becomes more reluctant to give extra portfolios. The distribution, 
then, becomes proportional to the percentage o f seats each party contributed to the 
coalition.
In terms o f qualitative dimension generally the party with the greatest weight gets 
the premiership, internal and foreign affairs, finance, education, and finally defensc.^ "^’ 
Each coalition partner desires to control particular ministry or ministries so as to 
implement party policies. '^  ^ Whereas Left-wing parties control spending or distributive 
ministries, like labor, health, social affairs, and construction. Liberal and Conservative 
parties have desire to get ministries related to economy such as finance, industry, and 
also internal affairs. The Ministry o f Education is the most controversial one during the 
coalition bargaining because whether they are religious, liberal, or leftist parties they all 
want to control that ministry in order to teach and disseminate their particular party 
philosophies.
1. 4. COALITION MAINTENANCE AND TERMINATION
Coalition parties prepare a coalition protocol at the end o f the bargaining in order 
to draw borders o f their actions during their rule. They do avoid discussing issues that 
might cause coalition breakdown. At the initial stage, they also establish coordination 
mechanisms and several sub-committees below the cabinet level to regulate internal 
communication among the coalition partners.^* The fate o f the coalition depends, to some
‘^*Ibid., p. 58.
^^Ibid., P. 64..
Laver and N. Schofield, Multiparty Government, p. 169.
^^ 1. Budge and H. Keman, Paities and Democracy, p.53.
*^^ .1. E. Schwarz, 'Maintaining Coalitions: An Analysis of the EEC with Supporting Evidence from the 
Austrian Coalitions and the CDU/CSU', in S. Groennings et all., eds.. The Study o f  Coalition Behavior, p. 
245.
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extent, on the existence o f the common decision-making mechanism because coalition 
parties are assumed to have reciprocal responsibilities, and also assumed to make 
decisions unanimously to reach policy goals stated in the coalition protocol.
They know that they cannot fulfill their individual policy promises due to the lack 
o f parliamentary majority They give up some part o f individual party goals in order to 
reach an agreement. When the number o f parties increases each partner has to make more 
concessions that may lead to the loss o f party constituency. Another point that has 
influence over the coalition maintenance is that extremist or captive parties have to make 
either more policy concessions in comparison to those o f their moderate partners or have 
to withdraw from the coalition.^^ The reason for this is that local party elites are 'inclined 
to be the most interested in the maintenance o f purity o f position for the sake o f showing 
a distinct profile to the electorate and at least appreciative o f logrolling concomitants'. 
Local party governors have an immediate chance to observe reaction o f their 
constituency to the actions o f the party at the governmental level. There may be a gap 
between what they promised and what they are doing in the government. Nevertheless, 
party elites try to do the best for the country rather than immediate fulfilling o f their 
constituencies' wishes. When the party has an institutionalized structure it is easy to keep 
the whole party organization as united.
Coalition partners follow some strategies toward each other during the 
bargaining as well as the maintenance period. These are bargaining, persuasion, and 
broker strategies.
Confrontation among partners does not generally emerge immediately after the 
formation. In the first stage they prepare legislation and implement common policies. It 
is something like a 'honeymoon period'. In the second stage there may appear some 
minor disputes among the partners; they overcome these disputes either through
Duverger, PoliticalPniiies(London'. Methuen, 1964, third editon), P. 336. 
‘*•*3. Groenninngs, 'Notes Toward Theories', p.462.
19
persuasion or through broker role o f the party leaders. In contrast to the first two stages 
in the third stage, especially when a general election is approaching major confrontations 
can be expected because parties try to fulfill their raison d'être policy goals to become a 
responsible party in the eyes o f their constituency, they even break the coalition.
Parties may continue the partnership if there are no better available coalition 
options. Withdrawal cost also affects a party's decision to remain or withdraw from the 
coalition. In order to avoid such a public punishment every party avoids from breaking 
the coalition if there is no 'outrageous injustice or failure to achieve any major goal'.‘*“
Governments are terminated in such occasions; when there is a formal 
resignation, when the party composition o f the government changes, when the Prime 
Minister resigns or when there is a new general election.^^ The degree o f compatibility 
and similarity o f party goals determine the fate o f the coalitions like internal policy 
disagreement and the fear o f identity loss. Success also leads to termination o f a coalition 
because, according to Budge and Keman,
wlien a party feels it can capitalize on its record so as to gain vote or limit 
losses, and when it has the premiership, with the ability to call an election at 
will, then it will do this the better to pursue long-term policy objectives by 
consolidating its policy position.'*“*
All these three variables indicate that multifarious factors influence the formation 
o f a specific coalition. Before investigating Turkish coalition experiences it seems better 
to elaborate coalition experiences from Western European democracies.
‘*'ibid., p.464.
“'-Ibid., p.463.
‘*^ 1. Budge and H. Keman, Parties and Democracy, p. 166. Dodd does not use the Resignation of Prime 
Minister as a relevant criterion as a relavant criterion rather he uses a criterion of reallocation of 
government portfolios among the coalition partners. L. C. Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary 
Democracies {?nnce\on\ Princeton University Press, 1976), P. 213.
'*'*[.Budge and H. Keman, Parties and Democracy, p. 59.
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CHAPTER II
EUROPEAN COALITION EXPERIENCES
This chapter concentrates on selected examples o f European coalition 
governments. Laver and Schofield distinguish four types according to their perception 
o f policy and office. They may see:
1. The office as an end in itself;
2. The office as a means to influence the government policies;
3. The policy as a means to control the office;
4. The policy as an end in itself'
In the light o f this theoretical framework, Laver and Budge put the Irish and 
Italian political parties into the first category, the Norwegian, German, Lukembourgian, 
and Israelian parties into the second one, French parties during the Fourth Republican 
period into the third one, and finally the Swedish, Danish, Belgian, and again French 
parties during the 1946-58 period into the fourth category“.
It seems appropriate to elaborate individual country experiences according to 
De Swaan's definition o f a coalition government to make clear each party's perception 
o f the coalition membership as appropriate to the thesis’s subject matter. He argues that
coalitions emerge from the interaction among actors each of which strives to
bring about and join a coalition that he expects to adopt a policy which is as
3close as possible to his own most preferred policy.'
As parallel to what this definition implies, it is necessary to follow a specific 
path which includes several criteria in examining the individual country experiences
M. .1, Laver, and N. Shofield, Multiparty GovernmentThe politics o f  Coalition in Emope (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), p 39.
"See M. .1. Laver, and I. Budge, (1992), p.414.
^A. De Swaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Foimation: A Study o f  Formal Theores o f  Coalition 
Formation Applied to Nine Ewopean Parliaments after 1918 (San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1973), p. 
82.
after summarizing the general feature o f coalition experience o f each country, the author 
applies the following common criteria to each country to find out the differences among 
the political actors that are acting in different party systems and in social and economic 
conditions. These criteria are
i. Number o f parties within the existing party system;
ii. Position o f the parties within the particular party system (e.g. pivotal parties or 
captive parties);
iii. Party strategies (including constraints, prior party relations, motivation e.g. desire 
to gain rewards, or self-preservation or to remain in opposition);
iv. Party structure (e.g. unified or having fractions);
V . Party ideology and party goals.
1 chose one country from each category just mentioned above which are Italy, 
Norway, France, and Belgium.
2. 1. ITALY
The Italian case shows four significant tendencies in the post-war period, the last 
o f which ended recently when the newly formed Social Democratic Party won the 
absolute majority o f seats in the parliament after 48 years o f coalition dominance in 
Italian politics."  ^ These tendencies are centrism (1948-1963), center-left coalitions 
(1963-1976), national solidarity one (1976-1979), and pentapartito coalitions (1979- 
1996).^ The first four coalitions that were brought about by De Gasperi comprised all 
parties in 1946 due to 'high valuation o f national consensus at the time o f foundation o f  
the Republic'. After expelling the Communist Party(PC) from the government in 1947
“^ Tlie Christian Democratic Party(DC) gained absolute majority at the end of the 1948 general elections. 
^These distinctions were made by A. Mastropaolo, and M. Slater, 'Party Policy and Coalition Bargaining 
in Italy, 1948-1987: Is There Order Behind the Chaos?' in M. J. Laver, and I. Budge, eds. Party Policy 
and Coalition Government {London'. St Martin's Press, 1992).
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Table 2. 1. ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS 1946-1987
Prime Minister Date in Parties in Government
Parri 06. 1945 Action Party, DC, PCI, PLI, PSI, PDL
De Gasperi I 02. 1946 DC, PCI, PSI, Action Party, PDL, PLI.
De Gasperi II 07. 1946 DC, PCI, PSI, PLI, PRI
De Gasperi III 02. 1947 DC, PCI, PSI
De Gasperi IV 05. 1947 DC, PLI,
De Gasperi V 05. 1948 DC, PSDI, PLI, PRI
De Gasperi VI 01.1950 DC, PSDI, PRI (abstention from PLI)
De Gasperi VII 07.1951 DC, PRI(abstention from PSDI, PLI)
De Gasperi VIII 07.1953 DC(external support from PRI)
Pella 08. 1953 DC(external support from PRI, PLI, and Mon)
Fanfani I 01. 1954 DC(government without vote of confidence)
Scelba 02. 1954 DC, PSDI, PLI(external support from PRI)
SegniI 07.1955 DC, PSDI, PLI (external support of PRI)
Zoli 05.1957 DC,(exter. support from Monarchists and MSI)
Fanfani 11 02. 1959 DC, PSDI (external support from PRI)
Segni II 02. 1960 DC(external support from PLI, PMP,PNM,MSI)
Tambroni 03. 1960 DC(external support from MSI)
Fanfani III 07.1960 DC(external support from PSDI, PRI)
Fanfani IV 02.1962 DC, PSDI, PRI(external support from PSI)
Leone I 06. 1963 DC( abstention from PSI, PSDI, PRI)
Moro I 12. 1963 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Moro II 07.1964 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI.
Moro III 02. 1966 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Leone II 06. 1968 DC(abstention from PSU, PRI)
Rumor I 12. 1968 DC, PSU, PRI
Rumor 11 08.1969 DC(ex supp. from PSI, PSDI, absten. of PRI)
Rumor III 03.1970 DC,PSI, PDSI, PRI,
Colombo 08. 1970 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Andreotti I 02.1972 DC(external support from PRI, PSDI, PLI)
Andreotti II 07.1972 DC, PSDI, PLI(ext support from PRI)
Rumor IV 07.1973 DC, PSI, PDSI, PRI
RumorV 03. 1973 DC, PSI, PDSI external support from PRI)
Moro IV 02.1976 DC, PRI,(external support from PSI, PSDI)
Moro V 02.1976 DC(external support from PSDI)
Andreotti III 07.1976 DC(abst. from PCI, PSI, PSDI, PLI, PRI)
Andreotti IV 03. 1978 DC(extemal support from PCI, PSI)
Andreotti V 03. 1979 DC, PSI ,PRI(gover. without vote of conf)
Cossiga I 08.1979 DC, PSI, PRI(abstention from PSI, PRI)
Cossiga II 04. 1980 DC, PSI, PRI
Forlani I 10.1980 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Spadolini I 06. 1981 PRI, DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI
Spadolini II 08. 1982 PRI, DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI
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Fanfani V 
Craxi I 
Craxi II 
Fanfani VI 
Goria I 
De Mita
12. 1982 DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI(abstention from PRI)
08. 1983 PSI, DC, PSDI, PRI, PLI
08. 1986 PSI, DC, PSDI, PRI, PLI
04. 1987 DC( gov. without vote of confidence)
07. 1987 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI
04.1988 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI
Party names: DC: Christian Democratic Party; PCI: Italian Communist Party; PSI: Italian 
Socialist Party; PLI: Italian Liberal Party; PRI: Italian Republican Party; PDI: Italian 
Democratic Party (Monarchist); PSDI: Social Democratic Party; PSU: United Socialist Party( a 
fusion o f PSI and PSDI); Source: J. Blondel, (1988).
with the support o f the Catholic Church, the United States, and the Confindustria 
(Confederation o f Industries), the Christian Democratic Party (DC) obtained an absolute 
majority o f the seats. The significant actors were the DC as the dominant actor in all 
Italian coalitions after the war, the Liberal Party(PLP), the Social Democratic 
Party(PSDI) and the Republican Party(PRI).^ These small parties either took part 
directly in the post-war coalitions or they supported the DC minority coalitions with 
other small parties like the Italian Social Movement(MSI) and the national Monarchist 
Party(PNP).’
The right-wing faction within the DC was successful in preventing the acceptance 
o f the PCI and the PSI as eligible coalition partners, but at the same time it resisted the 
demands o f a group within the party for setting up a coalition with the Rightist parties 
until the attempt o f the Tambroni government. It was supported by the MSI. That 
action resulted in massive popular hostility against his government in 1960. As a 
counterbalance to this faction, the Moro faction, a leftist faction within the DC, was 
trying to bring about its plan o f opening to the Left by including the PSI and DC within 
the same cabinet. They finally achieved this aim in 1963. This newly formed 
government was the first majority government within the six years.
In the second period, governments were rather stable and they gave priority to 
reform many government institutions and to start a new wave o f industrialization. But
’^Tlte PSDI split from the Italian Socialist Party in 1949.
^Tlie Natioalist Social Movement was neo-fascist party that saw itself as a heir of the defunct Fascist 
Party.
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these projects were hampered by the political opposition and the recession in the world 
economy in the mid-1960s. Both parties lost votes to the parties that stood on their left 
and right. During this period, although the PSI merged with the PSDI in 1966 to form 
the United Socialist Party( PSU ) they again split in 1969 when they could not represent 
good performance in the 1968 general election due to the growing pressure o f the PCI 
at the local as well as the national level. In the aftermath o f 1968 events the Moro 
faction was replaced by a right-wing faction and the DC distanced itself from the Left 
by approaching the Rightist parties. This tendency reached its peak when the DC lost 
votes in the referendum on divorce and abortion.
Oil crisis and economic recession that resulted in social unrest and growing 
terrorism led the DC to seek new coalition partners which was essential for widening 
the social basis o f the government. For this reason, hoping to take part in the subsequent 
coalitions finally, the PCI gave an external support to the DC minority governments in 
the third period. As the PCI obtained no concession from the DC and started losing its 
votes, it withdrew its support from the DC minority government after the assassination 
of Aldo Moro in 1979.
The new period is characterized as pentapartito coalitions with no common 
policy ground among the coalition partners. Mastropaolo and Slater describe this period
as
no programmatic base existed for the collaboration of the five parties of this
pentapartito coalition, payoffs were almost exclusively ministerial posts and
g
political nominations to the sottogoverno.
The DC was a government party without interruption because o f its pivotal 
role in coalition bargaining until recently. The source o f its role comes from both its 
electoral strength and position on the ideological spectrum which has always been in the
J. Laver and I. Budge, eds., Paiiy Policy and Goveinment Coalitions (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1992), p. 315.
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center. Small parties were captive parties because o f the fact that they either had to take 
part in coalitions or to remain in the opposition. This fluctuated from time to time, 
depending on the dominance o f a specific faction to the decision-making mechanism of  
the DC. They had no role that could affect the composition o f the coalition. The 
existence o f the small parties on the Left and on the Right gave the DC an opportunity 
to play off one against another . In other words, small parties created a space for the DC 
to act independently without any constraints during the bargaining which was the case 
especially after the exclusion o f the PCI from the government in 1947 as the second 
largest party in the Italian party system. All these meant that the fate o f all the remaining 
parties, including the PSI, was dependent on the DCs strategy which was in turn tied 
to dominance o f the particular faction within the party according to changing social, 
political, and economic circumstances.
Except for the PCI, the DC and the PSI, as the influential actors in Italian 
politics, had several factions, each o f which is called 'correnti' in Italian language. The 
DC, according to Laver and Schofield, 'is more a coalition o f factions than a party.'  ^
Leader o f the each faction chose its candidates which reinforced the continuation o f the 
loose structure o f the DC. It was not a unitary actor, rather a combination o f various 
factions with different policy targets.
Likewise, the PSI, as the member o f most o f the coalitions since 1963, split in 
1949 when Saragat socialists departed from the party to create the PSDI and 
recombined to form the United Socialist Party(PSU) in 1966. The fusion lasted only 
three years when the PSDI left the party after the failure in the 1968 elections. Though 
Craxi, the leader o f the PSI in the 1980s, reduced the number o f factions within the 
party, conflict at the personal level remained much the same, according to .lacobs.'“ It
'■^M. .1. Laver and N. Schofield, M ultiparty Government: The Politics o f  Coalition in Europe (New Y ork: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), p.231.
Jacobs, ’Italy’, in F. Jacobs, eds. Emopean Political Parties: A Comprehensive Guide (Essex: 
Longman, 1989).
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can be argued that party factions were one o f the significant variables in Italian politics 
o f coalition. In order to draw attention to this variable, Laver and Schofield quoted the 
following paragraph:
All factions must be accommodated in the government. When a new 
governing coalition is fomied, the twenty-six or more cabinet seats and the 
sixty or more sub-cabinet posts are distributed not only by party but by party
factions........Moreover, because factions extend their power out of the party
and into the governing institutions, disagreements among them are carried 
into the government itself. As a result, governments have been completely 
paralyzed and on occasion half have fallen because of fictional disputes. * *
By taking the existence o f competing factions into account, it is possible to 
summarize the DCs ideology and goals. The DC did not have a specific party ideology 
in the sense o f the PCI or the MSI during its coalition partnership. Rather it functioned 
more as a power broker than pursuing particular party policies. It was a catch-all party 
with the Left and Right-wing factions. Dominance o f the Right-wing or Left-wing 
faction to the party changed coalition partners. This meant that it had the capability to 
follow any economic policy. In terms o f economic policies, it has always followed 
pragmatic policies because o f its nature as a catch-all party in the absence o f a particular 
party ideology that could steer its economic policies. According to Jacobs, whereas the 
party expanded role o f the state and adopted expansionary economic policies during the 
domination o f the Moro faction and its coalition with the Socialist parties in the 1960s it 
followed laissez-faire economic policies in the 1980s.
The existence o f several factions meant that the party had to fulfill demands o f  
the various groups simultaneously. It had also Social Christian, and trade union wings 
through which it provided state assistance and state investments in the Southern, poorer
11M. Laver and N. Schofield, (1990), p.231.
27
part o f the country. The party had to expand the state machinery to provide better living 
standards to those people in this part o f the country which required the state 
intervention. During its coalition with the PSI they nationalized electricity, for example. 
Moreover, the party took decisions such as indexation o f wages, strict rent controls.*"
Though its name implies a religious party, it has been more like a non­
confessional party with a Catholic faction. In the absence o f a conservative party, 
having definite religious ideology on the right o f the DC most o f the Italian 
conservatives voted for the DC. Another indicator o f the DC as the non-confessional 
party is that it formed coalitions with the lay parties in different times rather than 
selecting them according to the religious criterion. Factions, as representing different 
segments o f society, created paradoxical situation for the party. On the one hand, the 
party could not behave as a unitary actor, on the other hand it has reached every part o f  
society and maintained its permanent social support. Allum describes the DC as 
the dominant bourgeois party, with political power as its chief aim. Power is 
required not to implement a specific policy but rather to prevent others from 
doing anything to which it, the Church and the great economic groups would 
be opposed.
In short, the DC, as a pivotal party that was on the center o f the political 
spectrum, maintained equilibrium until the recent elections by not leaving free space to 
any actor to spoil the balance. Rather, intra-party factional balances determined the 
party policy and hence its coalition partners.
F. Jacobs, (1989), p. 179.
P. A. Allum, Italy: Republic Without Government?(Hew York, Norton, 1973), p.229.
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2. 2. NORWAY
Before explaining the structure o f coalition governments in Norway, it is useful 
to summarize the particular features o f the Scandinavian party system that consists o f  
countries like Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.
Predominant cleavage in three countries has been socio-economic one for years. 
The existence o f three traditional parties - Liberal, Conservative and Social Democratic 
parties- as the effective ones depicts this reality. The addition o f the Communist and 
Agrarian parties increased the number o f parties from three to five in the 1920s. The 
situation remained the same until 1970s with the exception o f appearance o f the 
Christian People's Party as an advocator o f religious and cultural values in Norway in 
1933. The aftermath o f the referendum on whether or not to enter into the European 
Economic Community in the 1970s caused an increase in the number o f parties from 
six to eight in Norway, and from five to ten in Denmark. The political cleavage has 
had two axes in the Scandinavian party system: one has been the ideological cleavage 
e.g. Left-Right spectrum and the other has focused on rural-urban issues though it did 
not have much significance, in general. So there has been bifurcation o f the political 
parties as the bourgeois or non-socialist (including Conservative, Liberal, and Agrarian 
parties) versus the socialist bloc that consisted o f the Social Democratic or Labor Party, 
and the Communist or Radical Socialist parties. While the Social Democratic or Labor 
Party has dominated the Left o f the ideological spectrum the bourgeois side o f the 
spectrum has remained fragmented evenly to three or four parties that means bloc 
competition rather than competition among the individual parties. The predominance o f  
the Social Democratic or Labor Parties after the Second World War led to cooperation 
among the bourgeois parties to provide an alternative government to the Socialist bloc
1 4 Einborn and Logue, 1989. p.70
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in the 1960s. Voters aligned and realigned themselves within each bloc rather than 
preferring to move from one bloc to another. It implied continuation o f the sensitive 
balance between the two blocs. So parties have to carry out the policy promises which 
necessitates better a party organization and a strict party control over the constituency 
Otherwise, they cannot behave as unitary actors. For this reason, the Scandinavian 
parties have highly developed party stmctures and hence sophisticated organizational 
structures with country-wide branches. For them, then, it is easy to form and maintain a 
coalition for a long time, in contrast to the Italian case. Its repercussion at the level o f 
coalition bargaining is the formation o f either Social Democratic or Labor government 
or the bourgeois coalition o f three or more parties.
The reason why the author chose Norway is to show that minority 
governments are not the last solution to the government crisis. According to Strom, 
minority governments are a rational choice if political parties consider the long term 
policy targets and if opposition parties have an opportunity to affect government 
policies.'^ Norway represents two significant tendencies in her experience o f coalition 
governments in the post-war period. The first tendency is characterized by the Labor 
Party's majority governments in the 1945-1961 period. The Labor dominance to 
Norwegian politics was over at the end o f the 1961 general elections due to the 
emergence o f the Socialist Party on the left o f it. The second period that was 
characterized as the alternation o f the Labor minority governments and the bourgeois 
three or four-party majority coalitions started after this election and still continues 
today.“’ Strom and Leipart identify three significant features o f the Norwegian 
coalitions in terms o f their composition after the 1961 general elections.*’
*^ K. Strom, M inority Government and M ajority Rule {Hew York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
**’H. Ronimetvedt, 'Noiway; From Consensual Majority Parliamenterism to Dissensual Minority 
Parliamentarism' in E Damgaard, eds. Parliainentaiy Change in the Nordic Countries (Oslo: 
Scandinavian University Press, 1992).
*’ k . Strom and .1. Leipart, "Policy Pursuit and Coalition Avoidance', in M. J. Laver and I. Budge, Party 
Policy and Government Coalitions.
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Table 2. 2. NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENTS; 1945-1990
Prime Minister Date in Party Composition
Gerhardsen I 1945 Grand Coalition
Gerhardsen II 1945-1951 Labor
Torp 1951-1955 Labor
Gergardsen III 1955-63 Labor
Lyng
Liberals
1963 Conservatives, Christian People’s Party,
Gerhardsen IV 1963-65 Labor
Borter
Party, Liberals
1965-71 Center Party, Cons. Party, Chris. People’s
Bratteli I 1971-72 Labor
Korvald 1972-73 Christian People’s Party, Center Party, Liberals
Bratteli II 1973-76 Labor
Nordli 1976-81 Labor
Brundland I 1981 Labor
Willoch I 1981-83 Conservatives
Willoch II 
Party
1983-86 Conservatives, Christian People’s Party, Center
Brundland II 1986-89 Labor
Syse 1989-90 Conservatives, Chris. People’s Party, Center P.
Brundland III 1990- Labor
Note: The party of the prime minister is listed first.
Source: E. Damgaard, eds. Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries (Oslo: Scandinavian 
University Press, 1992).
The first feature is that coalitions have been either Socialist or bourgeois because 
o f the two-bloc characteristic o f the Norwegian party system. The second feature is the
decision o f the Labor Party o f entering any coalition with either the Left-wing or
Right-wing parties. This meant that Labor governments have always been minority ones
since 1961. The third characteristic is that bourgeois coalitions consisted o f at least three
non-socialist parties with the exception o f the Willoch government in the 1981-83
period that expanded to comprise the Christian People's Party and the Center Party in
1983. These three features fit the general characteristics o f the Scandinavian coalition
experiences.
The shift from majority Labor governments either to the non-socialist majority 
coalitions or to the Labor Party minority governments was the result o f the changes in 
the Norwegian party system in the 1960s and 1970s. Until the 1961 general election.
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there were five parties which were the Labor Party(DNA), as the only representative o f  
the Left on the ideological spectrum, the Conservative Party(H), the Liberal Party(V), 
the Christian People's Party( KRF) , and the agrarian Center Party(SP) which had been 
known as the Farmer's Party before 1959. The emergence o f the Socialist People's Party 
in 1961 did not disturb the balance between the two blocs, though it ended the Labor's 
historical predominance in the Norwegian politics since 1945.**^  Distribution o f 
parliamentary seats among the two blocs was evenly balanced that non-bourgeois bloc 
had 76 seats in comparison to 74 seats o f the bourgeois bloc in which the Conservative 
Party had the largest share with 29 seats after the 1961 general elections*^.
This period o f stability lasted until the referendum on whether or not to join the 
European Community in 1972. The referendum weakened the unitary status o f the 
parties. Because the two-bloc politics, as the determining feature o f the Scandinavian 
party system, provided inducement for the parties not to split. But the referendum 
divided the Liberal Party into two pieces as pro-EC and anti- EC parts. Whereas the 
Conservative Party and the Labor Party supported the entrance the Center Party and the 
far-left were against the entrance. New political groups emerged after this event that 
were the Socialist Electoral Alliance on the Left and the Ander's Lange Party on the 
Right."“ Although these new developments caused volatility the traditional parties like 
the DNA, the Conservative Party remained as unitary actors."' This specific 
organizational characteristic gave them an opportunity to follow particular strategies in 
time like the Labor's strategy o f not entering into a coalition with any other party for 
decades.
There have been two leading parties in the Norwegian party system which 
have been the Labor Party and the Conservative Party. During the 1961-65 period the
18It renamed Socialist Left Party later.
De Swaan, Coalition Theories, p.281. 
party was renamed as the Progrès Party later.
M. J. Laver and N. Schofield, M ultiparty Government, p.237.
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Socialist People's Party was the small pivotal party because o f the fact that the Labor 
Party minority government, that had been established with the outside support o f the 
Socialist People's Party after the 1961 general elections, was brought down again by 
only one no confidence vote o f the same party.““ Moreover, though the four-party 
bourgeois coalition government remained in power they never obtained vote o f  
confidence until the 1965 general elections because o f lack o f the two votes o f majority. 
The Progress Party played the same role in the aftermath o f the 1985 elections. Because 
it became a key party in the evenly balanced Storting(Parliament) where the socialist 
bloc won 77 seats in 1985 and 80 in 1989 versus 78 and 62 seats o f the bourgeois bloc 
in the same elections. The number o f seats the Progress Party won was 2 in 1985 and 
22 in 1989. With the outside support o f the Progress Party the Labor minority 
government remained in power until 1989. The party would have supported the 
bourgeois coalition rather than the Labor minority government during the same period. 
But the Progress Party decided to give support to the three-party bourgeois coalition in 
the aftermath o f the 1989 general elections. The coalition was broken down after a year 
when the dispute about Norwegian attitude to negotiations, which was held between the 
EC and the BETA, emerged.^^
As mentioned above, two characteristics o f Norwegian political parties - 
highly cohesive organizational unity and strict adherence to the party policy - 
distinguish them from other European political parties. It can be easily seen that these 
two features are interrelated if  the extremely evenly balanced Parliament is taken into 
account. According to Strom and Leipart, since they have represented interests o f  
different social groups like those o f workers', farmers', and business groups', they have 
tried to obtain office for instrumental reasons. In other words, they have seen office as a
““That party had just two seats in Parliament which is enough for the illustration of the evenly balance 
between two blocs.
"^For more information see H. Romnietvedt, 'Norway', in E. Damgaard, eds., Parliainemtary Change in 
Nordic Countries
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means to an end rather than as an end in itself. So they received ministries related to 
their party interests to fulfill what their social base demanded or what they promised to 
them before the elections. Economic issues have been the main areas o f dispute among 
the parties, though there have been always minor social, and cultural cleavages existed 
like abortion problem at the beginning o f 1980s. The competition among the political 
actors concentrated on how economic goods and pains would be distributed among 
various segments o f society."'* The dispute between the Labor Party and the 
Conservative Party, as the two largest parties within the system, focused on the subject 
matter o f the state control o f business. The DNA has followed social democratic 
strategy in its economic policies. The state involved in economic matters in order to 
lessen the growing pains o f the crisis through producing counter-cyclical policies. It 
also changed its policies o f direct state investment to eclectic state involvement and 
control o f the key industries rather than the whole economy. However, it never gave up 
its goals o f social equality and rewarded all supports through its redistributive policies in 
the 1945-65 period. As a ruling party, although it has had a strategy not to form a 
coalition with any party since 1930s it has always given chance to the oppositional 
parties to influence the party's decisions and policies.
As the largest non-socialist party, the Conservative Party has always claimed that 
market share o f the private sector should be increased and there must be a balance 
between the public and the private sector. This meant that it also favored social market 
economy like the DNA in contrast to its European counterparts such as British 
Conservative Party. So the party is a moderate conservative, however the only 
difference between it and the DNA has been over means rather than the ends. Alteration 
o f the power in 1965 and coming o f the bourgeois parties did not create a rupture
"“^ See the related section in A. De Swaan, Coalition Theories.
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between the non-socialist and socialist period."  ^Rather, the non-socialist coalition o f the 
four center-right parties(Conservatives, Liberals, Christian People's and Center parties) 
was seen as a continuation o f the Labor Party government due to the fact that they 
passed the pension reforms, which had been introduced by the Labor Party, along the 
similar lines what the DNA had proposed.
Strategically, the Conservative Party pursued policies in its relation to other parties 
that aimed at ending the DNA's predominance in the government in the 1950s and 
1960s. That was necessary for the party's continuation. Otherwise, it would have not 
satisfied its adherents and attracted new electorates. As the largest party o f the right, 
small parties were afraid o f being swallowed up by the Conservatives. They, at the 
beginnings, hesitated to enter into a coalition with the largest party in order to preserve 
their party identities. The Conservative Party made some reasonable concessions to 
alleviate the fear o f the small parties during the initial phase o f cooperation in the 1960s 
which meant the implementation o f the common policies rather than only that o f the 
Conservative Party and an equal distribution o f the government portfolios among the 
coalition partners."^
In sum, it is possible to argue that the agreement over social market economy 
created consensus among all the Norwegian political parties in the absence o f an acute 
ethnic, cultural, or religious cleavage. Arter states that
tlie exceptional four-party non-socialist coalition under Per Borten in 1965- 
1969 proceed differently. All network of deputy ministerial committees was
developed, comprising the deputy(assistant) ministers from all the governing
97parties, and these constituted important fomms of consensus building.“
“^M. Elder, A. H. Thomas, and D. Arter, The Consensual Democracies?: The Government and Politics 
o f the Scandinavian States (Oxiovd: Basil Blackwell, 1988) and F. Jacobs, "NoiAvay”
2 6
2 7
A. De Swaan, Coalition Theories.s M., “ ^  ^ . - -  -------- -
D. Arter, The Nordic Parliaments: A Comparative Analysis (New York; St Martin's Press, 1984), 
p.l 14.
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All these mean that policy-making in Norway has been based on consensus and 
cooperation at the level o f inter-party elites.
2. 3 .FRANCE: THE FOURTH REPUBLICAN PERIOD 
Unlike the prior two cases the party system was unstable in the French case 
during the 1945-1958 period. It is necessary to start with elucidating the party system 
before elaborating the coalition experiences. The French Assembly was dominated by 
the three groups in 1945 which were Communists(PCF), Socialists(SFIO), and Christian 
Democrats(MRP). The last one was the new-comer after the Radicals had lost power. 
The MRP had been the largest party during the Third Republican period'* .^ Three o f  
them controlled three-quarters o f the Assembly seats in 1945. The urgent social 
problem to be solved by the political parties was the preparation o f a new constitution 
during the first years o f the Fourth Republic. While the Communist Party favored a 
unicameral assembly in order to escape checks o f the upper house. The SFIO and MRP 
were against the idea because o f the fear o f domination by the PCF over the whole 
Assembly, though they agreed with unicameralism in principle. As opposed to all, De 
Gaulle demanded the establishment o f the presidential system with a strong head of 
thestate and an executive power. The constitution that proposed the establishment o f an 
assembly was rejected by the electorate in the referendum. At the end o f the elections 
for the Constituent Assembly that was held in 1946, the MRP emerged as the largest 
party with 28 percent vote share .
28J. F. McMillan, Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society 1898-1991 (London: Edward Arnold, 
1992), p.l54.
“^ Ibid., p. 155.
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Table 2. 3. FRENCH COALITION GOVERNMENTS: 1946-58
Prime Minister
De Gaulle 
Gouin 
Bidault 
Ramadier I 
Ramadier II 
Schuman 
Marie 
Queille I 
Bidault II 
Pleven I 
Quille II 
Pleven II 
Faure I 
Pinay 
Mayer I 
Laniel
Mendes-France 
Faure II 
Mollet
Bourges Mannoury 
Gaillard
Date in
11. 1945 
01.1946
06. 1946 
01. 1947
10. 1947
11. 1947
07.1948
09.1948 
10. 1949
07. 1950 
03.1951
08. 1951 
01. 1952 
03. 1952
01. 1953 
06.1953  
06. 1954 
02.1955
02. 1956 
06. 1957 
11.1957
Coalition Composition
PCF, SFIO, MRP, RAD, UDSR, Cons 
PCF, SFIO, MRP 
PCF, SFIO, MRP
PCF, SFIO, MRP, RAD, UDSR, RI
SFIO, MRP, RAD, UDSR, RI
SFIO, MRP, RAD, UDSR, AR
SFIO, MRP, RAD, UDSR, RI, PRL
SFIO, MRP, RAD, UDSR, RI, PRL
SFIO, MRP, RAD, RI, PAYS
SFIO, MRP, RAD, RI, PRL
SFIO, MRP, RAD, RI, PAYS
MRP,RAD, UDSR, IND, PAYS
MRP, RAD, UDSR, IND, AP
MRP, RAD, UDSR, IND, AP
MRP, RAD, UDSR, ARS, IND, PAYS
MRP, RAD, UDSR, RPF, ARS, IND, PAYS
RAD, UDSR, RS, ARS, RI, PAYS
MRP, RAD, UDSR, RS, ARS, RI, IND, PAYS
SFIO, RAD, RDA, RS
SFIO, RAD, RDA
SFIO, MRP, RAD, RDA, RS, IND Party
name: PCF: Communist Party, SFIO: Socialist Party, MRP: Christian Democratic party, RAD: 
Radical Party, UDSR: Union Démocratique et Sovialiste de la Resistance, RPF(ARS): The 
Ressamblement du Peuple Francais(Gaullist), RGR: dissident Moderates (like Indep, and 
Paysans), UFF: Pujadist Party.
Source: A. De Swaan, 1973.
The Communist Party also slightly increased its percentage o f votes. The SFIO, 
however, was the net loser in this election. Finally, the MRP and SFIO agreed on the 
creation o f a second chamber and later the new constitution was accepted.
For the preparation o f the new constitution grand coalitions were formed in the 
first years o f the Fourth Republic which consisted o f mainly the PCF, the SFIO, and the 
MRP as well as the Radicals and Conservatives. When the Cold-War appeared, the 
Communists were expelled from the government permanently in 1947. The following 
coalitions, in the absence o f the PCF, followed the same pattern that included Socialists, 
Catholics, and Radicals. The significant feature o f the coalitions in the 1946-51 period
37
was the inclusion o f the unnecessary members. According to De Swaan, in this period, 
political parties tried to choose partners whose policy objectives showed similarities 
with their most preferred policies^®.
The general election, held in 1951 substantially changed balance o f power 
among the parties in the Assembly. The Conservatives and Gaullist doubled their seats 
from 19 per cent 34 per cent; whereas the MRP lost almost half o f the Assembly 
seats.^‘ The Gaullist RPF emerged as the largest party from the election and this 
situation lasted until the end o f the Fourth Republic with minor changes.
Socialists did not participate in any coalition government from 1951 to 1956. 
The Gaullist RPF voted against all the governments until 1953 when de Gaulle 
withdrew himself from active political life. In the absence o f three largest parties, all 
coalitions were minority in character until the support o f the right-wing factions o f the 
GauIlists(ARS) to the Pinay government in 1952. The RPF split into two parts each o f 
which formed different parties. These were the URAS(later became RS) and ARS. 
There were two coalition alternatives at that time, the coalition o f Communists, Social 
Democrats, and Catholics i.e., center-Left or the coalition o f Catholics, Radicals, the 
RDA, Gaullists(RS), independents, and Poujadists(LTFF), i.e., center-right. Right-wing 
parties tried all available combinations including all the right-wing parties till the 
return o f the SFIO in 1956.
As the Gaullist movement lost its effect Poujadists(UFF) emerged as anti­
system party with 53 seats at the end o f 1956 general elections, but they were prevented 
from entering the government. Throughout the period, France waged war against her 
colonies, especially in Indo-China and Algeria. After the loss o f Indo-China war and the 
seizure o f power by the extremists in Algeria, de Gaulle was perceived as the only man 
who was capable o f producing the solution to the threat o f civil war. He was voted into
3 0
3 1
A. De Swaan, Theories, p. 186.
M. J. Laver and I. Budge, Party Policy, p.391.
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the power through which he obtained the right to prepare a new constitution. He 
suspended actions o f political parties for some time. The most clear feature o f the 
coalitions formed in the 1947-58 period was that the leading actors were the parties o f 
the center and o f the Right in coalition bargaining.
There were two largest anti-system parties that were the Gaullist RPF and the 
PCF, whereas the latter was in the position o f permanent opposition, the former lost its 
status in 1953 completely but its role was later carried out by the newly formed 
Poujadist UFF until the end o f the era. Two parties(the PCF and Poujadist UFF) were 
excluded from the government permanently. Rather than having a center party like the 
DC in the Italian case or the Social-Christian Party in the Belgian party system, the 
French party system had several center parties. Exclusion o f the largest parties from the 
government paved way for the inclusion o f all the smaller parties. Fragmentation 
prevented emergence a powerful center party that could play pivotal role during the 
coalition bargaining. There were several center parties such as the MRP, the Radical 
Party, the UDSR, the PRG, and Independents. Petry points out the existence o f 'plural 
core'.^“ According to him, parties that formed the plural core in all period were the 
UDSR, Radicals, the MRP, and Independents which took role in coalitions after 1951. 
Though the MRP emerged as the center party after the 1946 elections its center status 
was eroded by attacks o f both Socialists and Radicals. Whereas the Radicals' main 
criticism was directed to the MRP's progressive character in social matters as an 
advocator o f the state intervention and o f the state help to those who need, Socialists 
and Communists criticized its clerical character. The 1951 election results proved this 
reality. Systemic parties started to follow strategy o f the permanent exclusion o f the 
PCF from the government in 1947 and as result o f this policy the PCF could not become 
coalition member since then till the end o f the relevant period. Likewise, the Poujadist
^'F. Petty, 'Coalition Bargainig in the French Fourth Republic 1946-58', in M. J. Laver and I. Budge, 
Party Policy, p.387.
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UFF experienced such an event till the end o f the period. However, the Gaullist party 
could not continue its opposition role.
According to Pickles, there were four political families that were the Right, the 
Center-Right, the center-Left, and the Left.^  ^ Political actors were not unitary actors. On 
the one side, there were Communists, Socialists and Radical Leftists; more reactionary 
Rightist parties constituted the other side o f the spectrum and all these meant the 
permanent erosion o f the center on both fringes.
Both the MRP and the Socialist Radical Party, as center parties, were loosely 
organized. McMillan states that 'the MRP was essentially a party o f leaders, without a 
natural a well-organized base. Overnight, it lost its credibility as the party o f fidelity to 
de Gaulle'. '^* The Socialist Radical Party was never a socialist party because o f its 
individualistic, economically conservative leanings in contrast to the other Left-wing 
parties. But it was a strong Republican and an anti-clerical party. As a party policy, it 
favored comprehensive state educational system. Due to the internal quarrels it split into 
several parties, though it had been one o f the old and significant parties in the French 
political life until 1945. However, it took part in all coalition governments and ten out 
o f twenty-one governments were headed by the Prime Ministers from the Radical Party 
which implied that it was still an influential party at the governmental le v e l.A g a in  it 
was split into two parts in 1956.
The MRP was perceived as the party that could fulfill the place o f the Radicals 
at the inception, because the PCF was ejected from the government and hence the SFIO 
lost its pivotal position in the party system. The MRP played the role o f the center party 
until 1951. It was a center party since it was a supporter o f the democratic Republican 
ideas and its main inspiration was coming from the Catholic principles though its
Pickles, The Government and Politics o f  France: Institutions and Parties (hondon: Methuen& Co.,
Vol., 1972), p. 171.
3 4
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.1. F. McMillan, Twentietb-Centiuy France, p.l57. 
Ibid., p. 196.
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members were not exclusively Catholic. It was a party that was in favor o f social 
reform, however it was against Marxist and collectvistic ideas. According to McMillan, 
'it seemed for a time, likely to take the place o f the Radicals as a party forming a hinge 
between the moderate Right and the anti-clerical Left'.^ ® It was resembling a left-wing 
party because o f its organizational form with its strong trade union links. The party 
failed in this role for it was a newly formed party with a weak social base. The 
emergence o f the Gaullist party and the electoral recovery o f the Radicals in 1951 
elections weakened its pivotal position in the coming years o f the Fourth Republic.^^ 
The party became more closer to the Right than the Left when it started to form 
coalitions with the Right-wing parties after the 1951 elections.
Blondel identifies two most prominent features o f party system during the 
Fourth Republic which were the existence o f ill disciplined parties and secondly 
proliferation o f parties through party splits especially on the right o f the spectrum. *^  ^ Its 
repercussions at the social level were the perception o f parties as catch-all parties and 
the competition among the several parties such as all clerical center and center-right 
parties as opposed the anti-clerical left-wing camp that was including Communists, 
Socialists, and Radicals, for the votes o f the same social group as in the case o f the 
Catholic School problem in 1947.^^
p.207.
Cahm, Politics and Society in Contemporary France (1789-1971): A Documentary History 
(London: George G. Harrap&Co. Lim., 1972), p. 296-97.
*^^ .1. Blondel, The Government o f  France {London·. Methuen&Co., 1974), p.55.
^^'^ .1. Hayward, The One and Indivisible French Republic (Hevr York: W.W. Norten&Company, 1973).
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2. 4.BELGIUM
It is appropriate to analyze Belgian coalition experiences by looking at the 
changes in the party system. In general, the party system comprised three effective 
parties at the Parliamentary level until 1960s. These were the Christian-Social , the 
Liberal, and the Socialist Party. Possible coalition options were the Christian-Social and 
Socialist, the Christian-Social and Liberal, the Socialist and Liberal or tripartite grand 
coalition."*“ Social events have affected the coalition composition in addition to Cold- 
War that means the permanent exclusion o f the Communist Party from the game. The 
royal question in the years from 1945 to 1950, and the school problem between the 
1952-58 years were the most significant ones."** The School Pact was concluded among 
three parties in 1958. The Socialists and Liberals formed two coalitions in 1945-47 and 
1954-58 period. Before the Christian-Social Party gained the parliamentary majority in 
the 1950 general election, the Christian-Social Party governed the country with the 
Socialist Party from 1947 and onwards until the election.
The stable three-party system began to undergo significant changes from 1958 
onwards that lasted until 1978 when the Socialist Party, as the last one, divided into two 
pieces. It is necessary to divide that period into two parts again in order to capture minor 
but influential factors that affected the party system. The Flanders' economy gained 
momentum after 1950s in contrast to the Walloon's which had been the dynamic one 
until these years. Language problem emerged beside the regional problem in the fifties 
and sixties. Moreover, the Liberal Party reoriented itself by repudiating its traditional 
anti-clerical character. Socio-economic issues, rather than religious ones, became 
important for the party. It also renamed itself as the Party o f Liberty and Progress in
‘*“.1. Fitzmaurice, Politics in Belgium: Crisis and Compromise in a Plural Society (New York: St Martin's 
Press, 1983), p. 186.
"*’.1. Gerard- Libois and X.Mabille, 'Belgian Electoral Politics', in A. Lijphart, eds. Conflict and Co­
existence in Belgium: The dynamics o f  a Culturally D ivided Society (Berkeley: University of 
California, c.1981) pp.130-131.
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Table 2. 4. BELGIAN GOVERNMENTS: 1945-85
Prime Minister Date in Party Composition
Spaak I 03. 1946 Socialist
Van Acker I 04. 1946 Socialist, Liberal, Communist
Van Acker II 08. 1945 Socialist, Liberal, Communist, UDB
Huysmans 08. 1946 Socialist, Liberal, Communist
Spaak II 03. 1947 Christian-Social, Socialist
Eyskens G I 07. 1949 Christian-Social, Liberal
Duvieusart 06. 1950 Christian-Social
Pholien 08. 1950 Christian-Social
Van Houtte 01. 1952 Christian-Social
Van Acker III 04. 1954 Socialist, Liberal
Eyskens G II 06. 1958 Christian-Social
Eyskens G III 11. 1958 Christian- Social, Liberal
Lefevre 04. 1961 Christian-Social, Socialist
Harmel 07. 1965 Christian-Social, Socialist
Vanden Boeynants II 03. 1966 Christian-Social, Liberal
Eyskens G IV 06. 1968 Christian-Social, Socialist
Leburton 01. 1973 Christian-Social, Socialist, Liberal
Tindemans 1 04. 1974 Christian-Social, Liberal
Tindemans II 06. 1974 Christian-Social, Liberal, RW
Tindemans II 03.1977 Christian-Social, Socialist
Tindemans IV 06. 1977 Christian-Social, Socailist, FDF, VU
Vanden Boeynants III 10. 1978 Christian-Social, Socialist, FDF, VU
Martens I 04. 1979 Christian-Social, Socialist, FDF
Martens II 01. 1980 Christian-Social, Socialist
Martens III 04. 1980 Christian-Social, Socialist, Liberal
Martens IV 10. 1980 Christian-Social, Socialist
Eyskens M 04.1981 Christian-Social, Socialist
Martens V 12.1981 Christian-Social, Liberal
Party names: Christian-Social : PSC/CVP; Socialist Party: PS(B)/(B)SF:
PVV/PLP; VU: Flemish Federáis; 
Rassemblement Wallon.
Source: .1. Blondel and F. Muller-Rommel 
McMillan, 1988).
FDF: Front Démocratique des Francophones; RW: 
Cabinets in Western Europe (London:
1961. All these events-regionalism, linguistic disputes, and adoption o f the new
program by Liberals-meant change in the electoral behavior as well as the growth of
regional and community parties like the Flemish(VU), the Walloon(RW), and the
42Brussels(FDF) Party. Their number o f seats also increased during these years.
‘*"Tlie VU's seats rose 5 in 1961 to 12 in 1968, the RW's to 2, and the PDF's to 3.
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Coalitions included either Liberals or Socialists in this period due to the pivotal 
position o f the Christian-Social Party. After 1968 traditional three-party system was 
broken down when the 'Louvain Affair' appeared.
French and Flemish languages have been spoken in Belgium for centuries. 
There have been small conflicts between Flemish speakers and French speakers. These 
small conflicts reached the climax point when the dispute over the location o f  the 
Louvian University came to surface in 1968. The crisis was about 'of choosing between 
an expansion o f the French section o f the Catholic University o f Louvain (at that time a 
single institution in Flanders), or the transfer o f the French section to a French-speaking 
area'. *^ This affair created tensions within the traditional parties which, in turn, split the 
Christian-Social Party into Flemish(CVP), and Francophone(PSC) parties in 1968. 
Likewise, Liberals were divided into the PVV and PLP in 1972, and finally schism 
within Socialists created two different parties o f the SP and PS in 1978. After these 
events, the effective number o f parties jumped from three in 1961 to nine in 1978.
Proliferation in the number o f parties deeply affected the coalition formation as 
well as its maintenance. Moreover, the situation became more complex after the 
introduction o f new institutional constraints. These social developments required 
constitutional amendments which necessitated two-thirds o f parliamentary majorities. 
Two available coalition options emerged, either the grand coalition o f three traditional 
parties or the coalition o f two traditional families plus one or two community parties. In 
all, when the Constitution was amended newly introduced articles imposed new 
conditions on coalition composition. According to Fitzmaurice, three o f them were 
crucial for the coalition formation. The first one stipulated that the cabinet includes 'an 
equal number o f French speaking and Dutch speaking Ministers'.“*“* The second article
“*^ .1 Gerard-Libios and X. Mabille, 'Belgian Electoral Politics', in A, Lijphart eds, Conflict and Co­
existence in Belgium, p. 132.
4 4 .1. Fitzmaurice, Politics in Beigiimi, p. 122.
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promulgated the existence o f three regions(Brussels, Wallonia, and Flanders) and two 
communities(Francophone and Flemish) . Finally, the third article stated that in order to 
pass legislation which is related to a particular community and region there must be
a majority vote within each linguistic group of both Houses, providing the 
majority of the members of each group are present and on condition that the 
total votes in favor in two linguistic group attain two-thirds of the votes
cast, 4 5
Then, political leaders had to provide a coalition which includes two-thirds o f  
Parliamentary deputies plus a single majority from the community(ies). So political 
parties had two options: either to form a grand coalition o f three traditional families or 
to create a coalition that would include two traditional families and one or two 
community parties. The coalitions that were formed in 1971-1980 period fulfilled these 
conditions. For example, while the coalition formed in 1973 was a grand coalition 
embracing three traditional families those formed in 1977 and 1978 included Christian 
Social and Socialist families as well as the VU and the FDF. The new party system 
almost returned to the traditional three-party system at the beginning o f 1980 because 
most o f the coalitions that have been formed during this period consisted o f two 
traditional parties. The Christian-Social parties have always been the dominant ones. So 
it can be concluded that the Belgian case has three significant features which are as 
follows.
i. Coalition governments are the rule rather than the exception;
ii. Except for two cases in 1974 and 1977-78 years, the minority coalition 
governments are rare in the coalition history o f Belgium; and finally
45 Ibid, p. 122.
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iii. The Christian-Social Party has been the permanent member o f all coalitions 
since 1947 except for the coalition o f Socialists and Liberals in 1954-58; that kind o f  
option lost its feasibility as the school problem was solved in 1958.“*^
The Christian-Social Party(CVP/PSC) has always been the pivotal party 
because o f its center position on the ideological Left-Right spectrum and its electoral 
strength. After the school question was solved in 1958, the party gained opportunity to 
play o ff Liberals against Communists until the constitutional revision. After that time, 
according to Rudd and Fitzmaurice, factors have determined the party strategy that have 
been constitutional requirements and factions within the each party and in the family as 
well. After the split the CVP in the Flanders region and the PS in the Wallonia emerged 
as two unequally powerful parties.
As a pivotal party, that has had power to decide which party would take part in 
the coalition government, it is essential to look at the factors and the motivations that 
influenced decisions o f the Christian-Social parties. In other words, intra-party relations 
must be analyzed in order to reach a better explanation.
As the largest party, the Christian-Social parties have represented interests o f  
various groups. The CVP has been the largest party at the national level in contrast to its 
Francophone counterpart- the PSC. As Fitzmaurice pointed out, the three social groups- 
Catholic workers, small traders and businessmen , and farmers have had organizations 
within the party and they have provided continual support for the CVP. Factions, 
representing workers and businessmen have competed with each other as the 
representatives o f conflicting interests within the party. The fate o f the coalition partners 
were dependent on the dominance o f the particular faction within the party as the case 
for the DC in Italy. Whereas the labor organization within the party has favored
Rud, 'Coalition Formation and Maintenance in Belgium: A Case Study of Elite Behavior and 
Changing Cleavage structure, 1965-1981', in G Priadham, eds. CoaJitiona] Behavior in Teory and 
Practice: An inductive M odei for Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
p.l20.
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formation o f a coalition with the former, businessmen and small traders have always 
wanted to see the Christian-Social and Liberal coalition. The PSC, as the junior party 
within the family, has been in favor o f entering into coalition with the Liberals. These 
two dimensions made the job difficult for the CVP both at intra-party and inter-party 
level.
Likewise, Socialist parties have had the same problem. The PS and SP have 
had different trade union affiliations. Due to the prosperous economic climate in 
Flanders region, the Flemish trade unions have not been against entering into coalition 
with either Christian-Social Parties or Liberal parties. In contrast, the Walloon Socialist 
trade unions have rejected the option o f forming coalitions with Liberal parties since 
1970s as natural part o f their policies like 'decentralization o f economic powers and the 
implementation o f the socialist economic policies in Wallonia'.“*^ The CVP and the PS 
became pivotal parties in coalition bargaining. Developments within each regionally 
powerful party deeply affected their probable coalition partners. In this context, within- 
party developments o f the CVP have been much more significant than those o f the PS. 
Changes in power balances among the factions within the CVP was dependent on social 
and economic circumstances but still both parties have the fear o f replacement by the 
relatively powerful regional parties. Whereas the former feels the danger o f being 
outflanked by the VU, the latter by the RW.
As the constant partner o f all government coalitions, the CVP has been a 
pragmatic, flexible, and moderate party. It has played the arbiter role in Belgian politics 
through pursuing a center-Right and Center-Left path depending upon social and 
economic circumstances. According to Fitzmaurice, with the emergence o f community 
issues, it has changed this role gradually and became a strong supporter o f Flemish 
cultural identity. As the largest party in the country, its dominance in the state paved
Fitzmaurice, Politics in Belgium, p. 134.
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way to the development o f patron-client relations between the party and the Flemish 
population.
To sum up, though there are linguistic disputes between political parties o f  
the same family, they did not abandon their practice o f acting together during coalition 
formation process and entering the same coalition government in the 1980s. Laver and 
Schofield summarizes the situation as 'links between language wings o f the same family 
may loose in some cases, but they are not yet loose enough for one wing to go into 
office without the other'.'**^  For this reason, Lijphart characterizes the Belgian case as the 
most clear example o f consensual democracy in the world whose prominent 
characteristic is the sharing o f the executive power among the parties o f different 
communities rather than the majority party.'^ ^
The existence o f a center party makes easy the coalition formation because o f  
its reconciliatory power as representative o f interests o f different segments o f society. 
For such a party it is easier to make coalition with parties that are on both side o f the 
spectrum. The French case clearly supports this idea. The absence o f a permanent 
center party during the bargaining stage and in the coalition governments resulted in 
regime breakdown. However, in the Italian case, although party fragmentation and 
polarization were seen, the existence o f the DC prevented such an event due to its 
pivotal role that comes from its center position in the party system. Whereas the 
existence o f two blocs and the Labor dominance to the Socialist bloc and the 
Conservative Party as the powerful one in the Bourgeois bloc made the coalitions stable 
in Norway, the CVP/PSC's pivotal role as the center-party prevented the chaotic
4 8 M. Laver and N. Schofield, M ultiparty Government, p. 221.
"*^ A. Lijphart, "Introduction: The Belgian Example of Cultural Coexistence in Comparative
Perspective", in A. Lijphart, eds. Conflict and Coxistence in Belgium: The Dynamics o f  a Culturally 
D ivided Society (Berkeley : University of California Press, c.1981), p.4-5.
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situation even after the fragmentation o f the traditional parties in the 1970s. However, 
the same event ended the parliamentary democracy in France in 1958.
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CHAPTER III
TURKISH COALITION GOVERNMENTS 
3.1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH CABINET COALITIONS
This chapter covers all the coalition governments that have been formed since the 
general election, held in 1961 and tries to find out whether they were office-seekers or 
policy-oriented.^ All possible factors, namely situational, compatibility, and motivational 
factors will be taken into account as stated in the theoretical section. Descriptive and 
explanatory research designs were employed so as to analyze their nature without 
missing any relevant factor. As a historical topic, documents o f the past about the topic 
as the primary and secondary sources were used for data collection. While the first 
category includes parties' brochures before the elections, government programs, 
newspapers, and coalition protocols the second one consists o f textbooks, handbooks, 
periodicals, and magazines. This study covers a comprehensive survey o f newspapers, 
especially Milliyet, starting before the general election till to the disintegration. The 
survey also included the issues o f Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet that were published in 1979, 
o f Turkish Daily News, from .lanuary to August 1996, o f those periodicals like Briefing *
*The study does not embrace the RPP and the JP minority coalitions created in 1964 and 1979 
respectively due to the absence of another coalition partner or partners. Although the TPP-MP and the 
TPP-WP coalitions that were created after the general election, held on December 24, 1995 could not 
provide majority in the Assembly they will be investigated due to the existence of at least two political 
parties. Moreover, 'abovepaity' governments that took place between 1971-1973 after the semi-militaiy 
intervention will not be scrutinized due to the absence of free bargaining situation.
that were published between 1991-1994 and o f Middle East Monitor that were published 
in March, April, May, June, and July 1996.
Before elaborating the coalition theories it seems useful to give some descriptive 
information about them.
Table 3.1. E lection R esults(V otes and Seats)^ 
ELECTION RESULTS
YEAR
15-Oct-61
Votes(%) 
N. of Seats 
14-Oct-73 
Votes(%) 
N. of Seats 
5-Jun-77 
Votes(%) 
N. of Seats 
20-Oct-91 
Votes(%) 
N. of Seats 
24-Dec-95 
Votes(%) 
N. of Seats
RPP JP RPNP NTP DemP NSP RRP NAP TPP SDPP MP WP DLP
36.7 34.8 14 14
173 158 54 65 - - - - - - - - -
33.3 29.8 _ - 11.9 11.8 5.3 3.4 - - _ - _
185 149 - - 45 48 13 3 - - - - -
41.4 36.9 - - 1.9 8.6 1.9 6.4 - - - _ _
213 189 - - 1 24 3 16 - - - - -
_ _ _ - - - _ _ 27.2 20.75 24 16 10.8
- - - - - - - - 178 88 115 62 7
10.7 _ - - - _ _ _ 19.2 _ 19.7 21.4 14.6
50 - - - - - - - 135 - 132 158 75
-The data of the pre-1980 elections were taken from E. Ozbudun, 'Election Results', in K-D. Grothusen, 
eds., Turkey, pp. 739-743.
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In addition to the this table the following one gives some descriptive information 
about the coalitions.
Table. 3 .1?
TURKISH COALITION GOVERNMENTS(l961-1996)
Y ear Prime Minister Coalition Parties Date In Date Out Vote of Confidence
1961 Inonu RPP-JP
173-158
1962 Inonu RPP-NTP-RPNP-IND
171- 62-33-13
1965 Urguplu JP-NTP-RPNP-NP
172- 22-19-13
1974 Ecevit RPP-NSP
185-48
1975 Demirel .TP-NSP-RRP-NAP
150-49-9-3
1977 Demirel .TP-NSP-NAP
189-24-16
1978 Ecevit RPP-RRP-DemP-IND
214-2-1-12
1991 Demirel TPP-SDPP/RPP
178-88
1993 Ciller TPP-SDPP/RPP
178-52
1995 Ciller TPP-SDPP/RPP
182-65
1996 Yilmaz MP-TPP
125-135
1996 Erbakan WP-TPP
158-128
Yes No
Nov-61 May-62 269 4
Jun-62 Dec-63 259 134
Feb-65 Oct-65 231 200
Jan-74 Sep-74 235 136
Mar-75 Jun-77 222 218
Jul-77 Dec-77 229 219
Jan-78 Oct-79 229 218
Nov-91 May-93 280 168
Jun-93 Sep-95 247 184
Oct-95 Mar-96 243 172
Mar-96 Jun-96 257 207
Jun-96 278 265
^Tlie data were gathered from newspapers. Coalition Protocol Between the True Path pdrty and Social 
Democratic Populist Party (Ankara: Basbakanlik Matbaasi, 1993).
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The first coalition was formed between the RPP and the JP. In terms o f number o f  
political parties the coalition confirmed Morgenstern and Neumann's theory o f minimal 
winning coalitions but as a surplus majority coalition it did not fit Piker’s theory o f a 
minimum-sized coalition because o f its number o f Parliamentary seats which were more 
than necessary. Except for the total seats, the RPP-JP coalition was verifying Leiserson's 
and Axelrod's propositions in the sense that the number o f actors were minimal and 
adjacent on the one dimensional policy scale v/hich meant that this coalition was a 
‘closed’ one as no political party(ies) stood between them.“* However the RPP-JP 
coalition could not support De Swaan's theory o f policy distance because they were 
holding different ideas on the proper role o f the state in economy and government's 
attitude toward religion. In other words, as his theory implies there has been no smooth 
transition from Left to the Right in the Turkish case which stems from the absence o f a 
center party.
The second coalition was among the RPP-NTP-RPNP-independents that was a 
surplus majority coalition when its weight is taken as a relevant criterion. This coalition 
did not fulfill propositions o f coalition theories both in terms o f political party's policy 
positions o f parties
The last one consisted o f the .IP, the NTP, the RPNP, the NP.  ^ It was a 
minimum-sized coalition with regard to parliamentary seats. Although it was not a 
minimal-winning one Riker-s theory predicted truly. It also a 'closed coalition' because 
all adjacent parties took place within it. It means that it was fitting De Swaan's policy 
distance theory.
‘*Sayari ordered parties on the one dimensional policy scale as follows: RPP-JP-NTP-RPNP. S. Sayari, 
Parlementer Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hükümetleri (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Matbaasi, 1980), 
p.l72.
^The Nation Party was an offshoot of the RPNP that was established by ex-Chair of the RPNP, Osman 
Bolukbasi with his friends in 1962. Result of confidence voting: 231 'yes' againist 200 'no' votes. 
Milliyet, Marchs, 1965.
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Order o f parties from Left to the Right was the RPP-JP-RRP-DemP-NSP-NAP 
that emerged after the 1973 general election.^ The first coalition consisted o f the RPP and 
the NSP after four months o f coalition bargaining. Morgenstern and Neumann's as well 
as Riker's theory o f minimum-sized almost truly predicted this coalition. It also 
supported Leiserson's theory in terms of its weight but fails to fulfill the policy criterion. 
Both De Swaan's policy distance and Axelrod’s ‘closed’ coalition theoreis could not 
predict the coalition in terms o f their policy positions.
The second coalition was the coalition o f the JP-RRP-NSP-NAP, the so-called 
the First National Front Coalition.'^ This coalition was a minority one. Since four parties' 
parties could not assure parliamentary majority independent deputies voted in favor o f  
the government. De Swaan’s theory predicts this minority coalition to some extent but 
the majority condition was not fulfilled.
The Second National Front coalition was formed by the three parties that were the 
.IP, the NSP, and the NAP.** Although there were parties among the coalition partners but 
ideologically there were no differences between them. So this coalition may be identified 
as a closed one. However, it partially verified De Swaan's theory o f policy distance 
because the NSP was a pro-Islamic party in contrast to the secularist nature o f the .IP.
The second coalition embraced the RPP, the RRP, the DP, and finally the 
independents.*  ^This coalition, as Ahmad pointed out, a de facto coalition o f the RPP and
*’S. Sayari, Parlementer Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hükümetleri, p. 175.
^Before tlie confidence vote there were deputy transfers because of the fact that total seats of the four 
parties were not enough Parliamentaiy majority. The number of each part's seats were as follow: the 
.1P(150), the NSP(48), the RRP(9), the NAP(3). Eight deputies left the DemP and became independent the 
number of independents rose to 14. The result of confidence vote was 222 'yes' against 218 'no' votes. 
Two deputies abstained from voting, while four deputies did not come to the voting three of whom were 
the DeniP deputies. Milliyet, April 12, 1975.
**The coalition won the confidence vote with 229 'yes' votes against 219 'no' votes. Milliyet, August 2, 
1975.
**The situation before the confidence was as as follows in Parliament: the RPP(214), the DP(1), 
Independents who left the JP(14), the NSP(24), the NAP(16). Milliyet, December 21, 1977. The coalition 
cabinet won the confidence vote with 229 'yes' votes against 219. Milliyet, Febmaiy 18, 1978.
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JP. There was no ideological similarity between the coalition partners.'*  ^ It was 
aminimum-sized coalition but not a minimal-wining one. It did not proper to claims o f  
the policy-based theories o f De Swaan, Leiserson and Axelrod.
From Left to the Right the policy scale was the SDPP-DLP-TPP-MP-WP after 
the 1991 general election. The all three cabinet coalitions were formed by the TPP and 
the SDPP/RPP that were minimal winning and surplus majority coalitions. Since they 
did not share similar ideas about economic matters and since their understanding of 
secularism was different De Swaan's and Axelrod's assumptions did not have predictive 
power.
Two minority coalition governments were set up.after the general election o f  
1995. Whereas the MP-TPP minority had outside support o f the DLP the WP-TPP 
coalition was backed by the Grand Unity Party(GUP) which is a coalition o f the Right- 
wing parties.“ De Swaan's policy distance theory predicted the former as the coalition o f  
parties, having similar policy goals. However the second one is coalition o f parties that 
are holding opposite ideas about Turkish foreign policy, secularism, political problems.
'*Tlie RPP split from the SDPP in 1992 but two parties merged under the name tlie former in 1995. Tlie 
WP made an alliance with the Refonnist Democracy Party, and the National Work Party before the 
election to pass ten per cent national threshold.
' 'The MP made an election alliance with the small Grand Unity Party that won seven seats on the ticket 
of the MP.
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3. 2. SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
Economy was in bankruptcy in 1961 due to the deterioration o f the terms o f trade 
which was the result o f export stagnation. The government either canceled or postponed 
most o f the investments.’“ Private enterprises also stopped most o f their activities 
because o f economic insecurity, unpredictability, and the RPP's program o f planned 
economy. In addition to these unfavorable conditions, the poor harvest in 1960 and also 
1961 worsened the economic conditions in Turkey. .lust after 1963 economy entered 
into a period o f recovery when the private sector had secured ascendancy over that o f the 
state. Moreover, agricultural production, especially cotton and tobacco, increased 
depending on good weather conditions.’^
Economic stagnation resulted in four-million unemployed and a highly skewed 
income distribution in the sense that two per cent o f population received thirty-eight per 
cent o f national income which, in turn, meant social unrest and political instability.’  ^
The reason for the May 27, 1960 military intervention was to restore order and 
democracy in Turkey. The National Unity Committee was dissolved after almost one 
and half year o f rule when the first civilian government was set up. However its de facto 
rule continued because after the October general election in 1961 political party leaders, 
the service commanders, and the chief-of-the-general-staff Cevdet Sunay met on 
October 23, 1961 and signed the Çankaya Protocol. The protocol stipulated that the army 
would not intervene provided that
i) all parties support the candidacy o f General Gürsel during the presidential 
election;
'“F. Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy (Boulder. Westview Press, 1977), p.268 and see for 
the economic polisies in the 1950s R. Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.57 
'^Ibid., p.279.
’"’Milliyet, October 3, 1961.
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ii) they would abstain from making a political issue out o f amnesty and claim 
amnesty for those ex-Democrat Party members who were still in prison;
ii) they would not criticize or debate laws passed by the NUC since May 27; and
finally
ii) ismet Inonu, the Chairman o f the RPP, would be the prime minister and 
would form the new government.!^
Following the protocol, the military did not cease to supervise daily politics, 
rather its supervision continued in two ways:
a. The military officers, who had carried the coup, became life Senators in the 
newly established Senate except the 'Fourteens';
b. General Gürsel was duly elected President.M oreover, there were two 
military coup attempts on February 22, 1962 and May 21-22, 1963.
The .lustice Party's economic policies o f expansionary growth resulted in the 
indirect military intervention on March 12, 1971 whose rule lasted two years. Since 
Turkey was a newly industrializing country at that time, her infant industry was 
dependent upon importation o f foreign capital, intermediary goods, and also raw 
materials. The government had to import all these necessaiy items without exporting at 
the initial stage o f industrialization. In order to meet all these expenditures the ruling 
party chose inflationary growth that led to an abrupt rise in inflation. This affected the 
segments o f society with fixed income at the beginning o f the 1970s. After two years o f 
growth which was the result o f increasing exports and the rise in the workers' 
remittances the economy became stagnated again because o f the recession o f the world 
economy after the OPEC doubled oil prices in 1973 and again in 1979. Rise in oil prices 
in the world markets meant increase in prices o f capital, intermediary goods as well as
'^O. F. Lologlu, Ismet Inonu and the Political Modernization o f  Turkey, (Michigan:
Michigan University Microfilms Xerox Company, 1971), pp. 229-230 nad F. Ahmad, The Tiukish 
Experiment, p. 17 ].
M. Landau, Radical Politics in Turkey {LQiáQW. E. J. Brill, 1974), p.l3.
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those o f raw materials. Moreover, Turkey needed more foreign currency to meet her oil 
expenditures. During these years coalition governments did not halt expansionary 
industrial growth. The stagnation in industry resulted in decrease o f average GNP rate 
from seven percent to four per cent and rise in inflation from forty to sixty per cent in 
1977.'^ Its repercussions at the societal level were the deterioration o f the civil service 
and decline o f thmst to the democratic government due to the widespread pessimism 
among the people and the perennial accusations among the political elite. Ahmad also 
states that after the formation o f the RPP-NSP coalition in 1974 political terrorism 
started a g a in .T h e s e  worsening economic and social conditions gave way to 
polarization both at the elite and societal level.
Export-oriented industrialization policies replaced the former import-substituting 
ones immediately after the military intervention on September 12, 1980. The first civilian 
Motherland Party government formed in December 1983 and the subsequent TPP- 
SDPP/RPP coalition government also followed the same expansionary economic policies 
as their predecessors did before the intervention. Although the growth rate was around 
seven per cent in 1983-1987 after that date it gradually decreased. These expansionary 
economic policies again resulted in economic crisis at the beginning o f 1994, resulting in 
chronic inflation, unemployment, deterioration o f social justice due to unequal 
distribution o f the national income, decreasing productive capacity o f the private sector, 
strikes o f the workers in the public sector that led to the disintegration o f the TPP- 
SDPP/RPP coalition in September, 1995. Effects o f all these worsening economic 
conditions have been the erosion o f the middle classes, social unrest, high electoral 
volatility, and finally fragile coalition governments. Erguder states that 'Turkish
'^E. Ozbudun and A. Ulusan. 'Ovewiev', in E. Ozbudun and A. Ulusan, eds., The Political Economy o f  
Income Distribution in Turkey (Hew York and London: Meiner Publishers, Inc., 1980), p. 18.
H. Karpat, Turkish Democracy at Impasse: Ideology, Party Politics, and the Third Military 
Intervention, International Journal o f  Turkish Studies CWoXX No. 1, Spring/Summer, 1981, pp.1-43), 
p.40.
'‘^ F, Ahmad, The Making o f  Modem  Ti/rley (London: Routledge, 1993), p.l69.
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democracy has continued to frail and this constitutes one o f the most important obstacles 
to further democratization in Turkey.-®
The party system displayed a 'bipolar-decentralized' character after the 1961 
general election. Two decades o f the rnonoparty rule ended when the Democrat Party 
was allowed to form and compete in the general election o f 1946. It eventually came to 
power in the 1950 general election by obtaining 53.3 per cent o f the total votes and 83.8 
per cent o f the Assembly seats, thanks to the simple majority election system."' Its reign 
had lasted until the military coup that was carried out on May 27, 1960. In the meantime 
the DP consolidated its organizational structure in all around the country, even in the 
villages similar to the RPP. The discerning characteristics o f the two big parties on the 
each side o f the spectrum were their strongly institutionalized pyramid-type and country­
wide organization with branches in subdistricts and villages(bucak and ocak 
organization). Their approach to politics were integrative, rather than class-based or 
sectarian. Party system was a two party system but the center or the core area was vacant 
in the 1950s. Sartori argues that party system o f moderate pluralism is more likely if 
there is already 'structured and stabilized party system' which means
One in which at least one or two of the existing parties liave acquired, at 
the moment in which proportional representation is introduced- a national 
platform, a unified symbol, and some stable organization also at the local 
level, so that they are perceived by the countiy at large as the natural foci and 
channels of the political system. Clearly the strong structuring of the early 
parties can in itself be a poweiful restrainer or container of party proliferation.
Under these circumstances the internally created parties are likely to play a
“®U. Erguder, The Turkish Party System and the Future of Turkish Democracy, in E. Balim, et all, eds., 
Turkey: Political, Social, and Economic Challenges in the 1990s (hex Aen: E. J. Brill, 1995), p.69 and A. 
Eralp, 'The Politics of Turkish Development', in A. Finkel and N. Sirman, eds.. The Turkish State and 
Turkish Society {London'. Routledge, 1990), P.242.
"'e . Ozbudun, 'Political Parties and Elections', in K-D. Grothusen, eds. Turkey: Handbook on South 
Eastern Europe ( Gottingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 1985, Vol.IV), p.266.
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major role in the mass party era(instead of being ousted by the external created 
parties) and the pattern is therefore likely to remain bipolar.“^
There were four parties around the center, three o f which were against the 
government ownership o f industries (the newly established .IP and NTP, probable heirs 
to the defunct DP together with the RPNP). Their understanding o f the government's 
attitude toward religion was similar but it was different from that o f the RPP. These 
parties won 62.5 per cent o f the total votes and 277 seats respectively. However, the 
RPP as the only statist party with its strict understanding o f secularism obtained 173 
parliamentary seats with 36.8 per cent o f the total vote. The party system was 'bipolar- 
depolarized' there were four moderate parties with centripetal tendencies because this 
party system includes three or four parties."  ^ The reason for the centripetal tendency was 
the vacancy o f the core area in Turkish party system. In 'bipolar-decentralized' party 
systems all parties have chance to become a coalition partner; while some parties are 
alternating in the government others change their coalition partners. Available number o f  
possible coalition government options are relatively higher but limited."“* The newly 
established NTP was the pivotal party with its 65 seats in the Assembly in the sense that 
it was the key party in all coalition options except the RPP-.IP coalition.
Sartori further argues that development o f centrifugal tendencies are possible 
provided that a religious-confessional criterion is superimposed upon the Left-Right 
dichotomy. The degree o f centrifugation depends on the power o f the religious appeal."  ^
At the beginning o f the seventies, party system became fragmented starting in 1967 but 
not polarized until the creation o f the pro-religious National Order Party(NOP) and its 
heir, the National Salvation Party(NSP) a year after its closure in 1972. After that time
Sartori, 'European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism' in Lapalombara and Weiner, 
n. 170.
“^Ibid., p. 165.
"“*Ibid„ p.l38.
"^Ibid., p.l70.
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the party system started to represent tendencies o f polarization. With the adoption o f the 
RPP’s 'left-of-center' policies in 1965 the already existing distinction between the two 
blocs became more obvious. Although there were basically no differences between the 
type o f cleavages among political parties, namely the role o f the state in the economy and 
the parties’ attitudes towards religion before and after the shift political parties started to 
be ranged from the Left to the Right after the RPP’s shift. In other words, the parties that 
were more tolerant towards the Islamic religion and that gave priority to private sector in 
the economy took place on the right o f the political spectrum as opposed to the strict 
secularism and the statist economic policies o f the leftist parties. The defection o f the 
two liberal factions o f the RPP in 1967 and 1972 and their merger as separate parties to 
form the Republican Reliance Party(RRP) in 1973 illustrates the homogenization o f the 
camps.
As parallel to the prominent features o f the party system in the 1970s 
which were fragmentation, the emergence o f the pro-Islamic NSP, polarization, 
emptiness o f the center again Sartori proposes another typology o f the party system, 
'polarized-multipolar', that can explain Turkish case especially in the second half o f the 
1970s. Its significant characteristics are
1. the lack of centrality indicated by the physical existence of a center 
and thereby the likely prevalence of centrifugal drives; 2. a high degree of 
ideological rigidity or in any case a non-pragmatic approach to politics; 3. 
marked cleavage at the elite level, which in turn deepens the fragmentation of 
basic consensus; 4. the absence of real alternative government; 5. the growth of 
irresponsible opposition and thereby the politics of outbidding, of unfair
competition 26
26Ibid., p. 159-160.
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Although Right-wing parties won 61.4 per cent o f the total votes and 258 seats 
they were divided among five parties due to party fragmentation.^"  ^ It implies that in a 
polarized multipolar system every party has a great relevance for the formation of 
coalition governments as in the case o f the National Action party with three seats. The 
pro-Islamic National Salvation party became the pivotal party or the unavoidable partner 
of all majority coalition options when the newly established Democratic Party(DemP) 
rejected to participate in any coalition either with the RPP or the .IP after the 1973 
general election. When the system was polarized the RPP became a captive party. The 
reason for this was that it could not propose any coalition alternative against the Rightist 
bloc.
The ultimate reason for the increasing importance o f the small parties was the 
alternation o f all coalition partners in the absence o f an influential center party as the 
unchanging coalition partner. Put differently, center-Right and center-Left parties 
normally prefer to make a coalition with the center party as the approximate partner on 
the policy scale rather than the extremist ones. When the system was polarized the 
smaller parties became inevitable for all coalition options instead o f the center party 
which has been always absent in Turkish politics.
Despite three years o f military rule and the closing down o f all parties bipolar 
structure o f the Turkish party system reemerged after the 1983 general election. The 
distribution o f votes skewed towards the Right again. In the absence o f a significant 
religious party, the party system remained bipolar-decentralized until the 1991 general 
election. Though there was an increase in the number o f parties in the Assembly after the 
1991 general election the available number for coalition formation was very restricted 
which prevented the emergence o f a pivotal party.
“^See E. Ozbuduii, 'The Tiukish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization, and Fragmentation', 
M iddle Eastern Studies {Vo\. 17, No. 2, 1981, pp.228-240) and I Turan, ’Stages of Political development 
in the Turkili Republic', in E. Ozbudun et all, eds.. Perspectives on Democracy in Ti/ile/(Ankara: 
Sevinc Matbaasi, 1987),
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Despite the emergence o f two significant center-left and two center-right parties 
in the post-1980 Turkish party system the left-wing parties were able to secure 95 
parliamentary seats with their 31.5 per cent o f votes compared to right-wing parties with 
67 per cent o f votes and 355 Assembly seats respectively in the 1991 elections. In the 
1995 general election the total vote percentage o f the Left was around thirty percent in 
contrast to approximately seventy per cent o f the total right vote.^8 The Party system can 
be named as 'bipolar-fractionalized' during the 1965 -1973 and 1991 to present era.
Recent coalition bargaining supported the hypothesis, developed by Keman and 
Budge, who stated that systemic parties form coalition among themselves by disregarding 
the Left-Right distinction in order to secure the democratic system against the anti- 
systemic party or parties as the DLP and the MP did. The pro-Islamic Welfare 
party(WP), as the largest one in the aftermath o f 1995 general election, did not play an 
influential role during the coalition bargaining process which was stemming from its 
captive party status meaning that all parties rejected coalition partnership with the WP. 
Another characteristic o f the 'bipolar-fractionalized' party system is that keeping other 
factors under control, parties with centrist tendencies has capability and power to pacify 
anti-systemic parties during the coalition formation stage despite their fragmented nature.
Emergence o f the Democrat Party as opposite party o f the RPP in terms of  
economic and religious cleavages in Turkish society, a twenty-seven year rule o f the RPP 
with strict secularist and strong statist economic policies created centrifugal tendency 
among the political elite when the multiparty politics was introduced. Majority election 
system and the victory o f the DP in the three subsequent elections after 1950 because o f  
the Islamic character o f Turkish society resulted in emergence and consolidation o f  
bipolar party system in Turkey. The RPP, as the only party o f the 1923-1946 era 
consisted o f an overwhelming statist faction together with a smaller group who were on
-**Tlie calculation was made adding the votes of the parties that could not pass the ten per cent electoal 
threshold.
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the side o f private sector but they were also secular persons. This faction left the party 
after the RPP had moved to the left. Except for two factions that moved to the Right 
due to their inclination to support the private enterprise, there was no inter-bloc party 
movement. After this process o f internal party homogenization political parties have had 
certain tendencies within the same party philosophy. It means that there may be a 
liberal, a conservative or a nationalist group putting stress on private enterprise within 
the Center-Right party, other Right-wing parties have the same economic views but their 
stress either big industrialists or the smaller ones and on religion differ.^“
Unlike the formation o f the NTP that capitalized on the remnants o f the defunct 
Freedom Party, during its establishment in February 1961, the .IP's party elites were 
newcomers because the party elites o f the ex-DP had been in prison. However, these two 
newly emerged parties found ready party organizations at the provincial and sub­
provincial level stuffed by the followers o f the DP. In contrast to the organization o f the 
NTP that followed a mixed pattern o f penetration because o f its ready party elite and o f  
diffusion through inheriting ex-DP's organizations at the local level, the .TP's 
organization pattern was completely diffusive because o f the fact that the defunct DP 
adherents saw the .IP as the natural heir. Arsev similarly states that
when the time came to establish party organization at the country level, the job 
to be done was to change the name of the party and some party officials due to 
the ready organization of the Democrat Party.  ^^
Y. Geyikdagi, Political Parties in Turkey: The Role o f  Islam York: Preager, 1984), p.l25 and
M. J. Landau, Radical Politics, p.l7.
^^ ^Thougli the Motherland Party tried to this but in the end or at the top elite level there was no such 
faction. Because center-right parties have always been controlled by the liberal and nationalist faction 
rather than either consevative or the social democratic faction, even they have had little influence on the 
party policies..
■^‘A. Bektas, Demokratikleşme Surecinde Liderler Oligarşisi, CHP ve AP (1961-1980) {IsimhuV. Bağlam 
Yayincilik, 1993), pp. 33-34.
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Party factions play decisive role during the coalition formation as well as the 
maintenance stage. In order to reach a better understanding it is vital to identify the party 
factions. Dominant coalition o f the JP's elite had no control over the 'zones o f 
uncertainty' during the first years o f its establishment, in Panebianco's term. In other 
words, they could not control who would be the deputy candidate before the election. 
The party was more like the federation o f different factions in the Assembly with 
different aims. It consisted o f three different groups in the Parliament,: conservatives 
and religious sympathizers who became deputies for the first time, some authoritarian 
liberal persons, emotionally attached to the DP, and finally the moderate, better educated 
ones, closer to the state administration. The first two groups made an alliance against the 
moderates on the basis o f the common goal i.e., to obtain immediate pardon for ex-DP 
prisoners.^“ They were either called 'extremists' or the 'nationalist-sacredists'(miliyetci- 
mukaddesatci).^^ The Competition between these two factions had continued until the 
December 1970 when the extremists left the party to establish the Democratic Party 
under the leadership o f Ferruh Bozbeyli, even though the moderates became dominant 
after the Second General Congress o f the JP in 1964 with the election o f Suleyman 
Demirel, party Chairman.
Though Ekrem Alican and his close associates secured full control over the party 
executive, they could not succeed in obtaining the loyalty o f the party's parliamentary 
group. Religious and ardent nationalist groups also left the .IP either to create the 
religious NOP, later the NSP, or to take part in the pro-fascist National Action Party, led 
by Alpaslan Turkes. Likewise, the RPP also lost its last remnants o f conservative faction 
in 1972. Towards the end o f the decade three tendencies emerged within the RPP which 
were the group gathered around Ali Topuz, the General Center's group or the moderates
“^C. H. Dodd, Politics and Government in (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969),
p.l47.
Y. Geyikdagi, Political Parties in Turkey, p.l02.
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who were supporting the General Executive Board, and Deniz Baykal's group. While the 
first one was against the second, the third one opposed to the two by adopting the motto 
'left opposition'.^"*
The center-right parties-the TPP and the MP- have always had a secularist and a 
conservative faction, including nationalists and conservatives with their secondary role in 
the party administration. However, the liberals have been the ascendants and hence the 
ruling ones as their counterparts during the pre-1980 period.^^
Tursan draws attention to the existence o f the three factions within the TPP which 
are the 'status quo' group, the 'conservative renovators', and the 'liberal renovators'.^  ^ The 
First faction led by Ismet Sezgin and Koksal Toptan left the TPP after the formation o f  
the TPP-WP minority coalition together with their ten friends. The second faction under 
the leadership o f Ayvaz Gokdemir and Baki Tug prevented further democratization 
program during the TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition by collaborating with other parties' 
conservatives in the Assembly. The third faction is headed by the party Chairwoman 
Tansu Ciller.
The MP's factions has been liberals led by the party leader, Mesut Yilmaz, and 
conservatives who had the least influence on the direction o f party policies.
The SDPP was including the old RPP party elites and the new ones during its first 
establishment. After its merger with the Populist Party in 1985 this conflict became more 
apparent when Baykal's group, as a continuation o f the pre 1980 era factional disputes, 
had tried to capture the party control until he left the party with his eighteen associates to 
revitalize the defunct RPP in 1992. Inonu did not give ministries to this old faction in the 
TPP-SDPP coalition government. Baykal's group became the dominant one shortly after 
the merger o f the SDPP and RPP under the name o f the latter in 1995. Another group
"^^ Milliyet, October 22, 1979.
Tursan, 'Pernicious Party factionalism as a Constraint of the Transitions to Democracy in Turkey, 
Democratization, (Vol.2, No.l, Spring 15, pp.169-184), p.l75.
*^>Ibid., p.l79.
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within the SDPP was A. G. Gurkan's one whose aim was more democratization during 
their coalition partnership with the TPP.^’
Turkish public opinion has always been on the side o f consensus and compromise 
has generally no strong ideological commitments. Rather it has behaved in a pragmatic 
way in the sense that people and businessmen have called for the formation o f the RPP- 
JP coalition during the 1960-1980 era and more recently before formation o f the TPP- 
MP coalition if  no single party enjoyed a parliamentary majority. Finally party followers 
and businessmen succeeded in realizing their historical aims when the TPP-MP short­
lived minority coalition was formed because o f the strong pressure over the parties. 
Even though it was a short-lived one this coalition demonstrated power o f the centrist 
tendency o f the Turkish public opinion. Survey results that have been carried out before 
the 1977 general election illustrated that seventy-five per cent o f the respondents 
identified themselves with centrist, moderate ideological tendencies in the heydays o f  
ideological polarization at the elite and mass level.^» The results o f the 1977 general 
election illustrated that a great amount o f votes were won by the center-Right and 
center-Left parties in the absence o f the center party rather than extreme parties.
However the situation was somewhat different at the party elite level especially in 
the evenly but precariously balanced parliaments o f the 1970s. The past legacy o f the 
political culture o f the state precluded the development o f the notion o f the loyal 
opposition because o f some characteristics like low tolerance and authoritarianism. 
Karpat argues that some Turkish political leaders, including Inonu, perceived the RPP as 
the vanguard o f Turkish modernization and educator o f the people, the party elites
^^Ibid., p.l81.
K a l a y c i o g l u ,  'Elections and Party Prefrences in Turkey: Changes and Continuities in the 1990s', 
Com piifiitivepolitico! Stiidiss, (Vol.27, No. 3, October 1994, p.403-424), p.422.
‘^■^E. Ozbudun, 'State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey', in L. Diamond, eds., Political 
Culture in Developing Countries p.252. and also his another article 'Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and 
Reequilibrations' in L. Diamond, .1. Linz, and S. M. Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries: 
Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder and Colorado: L. Rienner, 1990), p.201.
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despised the opposition when they were in power or they identified those who were in 
power as usurpers when they were in opposition. The largest two parties have 
represented this political culture.'*  ^According to Heper,
their intolerance toward opposition, which leads to the persistent accusation that one's opponents have 
divisive motivations, would have hampered cooperation among the political parties.'^^
‘*"K. H. Karpat, 'Turkish Democracy at Impasse', p.32.
Heper, 'Recent Instability In Turkish Politics: End of Monocentrist Policy', International Joiunal o f  
Turkish Studies, (Vol.l, No.l, Winter 1979-1980, pp.102-112), p.l09.
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3. 3. COMPATIBILITY VARIABLES
This sub-section tackles with the question o f to what degree coalition partners 
have shared the similar party ideology, or the similar policy goals. Variables such as 
compatibility o f their social bases, and the effects o f prior party relations on the 
composition o f the coalitions will also be considered.
The first coalition was between the RPP and the .IP, the heir o f the ex-DP, after 
the general election o f 1961 that was described by Dodd as 'shot-gun marriage'.'*  ^
Ideologically, the difference between two parties was coming from their attitude toward 
the role o f the state in economy which means that whereas the former was giving priority 
to the state in economic matters the latter supported the private enterprise but the state 
would get involved in economic matters if the private enterprise could not manage. In 
other words, the state economic enterprises had to play a role o f supporting and 
encouraging the private sector .D u rin g  the election campaigns the .IP insisted on its 
ideas on the proper role o f the state in economy. In opposition to this idea that assigns the 
state into the secondary role the RPP emphasized that the economic planning had to be 
realized through the newly established State Planning Organization(SPO). The reason for 
this was coming from its strong criticisms o f the defunct DP's economic policies which 
had been characterized by lack o f any economic planning."·“* For this reason the new 
Constitution o f 1961 also stipulated the establishment o f the SPO. Shaw and Shaw 
describe it as 'progressively but basically a middle class liberal party, somewhat more 
socialistic than before but still moderate'."·^
“*-C. H. Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey, p.l44.
“•^Milliyet, September 13 and October 1, 1961.
“•“•O. F. Lologlu, Ismet Jnonu and Political Modernization o f  Turkey, p.235 and .
“• S^. .1. Shaw, and E. K. Shaw, History of Ottoman Empire and Modem Turfkey. Reform, Revolution, and 
Republic: The Rise o f  modern Turkey, /¿’d<?-7P75 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, vol. 
2), p.421.
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Another source o f difference was coming from their attitudes toward religion 
despite the fact that both parties were secular in their nature. In contrast to the strict 
secularism o f the RPP, the .IP represented a more tolerant attitude toward religion. But 
the former relaxed its statist and secularist policies before the election, consequently the 
party recognized the equal status o f the private sector with that o f the state and 
interpreted its statism as a social welfare state The party also welcomed foreign 
capital under equal conditions with domestic capital so as to secure the support o f the 
business community.
Both parties promised a piece o f land to the landless and land-short peasants, 
although the .IP’s promise was weak one, rather it preferred to increase agricultural 
productivity with modern farm techniques. The party declared to revise some segments 
o f the prevalent taxation system related to land, property, and agricultural income taxes, 
and also to reduce the proportion o f taxes on small trade. Furthermore, the party also 
promised to abolish to compulsory sharing bonds and to eliminate wealth declarations.‘*'^ 
The .IP promised to decentralize the state administration and to increase the autonomy of 
the local administrations.
The only point on which both parties declared the same intentions was the 
recognition o f the workers' right to strike and establishment o f social welfare provisions 
that would embrace the whole population.
However, the NTP had different outlook from the .TP as one o f the partners in the 
second coalition government with the RPP, RPNP, and Independents. It was an adherent 
o f the nineteenth century or laissez-faire liberalism. In an interview, Ekrem Alican, the 
Chairman o f the NTP, stated that except in areas where the public interest was
Balirampour, Turkey; Political and Social Tmnsfonmtion York: Theo, Gaus' Sons Inc., 1967).
p.57.
H. Karpat, "Social Groups and Political System after 1960", in K. H. Karpat, eds.. Social Change 
and Politics in Turkey {heidew. E. J. Brill, 1973), p.253.
‘***Even in the health sector the JP was recognizing the priority of the private enterprise, according to 
Dodd. C. H. Dodd,PoHtics and Government, p.l41.
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predominant, private enterprise should be the basis o f the economic development, the 
state had to help the individual entrepreneurs by providing technical knowledge, 
personnel as well through its technology and capital especially in areas where the private 
enterprise was weak. There is conditionality here that the state had to withdraw from 
these areas as the private enterprise was flourishing.“*^
Social justice might be provided through a just taxation system, according to 
him, but the taxation system should be inducive to the development o f the private sector 
rather than curbing it. Due to its strong adherence to liberal ideas coalition barraging with 
the RPP failed in the first round when there was disagreement over the proper role o f the 
SPO. Although the JP accepted the equal status o f the state sector with the private ones 
and planning role o f the SPO, the NTP declared after the disintegration o f the RPP-.TP 
coalition that they were against the SPO's working manner that would discourage private 
enterprise.^“ The NTP successfully made its ideas accepted by its coalition partner-the 
RPP during the second round o f the bargaining. According to the agreement Alican 
would be the Deputy Prime Minister responsible from economic affairs, including the 
activities o f the SPO. Due to its pivotal position, the RPP had to give more concessions 
as shown in the coalition protocol o f June 24, 1962^
........the state must encourage private enterprise, its investments, and to divert
them towards the fields necessitated by rapid and balanced development.
However, this encouragement must be through a financial and credit policy, 
and through the fomiation of a capital policy, and guidance and technical 
knowledge, and technical knowledge, and not through direct interference, 
which is compatible with the economic and political order with which we 
identify ourselves.........The fundamental principle that must guide the work to
‘^“Milliyet, Septembers, 1961.
■‘'“Milliyet, .hine 9, 1962 Türkiye CumhmiyetiHukimietlevi(l960-1978) (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi, 
1978, Cilt. 2), p.36.
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be undertaken by the state, should be to make strategic investments, 
investments necessary for long-term development, and investments that private 
enteiprise cannot undertake.
Another coalition partner, the RPNP, had been representing the conservative and 
religious sector o f the Turkish political spectrum until its charismatic leader, O. 
Bolukbasi, with his close associates left the party in 1962 to revitalize the ex-Nation 
Party(NP) o f 1948.^- After their departure the RPNP became relatively a moderate party 
that had been formed by the dissidents o f the DP.^  ^ The party remained alive together 
with the RPP during the military intervention in 1960.
According to Karpat, the RPNP adopted principals o f liberalism in both economic 
and political matters. The party program envisaged for the state a role o f supervising the 
market rather than becoming an obstacle through interference. The conditions the party 
declared before the coalition bargaining with the RPP justifies Karpat's statements about 
the party program.^  ^ These were about the working principals o f the SPO, land reform, 
and proper role o f the state in economy. In relation to the first, the party officials claimed 
that the SPO had to get rid o f theoretical works and had to focus on projects with 
practical value.
As a core idea o f liberalism, the party recognized private property as sacred rights 
of individuals and proposed that land reform had to be dealt with in terms of 
management rather than distribution o f the land. In other words, similar to the ideas o f  
the .IP and NTP RPNP was envisaging agricultural reform rather than land reform. The 
third conditionality was to end the state capitalism. Again it gave the state secondary 
role in economic realm, guiding private enterprise by providing capital and information.
^'F. Almiad, The Turkish Experiwent in Democracy, pp. 273-274. and K. H. Kaipat, 'Domestic Politics', 
in K-D. Grothusen, eds., Tmkey, p. 72
“^W. F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961 (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 103..
H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p. 433.
^nhid., p.433.
55Milliyet.lune 13, 1962 and September 15, 1961.
72
However, it was not against planning within the idea o f national economy. It envisaged 
that the state should train religious men, though it accepted the separation o f the religion 
from the state.
The third coalition government consisted o f the newly formed NP in addition to 
the JP, the NTP, and RPNP. The NP was the most conservative party with its special 
emphasis on religion and morality.^  ^ Like RPNP it believed in the priority o f the private 
sector over that o f the state as well as flexible planning but strongly against unequal 
competition that would lead to the extinction o f smaller ones as well as being against 
communism and fascism.
The first two coalitions were compulsory in the sense that they were dictated by 
the m ilitary .O n e o f the life senators had stated two days before the NTP's acceptance 
o f the partnership o f the RPP that 'we told President Gürsel that nobody except Inonu 
should be premier, and it is impossible to think a cabinet without the RPP'.^ *^  In terms o f  
party goals the third four-party coalition was a caretaker coalition before the 1965 
general election.
The constituency o f the RPP consisted o f different segments o f the society, 
mainly bureaucrats, some part o f the intelligentsia and professional groups, some 
segments o f the business community which were against inflationary economic policies 
of the DP, and local notables. In contrast the .IP's constituency was embracing large 
segments o f the business community, especially newly rising commercial groups and 
industrial middle classes, non-radical intellectuals, landowners and traditional rural 
elements in the relatively developed regions o f the country. The NTP was also appealing 
the same constituency as the JP, but the party was powerful in the eastern provinces o f
'^’R. P. Nye, The M ilitaiy in Turkish Politics, p. 273.
H. Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey, p .lT i.
*^^Milliyet, .Tune 20, 1962. Another interesting was that the voting held by the general Administrative 
Board of the .IP to decide whether to make coalition with RPP or not resulted in 90 'yes' votes against 89 
'no' votes. Six out of ninety persons had planned to abstain from voting at the begining. Milliyet, 
November 16, 1962.
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Turkey because its strong party organization during the time o f the Freedom Party in the 
second half o f the 1950s.^  ^ The RPNP and its offshoot, the NP, appealed to the 
conservative votes, large amount o f which was concentrated in Central Anotolian 
provinces like Konya, Ankara, Kütahya, Kirsehir, Afyon, Yozgat due to the charismatic 
leader, O. Bolukbasi.
In relation to leadership and constituency factors, the constituencies o f the JP and 
NTP felt hatred against the RPP and its veteran leader Inonu. Dodd draws attention to 
two factors that led to the such feelings: whereas the first one was originating from the 
bad reputation o f the RPP and o f its leader due to the strict secularization program, 
heavy-handed bureaucratic administration, and statist economic policies from which 
large segments o f the population, especially the mral ones, newly rising merchants and 
industrial middle classes had been deeply affected during the monoparty period, the 
second factor was the result o f identification o f the RPP with the military intervention as 
a rescue operation to save the RPP from the repressive policies o f the DP.^"
The JP leader, Ragip Gumuspala, who had been a general before he retired from 
the army in 1960, was rather a moderate person. Because o f his personality and o f the 
hostility o f the JP's constituency against the RPP he was not successful in establishing 
control over the party's parliamentary group and its provincial organizations during as 
well as after the coalition. Osman Bolukbasi was opposed to both Gumuspala and Inonu. 
Ekrem Alican and Hasan Dincer were moderate leaders o f the NTP and the RPNP.
Except for the RPP the two newly formed parties had no firmly established 
country-wide party organization before the 1961 general election. When they became 
coalition partners this created problems for the governing party elites in reconciling the 
demands o f the parliamentary groups, the provincial party leaders and the party 
executives. The environmental complexity and hostility in terms o f electoral volatility
H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics p.433 
H. Dodd, Politics and Government, p.l35.
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and army's hostile attitudes toward the newly established parties played significant role 
on the stability and effectiveness o f the coalition during the 1961-1965 period.
The party system is generally identified with fragmentation and polarization in 
the 1970s, starting toward end o f the sixties. In addition to the two parties, three new 
parties emerged which were the Democratic Party, splitting from the .IP, the NOP, 
established by those who left the .IP, and the RPNP. The third and last one was the 
Turkish Unity Party(TUP). Moreover, the RPNP was reorganized and renamed as the 
National Action Party in 1969. All o f these newly emerged parties took place on the right 
side o f the spectrum with the .IP. Four cabinet coalitions and a .IP minority coalition were 
created within a seven year period until the military intervention o f 1980.
Turkish political parties had to adapt themselves to their changing environments. 
In other words they were compelled to revise their ideological stance on the policy scale. 
Because as Ozbudun stated with increasing industrialization and social mobilization they 
(center-periphery cleavages) tend to be replaced by functional cleavages'.^' It meant that 
parties had to aggregate changing interests without interrupting internal party balances. 
However, it was a very difficult job to reconcile the old elements with the new ones 
within the rigid hierarchical structure o f the two old parties where there were vertical 
relations between the party elites. For this reason the change was a slow and painful 
process, resulting in departure o f the old elements rather than in reconciliation between 
them.
The RPP adopted 'left-of-center' policies to cope with its environment efficiently 
and not to yield its constituency to the newly formed Turkish Labor Party. Karpat 
describes the RPP's new ideology as follows:
 ^' E. Ozbudun, Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976), p.55.
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Tlie new ideology rejected Marxism and Communism, as well as the old form 
of nationalism formulated by Ataturk, that had been basis of the party until the 
1960s. Instead, it preached social justice, populism, and economic 
development based on massive state support, without rejecting private 
enterprise or individual ownership of property.
According to the new program o f the party, the 'public sector' would be the 
vanguard especially in the establishment and development o f large industrial enterprises 
and industry which was producing basic industrial goods.^  ^ The state would be 
empowered with opportunities and capabilities to realize planned and disciplined rapid 
industrialization, although the new program was giving priority to the national economy 
while not precluding international competition. On the contrary, the program stipulated 
that structuration o f Turkish industry with its institutions, adjustment o f it to the EEC 
standards and empowerment o f its competitive power in the Common Market would be 
taken into account as solution to the economic problems o f the country. '^* This implied 
that Turkey would not refrain from the Common Market she would also look for new 
markets in the Middle East.
The party declared its strong support to the small and medium-sized economic 
enterprises against the large industrial conglomerates in order to decrease regional 
inequality and population concentration in big cities. The party brought some 
limitations over the foreign capital in terms o f both quantity and sectors in which it 
would take place.
’^-K. H. Karpat, 'Introduction to Political and Social Thought in Turkey, in K. H. Karpat, eds.. Political 
and Social Thought in Contemporary Middle East York: Preager, 1982, second edition), p. 448- 
449.
Günlere: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1973 Secim Bildirgesi{Ank<iX3.·. Ajans-Turk Matbaacilik Sanayi,
1973), p.87. 
f’^ tlbid., p.58.
'■’^Ibid., p.82.
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It declared that all rights related to working life would be restored and social 
welfare provisions would be established.^^ For the land-less and land-short peasants the 
party also promise land through the state’s buying o f the large lands for distribution.
It seems useful to elaborate the conditions in which the National Salvation Party 
and the Democratic Party were established.
The effects o f newly changed cleavages were immediately felt in the state- 
business relations and hence within the political parties as agents o f representing, 
aggregating, and realizing these interests at the governmental level. The effects o f the 
functional cleavages were firstly seen within the body o f the Union o f Chambers that had 
three parts in the sixties and seventies. These were the Chambers o f Industry, the 
Chambers o f Commerce and Industry, the Chambers o f Commerce and commodity 
exchanges. Their countrywide numbers were respectively 8, 131, 50, and 52 in 1977.^ '^  
The Chambers o f Industry were located in provincial and district centers where large 
industrialists had no branches. These chambers were more like trade organizations. 
However, they had enough number o f branches to dominate the general assembly o f the 
union because o f the weighted representation compared to the Chambers o f Industry 
which were representing the industrialists' interests from metropolitan areas like Istanbul, 
Izmir, and Ankara.
In order to prevent corruption and favoritism at the ministerial level, allocation 
o f limited foreign currency was left to the Chambers o f Industry when the government 
adopted rapid industrialization policies in the 1960s. Another function o f the Chambers 
of Industry was the preparation and distribution o f quotas for the restricted commodities 
in the import regime.^ *^  All these were implying that big industrialists had control over
p.223.
OncLi 'Chambers of Industry in Turkey: An Inquiry into State Business Relations as a Distributive 
Domain', in E. Ozbudun and A. Ulusan, eds., The Political Economy o f  Income Distribution in Turkey 
(New York and London: Holmes& Meier, 1980), p.458.
*’ *^Ibid., p .469.
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the allocation o f resources in relation to the commercial sectors and small-and-medium- 
sized industrial enterprises, generally located especially in the Anatolian part o f the 
country. Necmeddin Erbakan's attempt to become the president o f the Chambers o f the 
Union in 1969 and Demirel's manner o f the recapturing o f the Union from Erbakan as 
the Prime Minister in 1969, according to Barkey, irritated the business community and 
led to the crystallization o f different interests within the JP. The .TP's support to the big 
industrialists became obvious with this event. Its implication was that the ,1P could not 
succeed in aggregating various interests within its body.^  ^ Appearance o f the NSP and 
DemP illustrated transformation o f this cleavage conflict to the political arena.
According to Sencer, the National Order Party, that was the predecessor o f the 
National Salvation Party, tried to reconcile morality and market economy.' '^  ^ The core o f  
the party's economic policy is to 'develop, stimulate and guide the private enterprise 
within the framework o f inducing rightful earnings and respecting the private ownership 
rights'.^  ^ However the NSP was against the monopoly capital; it was putting emphasis, 
like its coalition partner-RPP on vertical and horizontal diffusion o f the capital so as to 
assure equality between individuals and regions but like the other Right-wing parties it 
was also assigning the state into the secondary role in economy, limiting its role in areas 
where private enterprise had no enough power to establish and run economic and 
industrial establishments. The state should leave these areas to the private enterprise 
after establishing necessary enterprises and assuring their productivity.'^^
According to Saribay, 'national view', the official ideology o f the NSP that was 
adopted in the first General Congress o f the party on January 21, 1973, had five targets.
J. Barkey, The State and Industrialization Crisis in Tiukey {CoXovdido: Westview Press, 1990), p.l51. 
Sencer, Turkiyede Siyasal Partilerin Sosyal Temelleri{Ыди\Ъи\: Gecis Yayinlari, 1971), р.369.
Y. Saribay, Turkiyede Modernleşme, Din, ve Paıii Politikasi: M illi Selamet Partisi Отек Olayi 
(İstanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1985), p.l03 andN. Erbakan, The Just Economic System  ( Ankara : Bars Ltd. 
and Milsan Ltd , 1991) part related to the Essentials of the Just Economic System..
7-Ibid.,p.l03.
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These were internal peace, state-society integration, the ideal o f a big Turkey, moral 
development, and finally material development.
In terms o f land reform, since the party accepted the principle o f respecting the 
ownership rights, it was against land distribution. However, the party was envisaging the 
distribution o f the state lands and large private lands that were not used through the 
consent o f the owner. Unlike the RPP's program, agriculture had no priority in the whole 
development process. Rather than land reform, the NSP was insisting on educating the 
peasants and increasing the productivity o f agricultural lands. This means that tiie Party 
was not against landlords.
What the NSP understood from the word 'secularism' was totally different from 
that o f the RPP. While the former was perceiving it as religious freedom the latter was 
interpreting it as freedom for the leftist ideas.^^
In contrast to the ideas o f the RPP, the NSP was also against Turkey's entry to the 
Common Market and all kinds o f interests. All these depict that except similar targets o f  
heavy industrialization and support to the small industrialists, they did not share more 
things. There were deep ideological differences between the coalition partners both in 
terms o f economic as well as in social matters.
The second coalition was created by four parties that were the JP, the NSP, the 
NAP, and the RRP.
Ex-colonel Alparslan Turkes captured the control o f the RPNP in 1965. Before 
renaming the party as the National Action party in 1969 he reorganized the party in terms 
o f ideology by adopting 'nine lights' or principles, recruiting personnel, and re-organizing 
the party whose main feature was its strict hierarchic and militia-type structure. It became 
a pro-fascist party, emphasizing ardent nationalism and pan-Turkism with strong anti- 
communistic and leftist leanings. The 'nine lights/principles' consisted of
■^5|bid., p .ll l.
H. Karpat, 'Turkish Democracy at Impasse', p. 37.
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1. Nationalism;
2. Idealism;
3. Morality that was understood as the protection o f Turkish customs and
beliefs;
4. "Social-mindednes, referring to the protection and encouragement o f free 
enterprise, the provision o f economic incentives to holders o f small capital and state­
wide organization o f social welfare"’ ;^
5. Scientific mentality;
6. Liberalism, recognizing all rights and freedoms;
7. Care for peasant;
8. Populism; and finally
9. Industrialization.’^
The party envisaged a strong state as above and beyond the classes; the existence 
o f classes was rejected. Rather the party's understanding o f society was based on the 
existence o f six social sectors in a hierarchic way due to the perception o f society as an 
organic entity whose members have different talents. These sectors were workers, 
peasants, tradesmen and artisans, civil servants, employers and lastly liberal 
professionals.”
The party also included religion in its official ideology in 1973 to draw more 
votes. The party was economically and politically against the Common Market for 
nationalistic reasons, but it was not against private enterprise. Instead, its program 
proposed a mixed economy where the private sector would have priority over that o f the 
state.
M. Landau, Jews, Arabs, 7 i« i5 (Jerusalem: The Magnete Press, 1993), p.p270-271.
’ '’Ibid., p. 272.
” M. a . Agaogullari, 'The Ultranationalist Right' in I. C. Schnick and A. Tonak and , eds., Turkey 
Transition: New Perspectives ( New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 195.
’ '^ibid., p. 195.
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Another partner o f the First National Front Coalition was the Republican Reliance 
Party(RRP) that was created by the conservative faction o f the RPP in 1967 after Bulent 
Ecevit had been elected the General-Secretary o f the party and the RPP had moved to the 
left; later it merged with another party-the Republican Party which was also an offshoot 
o f the RPP that emerged after the resignation o f Inonu in 1972. The party could not have 
much incentives to offer to its voters, nor could it meet the attacks by stronger rival 
parties which created instability within the party. Finally it became almost extinct with 
three deputies in the aftermath o f the 1977 election.
The party was a liberal party, having strong secularist tendencies. It was 
representing interests o f the traditional and conservative elements like landlords and 
merchants.’  ^ The First and Second Nationalist Front Governments included all the 
ideological tones o f the right that were adjacent on the policy scale between the 1975- 
1978 era.
The last coalition was formed after the Second Nationalist Front had fallen 
apart towards the end o f 1977 by the RPP, the DemP, the RRP, and twelve Independent 
deputies, who had left the .IP. The interesting thing was that these twelve deputies left the 
.IP during the climax o f the ideological polarization in the party system.
The DemP that had been formed by forty defectors from the .IP in 1970 obtained 
forty-five seats in 1973 and only one seat in the 1973 and 1977 general elections 
respectively. The DemP's deputies had been representing the traditional wing o f the .IP.
It did not take part in any coalition government until 1978 due to the deep ideological 
differences between the RPP and the ideological similarity with the .IP. In the absence o f  
any organizational incentive and the internal strife due to the environmental hostility 
resulting from the attacks o f the JP, it could defend its unity against such hostility only 
until March 1975 from October 1973. As a newly formed party, it could not manage to
F. Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey, pAZS.
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pass 'survival threshold' like the RRP in the complex and hostile environment o f the 
1970s.**“ Similar to the RRP, the DemP which was on the side o f the private sector and 
representing interests o f the landlords, traders and merchants against the industrialists. 
Demirel's attempt to tax agricultural incomes to finance social welfare provisions and his 
manner o f dealing with the Chambers o f Union event in 1969 alienated this faction from 
the .IP.**' Like other newly emerged small parties it was also against the monopoly 
capital.
The four newly emerged four parties-the DemP, the RRP, the NAP, and the 
NSP had almost the same constituency; however, the last one was strongly supported by 
the small Anatolian industrialists and artisans with traditional conservative elements in 
contrast to the first two ones whose constituency heavily consisted o f landlords and 
merchants. As different from others, the NAP mainly represented the interests o f the 
lower middle classes.
There was a historical rivalry between Ecevit and Demirel as well as between the 
latter and Erbakan. The NSP established its party organization in forty-two provinces and 
approximately in three hundred districts in 1973, these numbers had reached sixty-five 
and over four hundred, respectively by 1977.**^  Likewise, the NAP had also completed 
party organization in important provinces in a very hierarchical manner not unlike that 
o f the army by 1973; all power rested in the general Executive Board, but in practice in 
the hands o f the party Chairman, Alparslan Turkes.**** According to Landau, number o f its 
branches had reached 567 out o f 572 administrative units by 1980.8^ *
Other two personality parties, the DemP and the RRP, took the .IP's and the RPP's 
local party organizations with them in traditional provinces when they left these parties.
**“Tlie term "suivival threshold" is used by A. Panebianco, Political Parties.
**'M. Sencer, Tiiikiye'de Siyasal Partilerin Sosyal Temellei’i (Istanbul: May Yayinlari, 1971), p.379. 
**^ A. Y. Saribay, Türkiye'deModenlesme,,Din, vePartiPolitikasi, p.l09.
**3M. a . Agaogullari, 'The Ultra-nationalist Right", p.l94.
**‘*.1. M. Landau, Jews, Arabs, Turks, p.267.
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The two big parties lost their provincial party organizations as wel as party cadres which 
meant a kind o f covert de-institutionalization for these two big parties. In other words, all 
parties practiced change, they either renovated at their party organization like what the 
RPP did in urban areas or newly established ones like the NSP and the NAP built new 
party organizations. In order to distribute organizational incentives to the party 
administrators as well as party followers and hence to complete and consolidate their 
organization they immediately had to come to power. The precarious balance between 
the Right and the Left bloc further restricted the possible number o f coalition 
alternatives. Large parties became heavily dependent on the smaller ones. The DemP 
could not manage to consolidate its party structure through sharing governmental power 
and it finally dissolved itself in 1978 after eight years o f life.
For the elaboration the very nature o f Turkish political parties it is useful 
to perceive them as organizations. Panebianco defines a political party as 'a structure in 
motion which evolves overtime, reacting to external changes and to the changing 
environments in which it functions'.**  ^He argues that
a party's organizational characteristics depend more upon his histoiy, i.e., on 
liovv organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other 
factor. The characteristic of a party's origin are in fact capable of exerting a 
weight on its organizational stmcture even decades later. Eveiy organization 
bears the mark of its formation, of the crucial political administrative decisions 
made by its founders, the decisions which 'molded' the organization.^^
He points out three factors that determine a party’s 'genetic model':
1. The pattern o f a party's initial country-wide organization, i.e., through 
penetration or diffusion;
Panebianco, Political Paiiies: Organization and Power {C<imhndgQ\ Cambridge University Press, 
1988), p.49.
»^^^^^Ibid., p .5 0 .
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2. The existence o f the external supporter during its initial formation period; and
lastly
3. The presence o f  a charismatic leader at the inception.**^
Combination o f these three factors causes strong party institutionalization. In 
addition to these, the degree o f party competition and the nature o f party-state- 
bureaucracy relations also affect the degree o f institutionalization.*** A party, which is 
initially formed in such a manner, has its administrative bureaucratic staff and party 
professionals with regular, 'centripetal' and 'vertical' internal elite recruitment tradition. 
If the party has a charismatic leader the cohesive governing elite's loyalty is to the leader 
rather than the party. Elite recruitment does not follow a regular pattern, rather division 
o f labor and organizational incentive distribution are in the hands o f the charismatic 
leader. There are no factions in both types o f parties. The reason for this is the lack o f 
free space where party elites move freely. But there may be tendencies whose relation 
with the dominant party elites or the charismatic leader shows a vertical character. To 
challenge the position o f the charismatic leader means excommunication and the end of 
one's political career.***^  The parties organized through diffusion are more like a 
federation o f factions with centrifugal elite recruitment pattern. Whereas the change in 
the strongly institutionalized parties and parties having charismatic leaders are painful 
and slow process, for the latter this change is a usual phenomenon.
Political parties function in an environment which may be complex, unstable, and 
hostile to their existence. Environmental complexity depends on soci-economic 
conditions, number o f political parties and electoral volatility. There is a curvilinear 
relation between complexity, instability, and hostility. In changing social situations the 
internal cohesion o f parties may weaken because several groups may propose different
8 7
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Ibid., p.50.
Ibid., p.l 13-114. 
Ibid., p.52.
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alternatives to control the environment and/or decision-making process diffuse in order 
to deal with immediate problems.^® In unstable environments party splits are the usual 
events. However, when unstable environment becomes hostile to threaten the existence 
o f the party the degree o f internal unity and party cohesion increases. There is a 
curvilinear relationship between these two variables, according to Panebianco. Attitudes 
o f the state or those o f the military in the Turkish case increases internal party 
cohesion.^’ There is also positive relationship between the size o f the party, degree o f  
institutionalization and coping with the environmental complexity as the cases RRP and 
of DemP clearly illustrated in the Turkish context.^“
Two significant factors that have affected political parties and hence the party 
system during the multiparty era were rapid social change and military interventions. 
Whereas the former caused party splits the latter one created the problem of  
institutionalization for the political parties. Besides a^ t^titudes o f the state led to the 
formation o f strong DP's party organization in the fifties.
Turkish political parties have represented similar features in the sense that they 
have been, in Duverger's term, internally created parties, except for the Turkish Labor 
Party, they all have had charismatic leaders such as Adnan Menderes o f the DP, 
Suleyman Demirel o f the .IP, Ismet Inonu o f the RPP and handful cohesive governing 
elites with centralized decision-making structure, i.e., they have been similar to the cadre 
parties, representing oligarchic tendencies. For this reason they either could not easily 
change their policy direction. In terms o f the degree o f institutionalization two largest 
parties, the RPP and the DP together with its heir the JP represented strong party 
institutionalization until the 1980 military intervention.
9 0
9 1
9 2
I^bid., p.60. 
Ibid., p.206.
Strong institutionalization gives way to party splits after certain degree because of the policy 
inflexibility which originates from the centralized nature of the decision-making system within the party.
Heper, 'State, democracy, and Bureaucracy in Turkey,' in M. Heper, eds.. The State and Public 
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In relation to internal organization o f parties in the 1970s Sayari claims that intra­
party democracy existed in the nominal sense in the 1970s In those years he argued that 
incumbent party executives exercise a good deal of control over the general 
proceedings and the outcome of the elections for the top leadership positions 
since the provincial congresses, where the delegates to the General Congress 
are chosen, are usually under the control of a local faction which aligns itself 
with the dominant faction within the central party organization.^'*
Dodd, related to another undemocratic aspect o f the party organization, argues 
that delegates secretly vote for the election o f the members o f the Central Governing 
Body and the party leadership.^  ^ Implication o f this stmcture is the existence o f two 
types o f party governing elites: those who were party careerists, starting from the lowest 
level, and deputies who had no influence over the party's decision-making mechanism as 
well as their future role in the party, especially if the party had a charismatic leader, as 
Panebianco argues. This mechanism may explain why the .IP deputies left their parties in 
the heydays o f polarization in the late seventies.
Prior party experiences influenced the parties’ decision to accept the partnership 
o f some parties. The NSP rejected the RPP's offer to form a coalition because o f the 
coalition experience in 1974 as did the .IP as the rival party o f the RPP since 1963.
The two Center-Right and center-Left blocs had been represented by the RPP and 
the .IP fragmented with the military intervention in the 1980s. On each side o f the blocs 
two similar parties emerged that were the Social Democratic Populist Party(SDPP), the 
Democratic Left Party(DLP), the Motherland Party(MP), and the True Path party(TPP). 
The first coalition was set up by the SDPP and the TPP after the 1991 general election.
Sayari, 'Aspects of Party Organization in Turkey', M iddle East Joiinml, (Vol.30, No.2, Spring 1976, 
pp. I 87-199), p.l90.
Ayata, 'Ideology, Social bases, and Organizational Stmcture of the Post-1980 Political Parties', in A. 
Eralp et all, eds., The Political and Socio-economic Transformation o f  Turkey Qsipovt Preager,
1993), p.42 andC. H. Dodd, The Crisis o f  Tiukish Democracy {Y{unimgio\r.T\\Q Eothen Press, 1990,
2nd ed.), p. 117.
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The SDPP perceived rapid industrialization as the only solution to the county’s 
problems; however, it urged a more egalitarian taxation system and economic planning 
through which the state would assume a directing role in the economy. It defended the 
State Economic Enterprises(SEEs), but its program revealed that it did not look at 
privatization ideologically.^^ The SEEs should take a role,
1. In areas where high technology are employed;
2. To close the economic gap between the regions;
3. In areas where the SEEs are producing strategic goods and services for the 
public interest.^ "^
In relation to privatization Ismail Cem, one o f the leading ideologues the SDPP, 
argued that social democracy had no obsession with ownership rights. Depending on the 
conditionality o f the public interest any enterprise could be bought and sold. Those SEEs 
that were in good conditions and those that had strategic significance for the public 
interest had to be autonomized in order to save them from the influence o f politics and 
bureaucracy.
Cem claimed that despite its intermediate regulating role, the market could not 
play the role o f the sole organizer in the long-run; this role had to be given to the 
common will o f the people in the long-term. The state has to define macro-economic 
targets and to determine the direction o f the economy. The state had to protect the public 
interests against the private ones; in doing so its intervention ought to be supportive and 
protective rather than restrictive.®*^
Other targets o f the party were the 'consolidation o f democratic principles and the 
development o f a social democratic culture'.®® However their understanding o f  
democracy was not based on 'sameness' o f individuals but on the recognition o f
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi programı: Yem Hedefler, Yeni Türkiye ( No information).
Baykal and I. Cem, (İstanbul: Cem Yayinlari, 1992), p. 86.
^^ Ibid., p.87.
Ayata, 'Ideology, Social Bases, ans Organizational Stmcture of post-1980 Political Parties’, p.42.
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differences within the limits o f national integrity. According to Baykal, another leading 
member o f the SDPP, the SDPP was against the 'standardization' and hence the 
'homogenization' o f the people, Baykal further argued that 'our national integrity was 
the integrity o f individuals, having different ethnic roots and religious beliefs'.'"* 
National integrity could not be reduced to ethnic sameness, rather everybody ought to be 
able to seek, develop, represent and reveal his/her national identity within ethnic 
differentiation.'"“
The TPP, on the other hand, was holding liberal and nationalistic ideas in relation 
to economic and national issues that were connected to its strong negative feelings 
against communism.'"^ In other words, the party's philosophy was based on the concepts 
of social justice and political egalitarianism as it is the case in the liberal theory. 
According to Ayata, the TPP's understanding o f social order was based on 'collective 
freedom' rather than 'individual freedom'. The former 'is collectively used and embedded 
in the traditions o f the country as the nation o f the people'.'""* The state was perceived as 
a liberal state and it was assigned into the referee role in economic life.'"^ Despite such 
deep ideological differences between the two parties their coalition was the longest living 
one in Turkish multiparty history if  we ignore its disintegration and revitalization in 
September just before the general election, held on December 24, 1995.
The TPP and the MP created a center-right minority coalition that was backed by 
the DLP o f Bulent Ecevit.
The MP's ideology was the synthesis o f the ideologies o f the pre-1980 parties, 
that is a combination o f tenets o f market economy, social justice, nationalism and
'""D. Baykal and I. Cem, YeniSol, p.76.
’"’Ibid., p.76.
’"“Ibid., p.76.
’""C. H. Dodd, The Crisis o f  Turkish Democracy, p. 117.
’""'a . Ayata, 'Ideology, Social Bases, and Organizational Stmcture of Post-1980 Political Parties', p.41. 
’"^Ibid., p.41.
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conservatism, according to founder and former leader o f the party, Turgut Ozal.‘°^  For 
him, social justice was the basis o f internal peace that had to be country-wide.' '^'  ^ Free 
market was the economic aspect o f the MP' ideology because free competition is 
appropriate to human nature that leads to increase in production, and prevents 
unproductivity.'*'* Their understanding o f nationalism was the same with the Kemalist 
understanding. The party, according to Ozal, reconciled secularism and conservatism 
because their understanding o f conservatism was based on respect for the traditions and 
mores o f Turkish society rather than standpattism.'*'*'
Ozbudun briefly describes both the attitudes o f the party toward the state and its 
bureaucracy with reference to its economic policies as such that
...for the first time in Turkish politics, smaller government, less governmental 
involvement in the economy, the greater reliance on market forces, 
privatization of public economic enterprises, and an overall reduction of state 
activities became consciously articulated party goals."*'
With regard to their ideologies, there were no differences between the two 
coalition partners in their approach to economic as well cultural matters; the only 
problem, however, was the competition for the same place and for the same 
constituency, in other words, their 'hunting ground' was the same and hence the question 
is a life and death matter, especially for the TPP.'"
**'^ G. Ozbas, eds., Kiuiilus ve Icraatlariyla Anavatan P a r t i s i information about the book). The book
is a compilation of speeches of Ozal who delivered in different places and times.
i*' I^bid., p.212.
i*'*lbid., p.212.
i*'‘-'lbid., p.213.
' **'E. Ozbudun, State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey, in L. Diamond, eds.. Political 
Culture and Democracy in Developing Coimtries (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 
p. 263.
'' 'The concept ' hunting ground' is used by Panebianco see for the TPP F. Acar, 'The True path Party 
1983-1989', in M. Heper and J.M. Landau, eds.. Political Parties and Democracy in Tiukey{\. B. Tauris, 
1990), p. 191.
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The last and governing one is the coalition o f the TPP and religious Welfare 
party minority coalition, backed by the ultra-nationalist pro-Islamic ultra-nationalist 
Grand Unity Party(GUP). Although both parties believe in the salience o f the private 
enterprise in the economy the WP supplants the TPP's secularist world view with the 
Islamic one. The WP, the heir o f the NSP, changed its protectionist economic policies o f  
the pre-1980 era. According to Sen, it adopted market oriented economic ideas.
The MP appeals to the newly rising export-oriented business groups, upwardly 
mobile newly migrated urban workers especially in the private sector. A carried out in 
December 1993 illustrated that the TPP's and the MP's constituencies were not different 
from each other. The only variation was that small peasants, merchants and artisans were 
more strongly represented(a sixteen per cent difference) in the TPP's constituency than 
that o f the MP.^ ^^  Housewives constituted a significant proportion o f their social base. 
The SDPP/RPP followers are white-collar workers, civil servants, employees and 
students. Blue collar workers, including factory workers employed in the private as well 
as public sector, service workers, sales persons, drivers and agricultural workers as well 
as merchants and artisans, are all attracted by the WP.**^
In terms o f party organization the WP has a mass party organization at the grass­
roots level due to its organic organizational model. Domination o f the same party elites 
for almost twenty-six years at the top level does not confirm the idea that it is a mass 
party. Rather the WP, like other parties, is closer to a cadre party because o f this feature. 
For this reason almost all Turkish political parties are like what Panebianco calls 
'electoral-professional' p a r tie s .^ H e  points out several features o f such parties. Party 
professionals play the central role in these parties due to their special tasks; vertical ties
' '-S. Sen, Refah Partisi'nin Teori ve Pratiği (Istanbul: Sarmal Yayinevi, 1995), p.9.
' TUSES Veri Arastirma A.S., Türkiye'de Siyasi partilerin seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin 
Toplumsal Tabani, 1993 (Ankara: Cem ofset Matbaacilik Saayii A.S., 1995), p. 44. 
ı>‘*Ibid., pp.42-47.
' '^A. Panebianco, Party Organization, p.264.
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within the party are weak because o f their appeal to "opinion electorate" in contrast to 
what mass parties do; personalized leaders and public representation play prominent role 
in terms o f the image o f  the party; grants by interest groups and public funds are the 
main financial sources o f such type o f parties rather than income coming from party 
members; they put more emphasis on issues and party leadership; party careerists and 
interest groups' representatives occupy significant place within the party organization.'*^ 
Existing Turkish political parties represent most o f these features in their party 
organization. For example the recently re-elected Chairwoman o f the TPP did not permit 
the election o f seventy-six deputies on the TPP tickets in the general election o f 
December 1995 and her preference for the top level professionals and bureaucrats, the 
former leader o f the MP's "princes", and the unchanging party leaders depict what 
Panebianco proposes.
* "’Ibid., p.264.
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3. 4. MOTIVATIONAL VARIABLES
The environment was both complex, unstable and hence hostile in terms o f both 
electoral volatility and in terms o f the military's threat to the newly formed the .IP and 
the NTP that were competing for the votes o f the ex-DP in the first half o f the sixties. 
Their attitudes toward economic and social matters were almost identical. Therefore as 
the smaller o f the two, the formation o f a coalition with the JP would have meant identity 
loss for the NTP. Another constraint was that all the ties between the .IP and the RPNP 
were broken down due to the personal adversities between the two leaders-Ragip 
Gumuspala and Osman Bolukbasi. He was also denouncing the RPP and his leader's 
attitudes."^
The RPNP revealed its intention to participate in a national coalition as the last 
possible solution, but the .TP was against the creation o f a national coalition. Rather the 
party was preferring a coalition under its leadership which would include both the NTP 
and the RPNP. The NTP was in a difficult situation as a pivotal party in the sense that on 
the one hand, despite its good intention to create a coalition with the RPP it had fear o f  
both domination o f it as a big partner and o f the reaction o f its indecisive constituency 
that could be triggered by the powerful opposition party i.e., the .IP. Bad reputation o f the 
RPP among the masses negatively affected the NTP's final decision. On the other hand, 
coalition partnership with the JP would mean for it identity loss . Although the NTP was 
ready to enter into coalition with the RPP which would include the RPNP, this option 
was out o f consideration because its leader, Bolukbasi, declared that the RPNP would 
not take part in any coalition.*'** The RPP-.IP coalition was the last option. Moderates 
and ex-DP members urged the JP to accept the partnership o f the RPP because the party 
might gain legitimacy in the eyes o f the army through this way it might alleviate the
* ^^ Milliyet, October 19, 1961.
** ^Milliyet, Novamber 10, 1961.
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military's pressure over the party, and also an amnesty might be secured for the ex-DP 
prisoners. According to Toker, the business class wanted to see the .IP in power so as to 
restore their lost due to the economic crisis in the last years.
The second coalition was created by the RPP, the NTP, the RPNP, and the 
independents. Considering the partnership o f the NTP, it would make the coalition with 
the RPP because this time the RPNP was ready to enter into coalition after Osman 
Bolukbasi and his close associates had already left the party in 1962 to revitalize the 
former Nation Party o f 1948. Although the JP elites declared that they wanted to form a 
coalition with the RPP the latter rejected this option due to the former coalition 
experience with it. After obtaining great policy concessions from the RPP because o f its 
pivotal role the NTP consented to make a coalition with the RPP which was essential for 
the survival o f both the regime and the smaller parties.
A right-wing caretaker coalition was set up in March 1965 that consisted o f the 
.IP, the NTP, the RPNP, and the NP in order to deprive the RPP from controlling the 
government before the general election o f 1965 and to use the state resources before the 
election rather than implementing common policies.
No party obtained a parliamentary majority in the 1973 general election because 
of the distribution o f the Assembly seats among seven parties, three o f which won 
seventeen seats (the RRP 13, the NAP 3 and the Unity Party o f Turkey 1).
The leader o f the JP, Sulejmian Demirel, declared that the .IP would remain in 
opposition by rejecting the idea o f a right-wing coalition that was proposed by the leader 
of the newly emerged Democratic party leader(DemP), Ferruh Bozbeyli.'-* The latter 
argued that the RPP was on the left in contrast to their Rightist position. He further 
argued that he was trying to consolidate Rightist ideas in the country and wanted to see a
Toker, Demokrasimizin ism et Pasaİi Yillari 1944-1973: Inonu'mm Son Basbakanligi 1961-1965 
(Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, second edition, 1994), p.22.
'“^^Milliyet, June 8, 1962 
'“^Milliyet, October 19, 1973.
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Rightist party in power rather than a leftist one.*-- The DemP declared that it would do 
every sacrifice and effort to protect the rights o f the people against the Left by taking the 
nation's tendencies into the consideration.*-^ However the .IP leader was planning to 
recover his losses by remaining in the opposition. In contrast to the attitudes o f these two 
parties, the Islamic National Salvation Party(NSP) as a newly created one was open to all 
coalition options. After the rejection o f coalition proposal o f the RPP by the .IP and the 
DemP, the NSP called a Rightist coalition once again. However their rejection 
reinforced the NSP’s hand in coalition bargaining with the RPP. Some provincial leaders 
of the NSP stated that
then there will be no coalition without us, we have to obtain more 
concessions. For example we should receive more ministries and create equal 
rights in the works that would be done.*-'*
In all, two groups emerged within the NSP despite its powerful bargaining 
position that was coming from its pivotal status in the party system: those who favored a 
coalition with the RPP and those who were against it. Whereas the former was claiming 
that to participate in a coalition with the RPP was useful for the future o f the NSP since 
the left press was on the side o f the NSP in those days, if  they would reject the offer the 
left press might disseminate negative ideas about the party that might lead to closure o f 
the party the latter was arguing that if  the NSP participates in the coalition the powerful 
opposition party, the JP, might follow a strong opposition strategy that might lead to the 
loss o f the NSP's already fluent constituency in the end.* 5^ All these illustrate that even 
though the two parties had no similar party ideologies, the concern for gaining legitimacy 
and the aim o f protecting its constituency played a greater role in the decision o f the
‘-^Milliyet, October 18, 1973. 
'-^Milliyet, October 27, 1973. 
*-‘*Milliyet, NovamberS, 1973. 
'“^Milliyet, Novamber 6, 1973.
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party. Another significant motivation was to use the state resources to distribute 
organizational incentives to party administrators as well as to followers. This was also 
true for the RPP because whereas the former was a newly established party the latter 
experienced covert de-institutionalization by losing its provincial organizations to the 
RRP and the shifting weight o f its constituency from niral to urban areas where the 
party established new party organizations and the university students became the new 
party organizators in these areas. This is why two clauses that stipulated an immediate 
pardon for the prisoners and legitimatization o f the ownership o f squatter houses on state 
lands before end o f 1973 without permission in the common government program o f the 
R.PP and NSP.·“'^ At the first round o f meetings the NSP rejected the offer due to fear o f  
losing the support o f its conservative constituency and religious orders. After Demirel's 
failure to form a coalition when the DemP leader rejected to enter into a coalition with 
the .IP under Demirel's leadership, the NSP accepted partnership o f the RPP.i^»
The rejection o f Demirel's Premiership by the DemP was the apparent reason. 
The main reason was the fear o f being swallowed up by the big brother, the .IP. This 
became obvious after the dissolution o f the RPP-NSP coalition partly due to the disputes 
between the partners but mainly to the RPP’s desire to turn the Cyprus success into vote 
in an early general election. When the RPP rejected any idea o f coalition with the NSP 
the DemP became the unavoidable or pivotal partner for all eligible coalition options, 
either a mixed coalition with the RPP or a rightist coalition. It always rejected a 
coalition with the .IP for avoiding identity loss. The DemP did not form a long-term 
working coalition with the RPP due to both fear o f strong opposition o f the JP and 
ideological differences between it and the RPP. Furthermore it did not want to take the
'-^T. Arkan, 'The National Salvation Party', in M, Heper and R. Tapper, eds., Islam and Politics in the 
Modern M iddle East (\Ae,v/ York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p.83.
'-^F. Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, Y
'-¡^According to Toprak, the NSP lost the support of the Nurcu Order after this coalition. See B. Toprak, 
"Religious Right", in A. Tonak and C. Schnick, eds., Turkey in Transition,
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responsibility o f carrying a leftist party to the power in an early election. Although as a 
rightist party the DemP was shared the same ideas with the JP, the fear for losing its 
identity the situation became very critical for the DemP. Recognizing this reality Ferruh 
Bozbeyli, the leader o f the party stressed that the DemP was under the covert pressure o f  
both the RPP and the JP. Whereas the former was looking for a partner that was essential 
for an early election the latter's only target was to disintegrate the p a r t y . Finally 
following the JP's declaration o f its decision which was about a cooperation with the 
NSP, the RRP, the NAP to form the so-called the Nationalist Front Government against 
the Left. This event prepared the end o f the DemP which entered into a process o f  
disintegration with the departure o f a group headed by Sadettin Bilgiç, known as the 
leader o f the extremist faction in the JP until 1970. The four-party Nationalist Front 
Government won the confidence vote with 222 'yes' vote against 218 'no' vote.'^i These 
events supported the idea that the newly created DemP could not pass the survival 
threshold and finally disintegrated because o f the environmental hostility. Although it 
had managed to resist the hostility up to the certain point with its increasing internal 
strength it dissolved almost two years later when it failed to pass such threshold. The 
party lost its ability to distribute incentives to its followers and members by rejecting all 
possible coalition options which quickly led to the disappearance o f the weakly 
institutionalized party. Because it had no adequate resources to control its environment's 
complexity in the sense o f both electoral volatility and high number o f political parties. 
The disintegration o f the DemP verifies Panebianco's hypothesis which claims the
' - ‘^ Tiie leader of the RPP declared that the party was open to all coalition options provided that there 
would be early eelection, Milliyet, September 20, 1974.
'■ '^iMilliyet, April 12, 1975.
'^*One day before the voting distribution of the seats in the Assembly was as follows: the JP(150), the 
NSP(48), the RRP(9), the NAP(3), Bilgic's group(8), the RPP(189), the DemP(31), the TUP(l) and 
lndependents(2), Milliyet, April 12, 1975.While two deputies abstained from voting four deputies did 
not come to voting three of whom were the DemP members, Milliyet, April 13, 1975.
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existence o f the curvilinear relationship between environmental hostility and internal 
strength o f political parties.
It was possible to identify manifest and latent goals o f the members o f the First 
and Second National Front Coalition Governments. The manifest goal for all partners 
was to prevent an early election and hence the RPP's control o f the government alone 
after a possible early election rather than the implementation o f common policies. 
Smaller parties found an opportunity to come to power which was essential for their 
survival, especially for the survival o f the NAP and the NSP. The RRP had already failed 
to pass the survival threshold in 1969 and peculiarly in 1973. For this reason it had no 
such an assertion in subsequent elections and in coalition bargaining to maintain its 
identity. However the NAP and especially the NSP had to reconcile two significant 
targets: on the one hand they had to maintain their identity within the rightist coalition, 
on the other hand they had to control the state resources to consolidate their newly- 
created country-wide party organization by distributing incentives. Thanks to its pivotal 
role which was vital for the survival o f the coalitions the NSP managed to reconcile these 
two aims by obtaining great concessions from the RPP and the .IP. For the NAP, there 
was no such problem o f identity loss as an ultra-nationalist party if one takes the 
common denominators o f the National Front coalitions into account. These were 
nationalism and religion. The JP's latent motivation was to recapture the votes it had 
already lost to the DemP, and the NSP. *32 xhg jp pursued a strategy o f persistent attacks 
against the RPP to reach this target which was necessary for survival o f the coalitions 
with no policy objective and the RPP responded to these attacks by adopting destructive 
attitudes toward the government as a prominent feature o f what Sartori calls 
'irresponsible opposition'. The reason for this was the absence o f any coalition
’32$, Sayari and I. Sunar, 'Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects', in S. O'Donnel and P. C. 
Sclimitter, eds. Transition ûom Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe i}A&Tj\zxi&. John Hopkins 
University Press, 1986), pp. 180, 181, and 182
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alternatives for the RPP in a polarized party system in the second half o f the 1970s and 
disappearance o f the line between the government and opposition. Polarization resulted 
in the revitalization o f the same coalition among the same partners except the RRP after 
the early general election in 1977 that is known as the Second National Front Coalition 
after failure o f Ecevit’s abortive attempt to form a RPP minority government.
The Second National Front Coalition was replaced at the beginning o f 1978 by 
the RPP-DemP-RJRP and dissidents from the JP as result o f the National Fronts' inability 
to solve the problems o f the country such as street violence, unemployment, rising 
inflation as a manifest reason. But the latent factor for their departure was Demirel's 
reluctance to revise the cabinet.
Four parties emerged after the 1991 general election as possible coalition 
partners. Those were the Tme Path Party(TPP), the Motherland Party(MP), the Social 
Democratic Populist party(SDPP), and finally the Welfare Party(WP). However, the 
Welfare Party(WP), the Reformist Democracy Party(RDP), and Nationalist Work 
Party(NWP) made an election alliance which is known as the holly alliance to avoid the 
ten per cent national electoral threshold before the election. The MP declared its 
intention to remain in opposition in order to recover its losses as an ex-ruling party 
despite the calls from the business community for the TPP-MP coalition. Mesut Yilmaz, 
leader o f the MP, declared that 'Nation gave us the duty o f opposition. We will carry out 
our responsibility as the main opposition party.'i^  ^Liberal wing o f the TPP rejected the 
coalition with the Islamic WP. The only solution was the TPP-SDPP coalition. Before 
the election Erdal Inonu made a statement that the SDPP was ready for every coalition 
options if the party could carry out what it promised to the electorate before the 
election.
'^^Milliyet, December 26, 1977. 
'^^Milliyet, October 22, 1991.
'^^Milliyet, September 5, 1991, Tlie SDPP's promises were a new constitution, replacement of the 
President, a new election system, decentralization of the state adminstration, equal income distribution.
98
When the coalition broke down on September 20, 1995 the MP's condition for 
the creation o f the MP-TPP coalition was an early election. However, Tansu Ciller, 
leader o f the TPP, did not accept an early election proposal with her party's twin which 
had increased its popularity as the main opposition party due to the failure o f the 
coalition to solve the country's urgent problems. This shows their intention that their 
first and foremost motivation focused around the gains and losses rather than common 
policy targets. After the failure o f Ciller's attempt to form a minority government with 
the help o f the minor parties, the only remaining option was the revitalization o f the 
TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition. Deniz Baykal, the Chairman o f the SDPP/RPP, had already 
declared that his party was ready to form a coalition with its former partner as long as the 
latter accepted his conditions which led to the coalition breakdown. They revitalized 
the old one as a caretaker election one. Their aim was not to produce solution to the 
problems o f the country but to remain in power during the election.
The early general election results that was held on December 24, 1995 
necessitated the formation o f a coalition. The novelty was the emergence o f the WP as 
the first party with a two per cent margin. The two center-Right parties with equal 
strength reached an agreement on the creation o f a center-Right minority government to 
which the center-Left DLP o f Ecevit gave outside support after two months coalition 
bargains. The common denominator, for this time, was to prevent the Islamic, anti­
secular WP coming to power rather than implementation o f common policy targets.*^’
reformation of the tax system, personnel reform, union right to public servants, reformation of the 
conscription system.
conditions were the wage incease for the workers who were employed in the public sector, 
cancellation of the postponement of the strikes of public sector workers, solution of the problems 
between the partners about the decrees related to governors, the content of the Anti-terrorism law 
amendmends of the some articles of the Constitution and promulgation of adjustment laws, fliture of the 
deputies of the dissolved People's Democracy Party, and RPP's claim of the resignation of Necdet menzir 
who spoke against the RPP during the Funeral of a police as the Chief of the Istanbul Police. Milliyet, 
September 20, 1995.
Ozbudun, Turkey: How Far From Consolidation?', Journal of Democracy (Vol. 7, No. 3, July 1996, 
pp. 123-138), p.l23.
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They demanded votes from the electorate to prevent the a possible WP government. In 
accordance with this strategy, both parties rejected coalition offers made by the WP. 
However Mesut Yilmaz met several times with the WP leader, Necmeddin Erbakan 
although he declared that they would not set up a coalition with the WP. The problem 
between the two center-right parties were not policy disagreement but it was locked on 
the question o f who would be the Prime Minister as a manifest reason. Yilmaz followed 
power-broker strategy to reduce the TPP's bargaining power and also he might aimed at 
dividing the rival party. With regard to the second strategy Ciller argued that 'no one 
should base his plans on the DYP(TPP). I.et him go and return the mandate or form a 
government. This is because the DYP will not be d iv ided '.M oreover, one o f the 
influential deputy o f the TPP, Necmeddin Cevheri stated that 'we will not let this party be 
divided. This responsibility belongs to all o f us'.*^  ^ Other deputies also made public 
statements that the most important duty for them was to preserve the integrity o f the TPP 
against all attempts aiming at dividing it. Put differently, the situation illustrated that 
environmental complexity may turn into hostility if  there is more than one party 
competing for the same position. The hostile environments increase the internal strength 
of the parties up to certain point. Since both the MP and the TPP had an equal degree o f 
institutionalized structure which is necessary for the control the environment, the TPP 
maintained its integrity because o f the hostility. They finally set up a minority coalition 
which lasted only three months.
With the disintegration o f the minority coalition due to the corruption allegations 
about Ciller. The only alternative that could save her the Motions was Erbakan's WP. 
The TPP-WP coalition was not totally unexpected, because during the coalition 
bargaining immediately after the elections and before the formation o f the TPP-MP 
minority government, Yalim Erez, as the right-hand o f Ciller argued that
'^ *^ Turkish Daily News, februaiy 16, 1996. 
i^^lbid.
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our aim is not being in opposition. We have come to power. And we want to 
form a coalition with the ANAP(MP). If it does not work out with ANAP, we 
will look for other government fomiulas. Whatever government fonmilas can 
possibly ensue from this overall picture, we will try each one.’ ®^
He also declared that 'if it is right for ANAP to form coalition with the RP(WP), 
it would be equally right for the DYP to form a coalition with the RP'.*"*‘ This statement 
shows that they were fearing from their constituencies rather than aiming at preventing 
the WP from coming to power. There were two possible reasons for the TPP's 
insistence on remaining in power. One was related to Erbakan's declaration that he would 
start motions about Ciller( that would send her to the High Court and possibly end her 
political life) just after both the MP and TPP had revealed that they would not set up any 
coalition that would include the WP.'^  ^ por this reason the Coalition with the MP would 
save Ciller from such danger. The WP remained the last solution to save her after the 
disintegration o f the TPP-MP minority government. The second reason was that in order 
to consolidate her power within the party. She had not permitted re-election o f seventy- 
six former TPP deputies in the last election so as to consolidate her power within the 
party. Her party leadership could only be secured by distributing o f incentives to new 
deputies.***^
As stated in the theoretical section, the WP, as an extremist party, always 
preferred to enter into coalition with the MP rather than the TPP immediately after the 
election as well as after the MP-TPP coalition fell apart. As a pragmatic party, the WP 
tried not to miss any opportunity which would open the way to the power in order to 
legitimize itself and to distribute incentives to the party followers which is the only way 
to consolidate its country-wide party organization.
I‘‘«Ibid, 
i^'lbid.
"^ -^Milliyet, Januaiy 1, 1996.
"^^ T^urkish Daily News, Januaiy 18, 1996.
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Coalition experiences in the post-1980 period depicted the significance o f  
motivational factors on parties' decisions. Policy objectives were not taken into account 
seriously. At the theoretical level, coalition bargaining before the formation o f the MP- 
TPP and the WP-TPP coalition created intra-elite and elite follower conflicts as in the 
case o f the TPP. 'Conflict-inducement negotiations' o f the MP could have led to the 
TPP's disintegration, but it did not divided because o f environmental hostility. However, 
twelve TPP deputies left the party when it accepted coalition partnership with the WP. 
The Reason for this departure was centralization o f internal decision-making and 
concentration o f power rather diffusion o f it and also absence o f necessary mechanisms 
to deal with intra-party problems. 1^ 4
Maor, 'Intra-Party Detenninaiits of Coalition Bargaining', JoiunaJ o f  Theoretical Politics, (Vol.7, 
No. 1, pp.65-91), p.66.
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3. 5. DISTRIBUTION OF MINISTRIES
Distribution o f ministries among the coalition partners has two dimensions. 
Coalition parents prefer to get many ministries. However, at the end o f the bargaining 
they receive some o f them, each party also value ministries differently. This subsection 
evaluates distribution o f government portfolios quantitatively and qualitatively.
The table illustrates that all big coalition partners were the net losers 
except for the TPP as the bigger one compared to the MP. The minister/deputy ratios o f  
the coalition parties, controlling almost equal number o f deputies were relatively equal or 
it skewed toward to the smaller ones slightly. The respective ratios o f the RPP and the JP 
were 6.36 and 6.96 in 1961. In other words, while the former could get 6.36 ministries 
for every hundred deputies the same number o f deputies meant 6.96 ministries for the 
latter. These ratios were 11.80 and 13.64 for the TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition in 1991. 
Those numbers for the TPP-MP(13.33-12) and the WP-TPP(11.39-14.84) coalitions 
depicted Gamson's theory o f equal distribution o f number o f seats between the partners, 
having almost equal weight in normal times.
The equality disappeared when the difference between the weights o f the 
partners became larger. This observation was true for the RPP-NTP-RPNP-indep. 
coalition. The respective ratios were 7.02, 9.68, 12.12, and 7.69. Results for the RPP- 
NSP (9.73 to 14.58) and the TPP-SDPP/RPP coalitions(9.89 and 18.46) support the idea 
o f skewnes toward the smaller ones in normal times. It can be argued that there was 
negative relationship between the number o f the seats and the coalition gains. In other 
words, when the difference between the smaller and the larger one became greater the 
coalition gains o f the smaller ones were increasing.
The numerical findings also supports the idea that bargaining power o f the 
smaller partners increased either when the system became polarized or the Right-wing 
parties came together to form coalition. The ratio for each coalition partner during
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Table 3.3. Minister/Deputy Ratio for all Coalition Partners
Party N. o f Ministers N. o f Deputies Minister/Deputy Ratio
RPP 11 173 6.36
.TP 11 158 6.96
RPP 12 171 7.02
NTP 6 62 9.68
RPNP 4 33 12,12
Ind. 1 13 7.69
.TP 10 172 5.81
NTP 4 22 18.18
RPNP 4 19 21.05
NP 4 13 30.77
RPP 18 185 9.73
NSP 7 49 14.28
.TP 16 150 10.67
NSP 8 49 16.33
RRP 4 9 44.44
NAP 2 3 66.67
.TP 16 189 8.47
NSP 8 24 33.33
NAP 5 16 31.25
RPP 23 214 10.75
RRP 2 2 100
DemP 1 1 100
Ind. 9 12 75
TPP 21 178 11.8
SDPP/RPP 12 88 13.64
TPP 18 182 9.89
SDPP/RPP 12 65 18.46
TPP 18 135 13.33
MP 15 125 12
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WP
TPP
18
19
158
128
11.39
14.84145
the .IP-NTP-RPNP-NP coalition was as follows: 5.81, 18.18, 21.05, and 30.77. They rose 
sharply to 66.67 in 1975 for the NAP and to 100 for the RRP and the DemP in 1978. It is 
possible to formulate the existence o f a positive relationship between the bargaining 
power o f the smaller parties and the polarization o f the party system, especially in bipolar 
party systems. Because the smaller parties got a ministry for their every deputy from the 
RPP in 1978 compared to the concession o f the JP to the NAP(66.67) in 1975. It meant 
that the former as the Left-wing party had to give more concessions to the Right-wing 
ones for the coalition building.
Since the .IP leader, Suleyman Demirel was not deputy at that time the 
premiership was given to an independent deputy, Hayri Suat Urguplu, in 1965 and the 
coalition partners o f the TPP-MP and the WP-TPP coalitions agreed on the rotational 
premiership. Except for these three cases leaders o f the biggest parties always became 
head o f the coalition governments.
Ministries such as the finance, education, interior, and external affairs have 
always been the most important ones for all parties with varying size. The largest 
coalition actors received the ministries such as finance , education and external affairs 
before 1980.
There were always disputes between the parties about who would control the 
Ministry o f Education and the Ministry o f Interior. While the .IP was able to get the 
Ministry o f Interior in 1961 the NTP could not manage to prevent its control by the RPP 
in 1962. It was against the RPP's control, both parties reached an agreement and wrote
'“*^ 1 used approximate deputy numbers for the calculation of the coalition gains for thse coalitions that 
were formed in-between elctions. Premierhip was not included during the calculations for the last two 
coalitions because of its rotational status.
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down to the coalition protocol that the Interior minister would be appointed by the RPP 
after the coalition partners reached a consensus on the same person.
The Nation Party as the smallest partner o f the coalition in 1965 received the 
same ministry because o f its powerful bargaining position within the party system. 
Although the RPP declared before the coalition bargaining in 1974 that it did not give the 
political ministries the NSP got the Interior ministry as a concession at the end o f the 
bargaining.The  NSP rejected a proposal suggested by the RPP deputy Deniz Baykal to 
accept any other ministry. The NSP deputy, Oguzhan Asilturk, argued that 'the 
government has three feet; its political foot is the Ministry o f interior, the social foot is 
the Ministry o f Education and the economic foot is the Ministry o f Finance. If we do not 
receive one o f them we cannot set up a coalition partnership'. It continued to control 
this ministry during the National Front coalitions, although the JP and the NAP did not 
want to give this ministry to the NSP at the beginning o f the coalition bargaining before 
the Second National Front Coalition.
These patterns changed in the post-1980 period. While the TPP as the big partner 
got the Interior, Education, and Finance ministries the SDPP/RPP received the Ministry 
of External Affairs in 1991. The TPP leader, Demirel, did not give the Ministry o f  
Education despite insistence o f the latter on this ministry. Later on it gave up this claim 
but wanted to control one o f the three ministries which were the Ministry o f Interior, 
Agriculture, or Public Works and Housing. Finally it got the last one.*^ **
Due to the almost equal weight o f the TPP and the MP they shared four ministries 
equally. As the former received ministries such as education and external affairs latter 
got the finance and interior ministries. However, the WP had to make more concessions
'"**’MilUyet, .lune 17, 1962 and June 22, 1962. 
'‘*'^MiIliyet, November?, 1973.
'‘***.Mil]iyet, Januaiy 15, 1974.
'‘^ ‘^ Milliyet, .lune 15 and 17, 1977 
'^^^Milliyet, November 18, 1991.
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to its coalition partner- TPP because o f its captive status. Whereas the latter managed to 
control the Ministry o f Education, External Affairs, and Interior so as to pacify the 
reactionaries within it the former got only the Finance Ministry.
Political parties tried to control particular ministries which were related to their 
specific party policies. The JP got the Ministry o f Trade until 1977 when it became 
coalition partner. The .IP and the TPP ,as continuation o f the former, controlled the 
Ministry o f Education except during the RPP-.TP coalition. They also controlled the 
Ministry o f Health except during the National Front coalitions. In Western European 
coalition experiences that ministry was controlled by the Left-wing parties. Ekrem 
Alican, the leader o f the NTP, became the Deputy Prime Minister responsible from 
economic affairs so as to control the SPO. He did not accept the partnership until the 
RPP accepted such a condition.
The RPP and its heir, the SDPP/RPP received ministries such as the labor, public 
works, and foreign affairs whenever they took part in a coalition government. The NSP 
always controlled the Ministry o f Agriculture and the Ministry o f Industry. But the WP 
could not get the latter in 1996. Both the NSP and the WP always managed to receive the 
Ministry o f .lustice.
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3. 6. COALITION MAINTENANCE AND TERMINATION
Turkish coalition governments have had no permanent standing committee to 
solve problems between the members except for the one during the RPP-NTP-RPNP-Ind 
coalition. Establishment o f the standing coalition committee was demanded by the NTP 
to resolve conflicts among the partners. It consisted o f chiefs o f parties' parliamentary 
groups.*^' However, the NTP leader Alican sent memorandum to Inonu directly rather 
than to the committee in order to talk about the solution o f the problems that the 
coalition was f a c i n g . I t  illustrates the ineffectiveness o f it. Later coalition partners 
decided to set up a standing commission that was led by ministers from coalition 
partners to increase its power.
There have been no standing coalition committee or commission, rather coalition 
partners have preferred to form ad hoc commissions, including ministries from each 
party. Prime Ministers occasionally participated and sometimes headed them. They also 
met other party leader or leaders to reach an agreement to find out solution to 
problems.
As pointed out at the beginning o f this part due to the structural characteristics o f  
Turkish party system coalition governments have been either rightist coalitions or mixed 
ones. It seems very useful to look at the sources o f the problems that emerged between 
coalition partners at the ideological level.
'^'Milliyet, June 9, 1962.
' “^.Milliyet, December 25, 1962.
'^^Milliyet, August 21, 1963
'^^See liow coalition partners solve the problems Milliyet, April 15, 1974, May 21, 1974, November 22, 
1992, .Tanuaiy 16, 1993, Januaiy 24, 1993, and April 14, 1995.
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3. 6. 1. RIGHT-WING COALITIONS
Rightist coalitions embrace the four-party coalition in 1965, the First and Second 
National Front Coalitions between 1975-1977, the MP-TPP from March 12 to June 6, 
1996 and the WP-TPP minority coalitions from July 8, 1996 now on. The common 
characteristic o f all is that their aim was not the realization o f common policy targets; the 
uniting factor was rather the prevention o f the RPP until the 1980, o f the Islamic WP 
from coming to power, and the last one's sole motivation was to save Tansu Ciller, leader 
of the TPP, from the motions submitted by the WP.
The first one was the caretaker rightist coalition for approximately nine months 
before the general election, held in October 1975. Each party aimed at using state 
resources before the elections that would provide them with power during the election 
campaign. The small partner Nation Party criticized Premier Urguplu's visit to Moscow 
and its two deputies did not sign the cultural agreement between Turkey and the USSR in 
order to draw public attention before the general e l e c t i o n . T h e  coalition disintegrated 
with the election.
The second one was the National Front Coalitions that was set up to prevent an 
early general election and the possible rise o f the RPP. The government rejected the bill 
related to the early election in the Assembly five days after its establishment.'^^ Since 
there was no common policy agreement among the partners other than postponing the 
early election they immediately started to move independently to follow their individual 
party interests. As a part o f its individual party policy Suleyman Demirel, Chairman o f  
the JP, declared that the government reduced the price o f the artificial fertilizers and 
especially more reduction on the prices o f the fertilizer that is used in wheat cultivation 
between 43 and 154 kurus a kilo. He said that the government subsidized the farmers
'^ ^C. H. Dodd, Politics and Government, p. 157 and Milliyet, August 9, 1965. 
'^ '’Milliyet, April 18, 1975.
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with around TL five b i l l i o n . Wh i l e  the prices were going up in the world markets as a 
result o f rising oil prices the JP was aiming at recapturing its rural former constituency 
that had already been lost to the DemP and hence leading to the extinction o f the RRP, 
the NSP and the DemP. Moreover the government also increased the quantity of 
economic support for cotton producers as well as some agricultural producers without 
reflecting these increases to the prices o f the final produced g o o d s . B e s i d e s  these the 
government promised to clean all the debts o f the peasants.
The NSP used its pivotal role to force the .IP and other coalition partners to 
realize its individual party policies. Some of the conditions that NSP extracted from the 
.IP for the continuation o f the coalition was a curriculum based on moral values in 
national education, the establishment o f the State Industry and Investment Bank, 
relocation o f general directories, new cadres for the Ministry o f Industry , in return, the 
NSP did not obstruct the decisions o f the cabinet.*^  ^ The government could not 
promulgate the import regime on time because o f the conflict between the Ministry o f  
Trade and the Ministry o f Industry, since the former was controlled by the .IP and the 
latter by the NSP. As two rival parties the .IP and NSP could not agree on the location of  
any public project in two years, according to Barkey.'*’'^ Moreover the NSP did not sign 
the authorization about a ten per cent devaluation o f TL in September 1977. It was made 
by the Central Bank without the approval o f the cabinet.* ’^’ They did not have common 
decision-making mechanism nor was there correspondence among the partners, rather 
they behaved independently.’ -^ Ahmad states that political parties were behaving as they
'^ i^Vlilliyet, April, 20.
’-^”!VIilliyet, .Tune 22, August 6 1975, and April 20, 1976.
' ’^^ Milliyet, Novamber 7, 1975.
Barkey, The State and Industrialization Crisis in Turkey (Co\oïa.àe: Westview Press, 1990), p. 164. 
”’’F. Ahmad, The Making o f  Modern Turkey (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 167 and F. 
Ahmad, 'The Militaiy intervention and the Crisis in Turkey', in H. Ramazanoglu, eds., Turkey in the 
World capitalist System (MdevshoV. Avebury. 1985).
”’“M. Heper, recent Instability in Turkish Politics: End of a Monocentrist Policy?, Internationa! Journal 
o f Turkish studiesV  o \.\, No.l, Winter 1979-1980, pp.102-113, pp.105-106.
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were preparing for an election. They preferred short-term party goals such as creating job 
opportunities for party followers in the state bureaucracy. There were seventy thousand 
vacant civil servant positions in the bureaucracy. In addition to this, 224 thousand civil 
servants were recruited until the end o f 1977.’ 3^ -ptie number o f appointees within the 
first nine months o f the National Front Coalitions were 1497, o f whom 602 were upper- 
level bureaucrats. The number o f recruitment was 1286 o f whom 359 were upper-level 
during the RPP-NSP coalition.i^^
The .IP deputies were complaining about the cabinet. Despite Demirel's promise 
to revise the cabinet he did not fulfill his demand which created instability within the 
p a r t y . Hilmi Isguzar, the .TP deputy from Sinop, stated that the government was more 
like a federation rather than a coalition, each party was following its own interests. 
Similar to this statement, according to Mustafa Kilic, the .IP deputy, the government was 
not a coalition, it was a government with three heads; every party was governing by 
itself within the coalition government. He points out two reasons for this event one of  
which was personal disputes and the other was the NSP's attitudes within the coalition.
All these illustrates the two faces o f the problem: one was the NSP's attempt to preserve 
its identity vis-à-vis the .IP and the second one was desire o f all parties to allocate 
government resources to their followers. The NSP put more emphasis on industrialization 
policies because the other parties were also tolerant towards religion. In other words the 
religious theme lost its significance within the rightist coalition. In order to compensate 
this gap the NSP always created problems for the JP. The First National Front coalition 
ended with the early general election. The defections from the JP ended the second one 
towards the end o f 1977.
'^ ’^Hurriyet, December 13, 1978. 
'^ ’‘‘Milliyet, Januaiy 1, 1976. 
'^^Milliyet, September 29, 1977. 
i66Milliyet, October 27, 1977. 
'^^Milliyet, December 12, 1977
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The MP-TPP coalition was a compulsory co-operation o f the two center-Right 
parties, backed by a center-Left party to prevent the rule o f the Islamists and the union o f  
the center-right, as the leader o f the TPP stated.*^ ** It was dependent on the decision o f  
the center-Left DLP, especially on the privatization issue. The Coalition had already 
made a concession to the DLP by omitting a government target to privatize the country's 
social security institutions in the government program before the vote o f confidence.
The first problem emerged between coalition partners on the issue o f  
appointment o f key state bureaucrats like to the Central Bank, the Treasury and the 
Privatization Administration Board. Although the leader o f the TPP, Ciller, did not take a 
post in the government she had obstructed all the government decisions until her 
demands were met as the governors were appointed.
Meanwhile, the WP started motions to investigate alleged irregularities in the 
issue o f contracts by the state-owned Turkish Electricity Distribution Company(TEDAS) 
and the privatization o f the state shares in the Turkish Automative Industry Co- 
operation(TOFAS). While the former was passed by 232 votes against 179 in the 550- 
seat assembly on April 24, 1996 the latter was by 376 votes to 141 to set up a 
parliamentary probe about her.’'^ * The MP deputies also voted in favor which worsened 
the relations between the coalition partners.
The TPP's strategy was, then, to deadlock the government that would result in the 
resignation o f Mesut Yılmaz. So they could put the blame on him and hence could 
become the party that was not breaking the coalition in the eyes o f the public. It was the 
only way to escape the public punishment in the subsequent election.
'^^^TurkishDaily News, march 7, 1996.
'^ ’'^Middle East Monitor, Vol.6, No.3, March 1996, p.l5.
' '^^Turkish Daily News, April 12, 1996
'^’Turkish Daily News, April 25, and May 10, 1996. 
'^-Turkish Daily News, April 26, 1996.
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Another problem with her was the claim that she had allegedly misspent the TL 
five hundreds billion from the Prime Ministry slush fund.·'^  ^ Although President Demirel 
advised her to inform the Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz she rejected the idea and 
declared that the TPP would withdrav/ from the government. When the Constitutional 
Court invalidated the confidence vote for the TPP-MP government the Prime Minister 
Mesut Yimaz handed his resignation to President Demirel on June 6, 1996. Two weeks 
before the resignation o f the government the TPP's leader stated that
being a minority government it cannot carry out the functions of the state in
this situation..........  It is essential to form a majority government which can
work and solve the countiy’s problems. The DYP will give the necessary 
support to such a majority government.
Parallel to this statement the TPP did not hesitate to set up the TPP-WP minority 
coalition so as to save its leader from the motions rather than to produce solutions to 
country's urgent problems as claimed by its leader. Two problems emerged between the 
partners: one was each party's approach to the Kurdish issue another one was the 
Turkey's foreign policy directions.
Coalition governments could not work when all the Right-wing parties came 
together. Small partners became representatives o f interests o f small segments o f the 
society and directly transmitted them to the parliament, especially in the seventies. They 
followed their specific party ideologies strictly. Ideological rigidity increased when the 
number o f competing parties rose in the same period. However, all parties gave up their 
party ideologies during the coalition bargaining. Erhmann argues that
the gap between high sounding principles and the need for pragmatically based 
coalitions becomes painfully obvious. It makes ideologies appear as
'^^Turkish Daily News May 18, 1996.
•^ ‘‘Turkish Daily News, June 6, 1996 and see also Middle East Monitor, Vol.6, No. 7, .July 1996, p. 15. 
'’^ ^Turkish Daily News, August 7,and 8, 1996.
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subterfliges and convinces the voters that electoral contests are manifestations 
of sheer irresponsibility.^^^
Heads o f the coalitions could not control the ministers. They tried to fulfill 
demands o f the party rather than those o f the governmentsJ They became 
independent units within the federation-like coalitions.
3. 6. 2 MIXED COALITIONS
Mixed coalitions consisted o f the RPP-JP, the RPP-NTP-RPNP-Ind, the RPP- 
NSP, the RPP-DemP-RRP-Ind, and finally the TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition. It is possible to 
identify two kinds o f problems that emerged between the coalition partners. The first 
problem that they faced was related to the economic matters but the second one was a bit 
more complex one and related to political as well as religious affairs. Parallel to the 
mixed cabinet'coalitions, ad hoc Right-wing parliamentary coalitions have been the usual 
one during the deliberation o f substantial matters in the Assembly.
The amnesty question determined the life o f the first coalition with the economic 
ones. After the government had pardoned those who had attempted an abortive coup on 
February 21-22, 1962 the .IP's internal power balances changed that resulted in the 
increase o f the influence o f the extremists within the p a r t y . T h e  RPP consented a 
partial amnesty for the Yassiada trials, while other parties were claiming the release o f all 
prisoners.Whereas the RPP proposed a partial amnesty that would include those up to 
six years o f imprisonment before the October 29, the .IP pressed for the inclusion o f 
those up to ten years in the first stage and all the remaining ones in the next stage with a 
determined date. The difference between four years was the exclusion o f twenty-six
W. Eriimann, Politics in France Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971, second edition), p.203 
Petiy, 'The Role of the Cabinet Ministers in the French Fourth PRepublic', in M. Laver and K. 
Shepsle, eds., cabinet Minsters and Parliamentary Government (Cambrige: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), p. 132.4 
* *^^Milliyet April 14, 1962.
' ‘^-'Milliyet, May 2, 1962.
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persons.'®^ ® This illustrates that the JP moved according to the demands o f its 
constituency.
When the RPP and the JP met on May 3, 1962 they discussed economic problems 
. The JP claimed the abolition o f the declaration o f the wealth and cancellation o f the 
compulsory saving bonds. The reason for this was their promise to their electorate before 
the election. Another dispute between the parties originated from the working manner of 
theSPO.‘8'
The bill aiming at starting a probe about ex-DP deputies-Samet Agaoglu, Sitki 
Yarcali, and Esat Budakoglu for misusing their post was rejected by the votes o f the .IP 
and NTP. The RPP became very angry about this cooperation. Finally İnönü resigned 
on May 30, 1962.
The second coalition witnessed the same problems. Economic problems were 
related to the working manner o f the SPO. The leader o f the NTP claimed that the SPO 
was an advisory board that could not determine the proportion o f the taxes which was the 
job o f the Finance Minister.**  ^ The NTP had the fear o f being dominated by the RPP. 
Alican sent a memorandum to Inonu and proposed to act in cooperation.
There were two cases o f covert coalition in the parliament among the parties on 
the right side o f the bloc. While the NTP and RPNP deputies voted in favor o f the .IP's 
general amnesty proposal, they also voted against lifting the JP deputy Resat Ozarda's 
immunity.*®*^  This made clear that they naturally cooperated on issues that were 
substantially significant for them. Small partners withdrew from the coalition 
immediately after the local election held on November 17, 1963 to prevent further party 
losses.
'®^ ®®Milliyet, May 14, nıay 21, and may 22, 1962.
®®®®Milliyet, may 4, 1962.
*® -^Milliyet, April 26, 1962.
®®^ -*Milliyet, sepember 11, 1962.
®®^‘®MiIliyet, Januaıy 14, 1963 and July, mayl4, 1963. 
®®^ ^milliyet Februay 22, and May 14, 1963.
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The RPP-NSP coalition government experienced problems in ideological and also 
cultural areas. Twenty deputies o f the o f the NSP voted against granting amnesty to 
those who had violated the Articles 141 and 142 o f the penal code even though the NSP 
promised to vote in favor during coalition bargaining that took even place in the coalition 
protocol. Before the voting, one o f the NSP deputies argued that they could not forgive 
communists. ***<’ Like the NTP the NSP also tried to avoid the dominance o f the RPP. The 
party chose small but controversial issues to draw public attention like the party issues 
related to public morality, pornographic publications and movie films. The RPP 
withdrew from the coalition immediately after the Cypms victory to capitalize on its 
success in an earliest election which was necessary for coming to power alone.
The last coalition was between the RPP, the RRP, the DemP, and Independents 
from the .IP before the military intervention. The independent ministers behaved as a 
Right-wing party within the coalition. The acceptance o f the proposal given by the 
seventy-four RPP deputies which was mainly about the establishment o f the engine 
industry by the state created a government crisis as the independent ministries strongly 
reacted against the decision, The Industry Minister Orhan Alp, an independent deputy, 
declared that the RPP had to accept the powerful situation o f the independents within the 
government. The independent deputies were not responsible for the RPP's program, they 
had to wait until obtaining parliamentary majority to implement their program.**  ^ He 
started to behave independently after this event and in one o f his meetings with the 
industrialists he stated that 'you do not consider the SPO's plan s er i ous ly ' . The  six
'*^*’Milliyet, March 23, 1974
'**^Milliyet, September 16, 1974. 
'*^ **Hurriyet, Novamber 30, 1978. 
'*^‘-^Hurriyet, December 12, 1978. 
’ '^^Hurriyet, Jaiiuaiy 27, 1979.
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independent deputies were also against the modification o f Articles 141 and 142 o f the 
penal code.*^  ^ This coalition terminated after the by elections towards end o f 1979.
The last mixed coalition was between the TPP and the SDPP/RPP. They 
advocated before the election to change the constitution radically and to move President 
Turgut Ozal from the office. They declared a re-democratization program after the 
election with great enthus iasm.They pledged that civil servants would establish trade 
unions and the Higher Education Board would be abolished. However from its inception 
this time privatization and again critical political and social events for both sides affected 
the degree o f the compatibility between the partners The war on privatization and 
democratization between them lasted until the end o f the coalition in the form o f  
reciprocal bargaining. The TPP could not obtain any concession from its partner related 
to privatize the SEEs without giving some concession about democratization. It seems 
better to concentrate on the substantial topics, including the economic ones, about which 
the ruling TPP and the Right-wing opposition parties made co-operation.
The first one was that the TPP and MP back-benchers voted against the proposal 
that was given by the group deputy chiefs o f the two coalition parties. It was about the 
appointment o f the university rectors by President among the three candidates who are to 
be elected by the university staff. The Higher Educational Council would become 
ineffective with this proposal. After this event the TPP Chairman, Demirel, promised his 
coalition partner to correct this situation at the General Council but the same coalition led 
by TPP deputy Ayvaz Gokdemir rejected the same bill once again.
The SDPP was forced to make significant concessions in its proposal. It was 
about the changes in the Code o f Criminal Procedure which would increase the rights o f
Cumhuriyet, April 15, 1979.
'^-C. H .Dodd, 'Developments in Turkish Democracy', in V. Mastny and R. C. Nation, eds., Turkey 
Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power {Boulder. Westview Press, 1996), 
p. 135.
'‘-'^Milliyet .luly , 1992.
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suspects in detention forced substantial concessions. The reason for this was the tacit 
alliance between President Ozal and hard-liners o f the TPP.*^  ^ The TPP and MP 
conservatives brought an issue which was about not to include crimes under the realm of  
jurisdiction o f the State Security Courts(DGM) within the democratization package to the 
agenda in the Assembly, the arrangement was withdrawn back to the .Tustice 
Commission. The partners found a middle way which was about the redefinition o f the 
crimes and in return the extension o f the detention period, and the existence o f a ready­
waiting lawyer in terror crimes which was the TPP’s proposal, The MP, WP, and 
TPP back-benchers moved together to reject the SDPP bill under which May 1 would be 
made a public holiday despite some o f the TPP deputies’ supported to the bill.·^^
Conservatives o f all parties in the parliament, including those o f the TPP, 
reached an agreement to act together to remove the clause about the pro-shariah 
activities from the newly prepared anti-terror legislation. It was prepared by the mixed 
group o f the coalition partners .The  other problem with the anti-terror bill was that the 
exclusion o f a clause concerning anti-secular activities in the committee. The SDPP 
wanted the clause back in by claiming that anti-secular or Islamic fundamentalism was 
detrimental like the Kurdish nationalism for the state. The debate over the bill was 
delayed.* *^* The bill that would grant the civil servants union right was sent back to the 
Constitutional Commission as a result o f the proposal given by the TPP and MP 
deputies.'^‘^ Two parties made co-operation in the Assembly for the appointments to the 
vacant post o f the Radio-TV Upper Commission, five deputies from the TPP and Four
'‘-'^Briefing, March 8, 1993, Issue 930, p.7.
'^^Milliyet Novamber 16, 1992.
'‘■'^’Milliyet, March 11, 1993, and Briefing, March 15, 1993, Issue 931, p. 7. 
*^^Briefing, Novamber29, 1993, Issue 966, p. 4.
*^ *^ Briefing, December 1993, Issue 968, p.5 
’ ‘^-'Milliyet, May 5, 1994.
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from the MP were elected. The TPP had promised its partner to leave one post to it.“*'*' 
The twin center-right parties also cooperated in the Planning and Budget Committee of 
the parliament to alter some points o f the privatization bill.-®* Although the modifications 
were not very important they were related to the very basis o f their party philosophy. All 
these support the idea that Right-wing parties move as long as there is very threat to 
their material as well as ideological existence. However the cooperation was a temporary 
one rather than a lasting one due to the similarities o f their aim in the last instance. The 
other side o f the coin is related to the dependence o f the statist/leftist parties to the right- 
wing parties because they have been always controlled by more than two-thirds o f the 
parliamentary seats in both coalitions and constitutional amendments.
The TPP/SDPP/RPP coalition fell apart on September 20, 1995 due to the 
disagreements over some points like wage increases for the public workers, delay o f  
strikes, etc. Later on these two parties formed a caretaker coalition that lasted until the 
1995 early general election.
The mixed coalition experiences support the two-bloc character o f Turkish party 
system. Co-operation among the Right-wing parties at the parliamentary level rather than 
the governmental level was the result o f weak party institutionalization on substantial 
issues which have been especially economic and religious one. The statist/Left-wing 
parties have still been preserving their strict secularist attitudes and statist economic 
policies. Because two topics -privatization and democratization were the main source o f 
dispute between the TPP and the SDPP/RPP as representatives o f each bloc during their 
coalition. .lacobs argues that
the general approach o f Turkish political parties to the politics o f
democracy can be divided into three categories: short-run and
“' '^^Milliyet May 11, 1994.
“^ f^Milliyet, October 24, 1994.
-“-K. Saybasili, DYP-SHPKoalisyominun Uc K/y/(Istanbul:Baglani Yayinlari, 1995).
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pragmatic; middle-range and programmatic; and long-range and 
messianic. With rare exceptions, the first is the most prevalent in 
Turkish politics,....-‘^3
M. Landau, 'Coiilusion', in R. Tapper, eds., Ishm  in Modern Tuikey: Religion, Politics, and 
Literature in a Secular State {\ondo\r. I. B. Tauris, 1991), p.207.
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CONCLUSION
The thesis sought to an answer to the question o f whether Turkish coalition 
governments were office-seeking or policy-pursuing ones. Political parties were taken as 
the only actors and their aim and duties were evaluated, their manner o f working in 
Western European and in developing countries were compared in the introduction. Their 
behavior represented great differences in the two different contexts. Their manner o f  
functioning is important for their policy aims. In other words, their policies are especially 
short-term rather than longer-term in developing countries. Its effect on coalition 
formation, maintenance, and success were also evaluated which carries significance for 
Turkey as a developing country.
In the first chapter the coalition theories were revived and a theoretical 
framework was built. The second chapter concentrated on the experiences o f four 
European countries to show the influence o f the number o f parties, their relative position, 
individual party strategy, party structure and their ideology on the composition o f the 
coalition and its duration in order to compare Turkish case and find out a proper place for 
Turkish coalition governments in terms o f whether they were office-seekers or policy- 
pursuers. The third chapter tried to answer this question by considering all the factors 
that affected formation o f the coalitions and their success in the light o f the theoretical 
framework, developed in the first chapter.
It can be argued that coalition governments in Turkey were 'office-seeking' in 
general. Because most o f the cabinet coalitions were either minimum-sized or minority 
coalitions. Minimum-weighted coalitions were the JP-NTP-RPNP-NP(226 seats) in 
1965, the RPP-NSP(233 deputies) in 1974, the .TP-NSP-NAP(229 seats) in 1977, the
RPP-RRP-DemP-independents(229) in 1978, the second TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition(230) 
in 1993. They either could just provided the parliamentary majority or their total number 
o f seats was slightly over the required limit, the highest number was 233 among the five 
coalition experiences.
There are three cases o f minority coalition governments which were the .TP-NSP- 
RRP-NAP in 1975, the TPP-MP in 1996, and finally the WP-TPP coalition that was 
established in the same year. In other words, nine coalition governments were 
numerically weak ones in the parliament out o f twelve. It meant that coalition 
governments could not initiate to change the constitution or to make substantial policy 
shifts. They were dependent on the parliament in all their moves because o f their 
precarious majority. Although coalition partners knew that their coalition would be 
ineffective in the parliament over the most significant issues they formed coalition 
governments. Then, by looking at the numerical data about the coalitions it can be argued 
that four-thirds o f the coalitions that were set up until now were office-seekers. Their 
first and foremost aim was to control the government rather than to produce solution the 
country's problems by establishing powerful government coalitions.
Four surplus majority coalitions were formed which were the RPP-.IP(331 seats) 
in 1961, the RPP-NTP-RPNP-independents(266) in 1962, the TPP-SDPP/RPP(266) in 
1991, and finally the TPP-SDPP/RPP(247) in 1995. The first two coalitions were the 
compulsory ones rather than the result o f the natural process. Political parties like the .TP, 
NTP, RPNP accepted the partnership o f the RPP because o f the military fear. But the JP 
rejected the idea o f the national coalition even in such situation. Rather it preferred to set 
up a coalition with the NTP. However, in all European countries political parties formed 
grand coalitions, including all the parties after the Second World War. This has not been 
the case in Turkey yet. Their reluctant attitude resulted in the regime breakdown in 1980.
Their office-seeking character can also be verified qualitatively in addition to the 
quantitative verification. As indicated in the third chapter situational and motivational
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factors affected their decision to participate or not the particular coalitions. The first two 
surplus majority coalitions were the last options and unnatural ones or they were 'shot­
gun' coalitions. The aim o f the JP was not policy but to gain legitimacy and to obtain a 
general pardon for the ex-DP members from the RPP. Besides the motivational factors, 
comparison o f the compatibility variables related to the coalition parties supported the 
great differences between the coalition partners in terms o f party ideology and goals 
which were revealed during the election campaigns, party stmcture, and their 
constituency.
The only target for the four-party coalition in 1965 was to be in power before the 
general election and to prevent the RPP's control the government. The coalition was a 
caretaker one rather than a policy producing one. It was an office-seeking one because 
the NTP had not accepted the JP's partnership after disintegration o f the second coalition 
government in November 1963.
The coalitions like the RPP-NSP, the RPP-RRP-DemP-independents, the TPP- 
SDPP/RPP in 1995 the were the last remaining options. Their target was not carrying out 
common policy objectives. While the last one was a caretaker government the first two 
had no ideological similarities. The DemP did not accept to make coalition with the RPP 
in the immediate aftermath o f the 1973 general election and even it rejected the idea o f a 
creation o f a caretaker election government with the RPP after the RPP-NSP coalition 
fell apart in September 1974. Although it had only one deputy in 1978 it participated the 
coalition. Likewise, though the RRP had left the RPP because o f its leftist policies in 
1967 it did not hesitate to take part within the same coalition with it in 1978. The same 
conditions were also true for twelve independent deputies as being members o f the .IP 
before establishment o f the coalition. As secularist and religious parties the RPP and the 
NSP came together to create a coalition in 1974. The latter had heavily criticized the 
former for its leftist policies before the election.
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For the parties that took place within the WP-TPP, the TPP-MP, and the so-called 
First and Second National Front coalitions the most preferred party policies had no 
significance. While the TPP and the MP agreed to create a coalition so as to prevent the 
pro-lslamic WP coming to power. However, the public statements made by the TPP 
deputies and its leader supported the their office-seeking aims. Because they stated 
during the coalition bargaining with the MP that if  they could not form coalition with the 
MP they would accept the WP's partnership. Similar to this case the National Front 
coalitions aimed at controlling the government instead o f accepting the RPP's dominance 
to it. The first coalition was set up to save the TPP leader from the motions, started by 
the WP leader.
The only coalition government that was set up with great enthusiasm was the 
TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition in 1991. They came together to carry out their party programs 
which were revealed before the elections like democratization, solution o f the problems 
such as terrorism and unemployment. Coalition partners had different ideas about 
economic as well as political issues. Privatization and democratization were the two 
permanent sources o f dispute between the coalition partners. Despite the fact that this 
reality was known by the coalition partners before the coalition and also became obvious 
immediately after the formation o f the coalition they continued the partnership for five 
years. They could not carry out any major policy objectives within these years. Then, it 
can be deduced that if  their aim was not to realize common policy objectives the 
remaining answer was the control o f the state resources.
The source o f disputes among the parties during bargaining supports the office- 
seeking nature o f Turkish coalitions. Disputes among the coalition partners originated 
from the distribution o f ministries rather than from policy disagreements. Coalition 
partners always formed the 'roof o f the coalition before preparing the coalition protocol. 
The only policy dispute was between the RPP and the NTP over the control o f the SPO 
and the role o f the state in economy during the bargaining.
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In general two motivations- party gains and maintenance o f the party identity- 
determined the composition o f the coalitions, their duration, and coalition success. The 
vital problem for the political parties in Turkey which led to the predominance o f these 
two factors during coalition bargaining has been weak party institutionalization. A short 
history o f multiparty politics in Turkey, military interventions and the closure o f political 
parties by the army, and rapid social change prevented the consolidation o f the country­
wide party organizations, parties could not control their volatile constituencies. They had 
no regular party members to finance their expenditures like their Western European 
counterparts. Once they were in power they preferred short-term policy objectives to the 
long-term ones which were essential for the immediate control o f the volatile 
constituency.
Small parties as the newly emerged ones always considered to protect their party 
identity vis-à-vis their bigger counterparts and also their twins. This was the case for the 
NTP, RPNP NSP, NAP, RRP, DemP in the sixties and seventies. The smaller parties 
like the DLP and the GUP did not accept to take part in the coalitions that were 
established in the first half o f 1996 to secure their identity by avoiding the possible 
strong criticisms o f their twins such as the RPP and the NAP. Even the big ones such as 
the TPP could not continue its coalition partnership with the MP for the same reasons.
Party motivations concentrated on the positions and targets such as depriving 
one's worst enemy o f control the government rather than on common party policies. For 
this reason they failed to succeed in finding solutions to economic as well as political 
problems Turkey has been facing.
Turkish party system is similar to the Norwegian one, both systems have had no 
center party like the DC in Italy and the CVP/PSC in Belgium. There was no permanent 
party in all coalitions. The significant difference between the Norwegian and Turkish 
cases was that whereas the former had institutionalized parties the Turkish ones could not 
consolidate their organization due to the military interventions. While the Right-wing
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parties gave outside support to the Labor minority governments in Norway their Turkish 
counterparts formed the Nationalist Front coalitions to prevent the rise o f the RPP. For 
this reason Turkish coalition experiences were similar to the French cases between 1945- 
1958 period. There were large number o f small parties which became representatives o f  
interests o f small segments o f the society. They transmitted them to the parliament 
especially in the second half o f the seventies. They formulated and decided policy and 
acted as the principal agents in mobilizing for their proposals and actions. Policy 
differences between the ministries within the same government has always been the case 
in Turkey. Coalition members not only populate the state but also they penetrated 
society. They behaved independently in the coalition to consolidate their party 
organization. The reason for this kind o f behavior might be the lack o f clear-cut 
government opposition divide in the Turkish context as the four-party coalition in 1965, 
coalitions that were established in the second half o f the seventies and the WP-TPP 
coalition supported this reality. Another reason may be weak institutionalization o f  
political parties and an immediate need for control o f patronage .
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